


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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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**THE IDEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF
PERESTROYKA**

**The Transitional Period: World Experience and
Our Problems**

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May 90 (signed to press 15 May 90) pp 3-14

[Article by N. Naumova, leading scientific associate,
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[Text] What is the transitional period? What reality do we find ourselves in and move with? Studying the transitional period is a complex task, since it relates to the strict dynamism of processes, outdistancing our thoughts, as well as to the strong (both voluntary and compulsory) inclusion and involvement of each person within it. Unpredictably affecting everyone's vital interests, we cannot regard them aloofly and soberly.

In the literal meaning of "transitional period," we usually mean an extensive and structured present, located "between" the past and the future: something determined by the past (by the cause) and by the future (the goal). However, both the past and the present are indeterminate for the transitional state of a social system. The past is interpreted over and over again, becoming "unpredictable:" after all, if the past has only one meaning, we can move in only one direction, toward a future without alternatives. This is precisely why serious debates about our past keep arising and are not coming to a halt. People are looking not only and not so much for the truth, as for a substantiation of an already-chosen future. The future (the social goals existing in social awareness) is not simply contradictory, but also torn to pieces, since integration in society is weakening and society is not gathering the necessary critical mass of commonly accepted values. No society whatsoever can develop normally without this mass. Today, the need to "gather" manifests itself in the debates, which sometimes seem scholastic, on socialism and communism, in the touchingly abstract references to common human values, as well as in the persistent idealization of national history. Moreover, the concept of social goals changes dynamically after a struggle and the "victories" of group interests...

Maybe it makes sense to define the transitional period as an independent state of a social system? It should be distinguished not only by its own internal properties, but also by its place in the continuous stream of history. Stable, inert periods of development coincide geometrically with the line of the completed historical process,

where the severed, "nonviable" branches can no longer be seen. Transitional periods travel "at an angle" to this line, since they are full of abundant and chaotic processes going in various directions with regard to the trend that is taking shape. In this sense, the transitional period is like a "bridge along the river" which carries the sum total of historical events. It may or may not have obvious human meaning, social functions or a historical future. That is why it is so hard to understand.

It is impossible to define the content and direction of this stream on the whole. However, unquestionably, the entire, accelerating process of modernizing society, the structural perestroika of the economy and the new scientific and technical information wave are laying the "track" for it today. Such restructuring and modernization take very diverse forms. The period up until their conditional end, i.e., until the country starts a new level of steady economic growth, as well as until the stabilization of social and political structures, is usually called the transitional society or transitional period.

In most countries (with the exception of a few of the most developed ones, such as the U.S., Japan, the FRG and Great Britain) these transformations have the nature of "modernization in pursuit," to use the jargon of modern sociology of development. As a rule, this is a long-term and diverse process, sometimes lasting the lifetime of a man or a generation. In characterizing the social forms and content of these periods, we must speak primarily of the degree of their strictness, the size of social costs, and the social "price" paid for a possible long-term socioeconomic gain (even if not implemented everywhere). We must remember that, according to the assessments of authoritative researchers (for example, Nobel Prize winner Jan Tinbergen), many countries which are modernizing "in pursuit" will be unable to catch up to the most developed countries in terms of the standard and quality of life. The less successful the structural rebuilding or "tardy" modernization is, the greater the probability of a subsequent lag and the appearance of "relapsing" modernization—inefficient, at a high social "price," and with a constant need for new "leaps."

Our transitional period is a state of active "lagging modernization" from above, politically, a structural rebuilding of the economy and attempts to include ourselves in the new technological wave. The main task is to avoid the vicious circle of "relapsing" modernization (or maybe to get out of it), to constantly seek a certain, nearly unattainable optimum in the necessary rates of economic and political reform, as well as an acceptable social cost for them.

Among the positive factors of our modernization are sufficient natural resources, the absence of foreign dependency, and the interest of, essentially, the entire world in the success of our perestroika, in an economically developed, politically and socially stable Soviet Union. The political and economic (for now, weak) activeness of the intelligentsia is very important. The

existence of a large, sufficiently skilled working class, insufficiently organized for the protection of its own interests, is a positive factor in the first, most difficult stage. However, the lack of organization may be a negative factor in the next stage, when successful economic development presumes an increase in the share of the national income earned by hired labor, i.e., a consistent struggle for such redistribution. Let us hope that we have already undergone the most difficult historical form of "tardy" modernization in the 1920s-1930s and that we will succeed in using this experience. Apparently, the negative factors should include the size and ethnic and cultural diversity of the country (its poor controllability), increased ecological limitations on industrial development, and the "squeezing" of the resources of the countryside. In this area, it is hard simply to evaluate the specific features of a culture, our society's systems of norms and values. This is a complex problem requiring fundamental (above all, sociological) study. Here, we cannot make do with either the edicts of "lazy parasitism" or of "collectivism in stages," or with emotion on the subject of selflessness, patience and commonality.

Contemporary "tardy" modernization adopts various forms depending on the level of the country's economic development, its natural and human resources, the nature of its culture, and the specific features of its political system. However, in any case, it is a special, independent state of a social system, with its own logic and mechanism of development. What determines the effectiveness of this system? What determines whether it will lead society to a new level of development or to a vicious circle of feverish, "relapsing" modernization?

In this sense, the world has accumulated enormous experience which is actively used in the context of the politics and sociology of development. Some of the observations obviously have some things in common with our reality. We must interpret them in the context of our unique historical situation, so as to not repeat the mistakes of others, since, it seems, we will have enough of our own. Today, it is especially important to single out the key social problems, the solution of which is impossible without a combination of world experience and historical creativity (without which we cannot manage).

Contemporary works on development sociology¹ note that the most important social prerequisites for a successful transitional period are **mobilizing social potential, shaping a flexible, dynamic social structure, and ensuring positive interaction with the external (international) environment.** However, the basic prerequisite is efficient **social management**, preserving the controllability of the social system.

The mobilization of social potential, i.e., of the population's total energy, can only be successful if the motives for socioeconomic activity, which are necessary under conditions of modernization, are shaped and developed. It is believed that the most effective motivation in this case is entrepreneurial. Private interest is the social form of this motivation. It is based on the market method of

obtaining income (not strictly related to labor effort) and on the strongest "cumulative advantage:" private ownership of the means of production and the possibility of using hired labor. A sufficiently large stratum of entrepreneurs is formed on this basis. In turn, an elite (big businessmen, managers, specialists and experts) is singled out, which acts as the strongest factor in activating economic development.

The difficulties with such a method for mobilizing social potential, primarily related to the fact that developed, i.e., effective and socially acceptable entrepreneurial motivation is formed far from immediately. For instance, in developing countries today its initial forms are inefficient due to a strong dependency on foreign capital and (or) on the local state bureaucracy, the orientation only toward super-profits because of the inclination to turn accumulations into property, instead of capital, or to transfer accumulations abroad.

The classical characteristics of an entrepreneur are considered to be (starting with the works of Max Weber) a rational attitude toward the world (values and standards), a high level of aspirations, willingness to take risks, and full responsibility for one's fate (rejection of social protection). The most contemporary features are high political culture, economic competence and legal awareness.

Contemporary experience, including ours, indicates that legal awareness is the hardest to form. In the first stages, there is a predominance of mercenary interests, craftiness, violence, erosion of standards of conduct, corruption and favoritism. Political activeness appears fairly rapidly. For instance, according to data from the VTsIOM, under the AUCCTU and USSR Goskomtrud, among the goals for which cooperative workers are uniting and consolidating their forces, the "political protection of cooperative workers (by nomination of people's deputies)" took first priority by a wide margin—90 percent of those surveyed—and "legal protection of cooperative workers"—80 percent. The research that we have begun on entrepreneurial motivation shows that the need for economic competence is not great at present, since it is still possible to make do without it. The rational attitude toward one's activity is sometimes violated by the uncontrollable aspiration for self-assertion and raising one's self-appraisal. However, the most serious shortcoming from the viewpoint of economic efficiency is the irrational, guardedly aggressive attitude, sometimes observed here, toward hired labor and its organized social activeness (strikes, trade unions, workers' associations, etc.).

The legal awareness of our entrepreneurs is often structured on a "double standard:" in certain social relations (with friends, family, associates) the law and "rules of the game" are observed, and in other relations, they are not, or not mandatorily. Such legal "looseness" is, of course, linked to the "shadow" origins enterprise here. This connection continues to be socially dangerous due to the active use of corruption, violence and other types

of illegal and socially unacceptable behavior, involving increasingly greater numbers of people in its sphere. Moreover, the "shadow" morals, accustoming one to super-profits, provide no entrepreneurial motivation for being truly economically efficient. However, the question of whether a corrupt, shadow stage is necessary remains open. It is hard to determine whether it is expedient to utilize this specific form of original private-enterprise accumulation in order to avoid solving the serious problem of said accumulation at the expense of workers and peasants. It can be assumed that a more efficient and less socially dangerous shadow form of private interest will begin when its link to the state and political apparatus starts to break and the influx of specialists (intelligentsia) into it increases.

The intelligentsia's role in the transitional structures of societies which are modernizing is discussed in connection with this. This role is especially great with large lag in modernization, when a strong class of private owners and strong, skilled and well-organized hired labor have not yet been formed. There are two ways of including the intelligentsia in the processes of modernization. The first, effective way is to unite intellectual labor with private enterprise and the development of free professions. The second, relatively ineffective way is related to the advantageous inclusion of the intelligentsia in political and state activity, turning the intelligentsia into a political and administrative elite of functionaries. Precisely this trend prevails here now, although an influx of the technical intelligentsia into enterprise is also observed. It seems that inclusion in the state and political structure usually increases the intelligentsia's separation from the masses, creates a feeling of its weakness and isolation, and is accompanied by an irrational attraction to charismatic leaders.

Another way to mobilize social potential is to shape and enhance collectivistic motivations and directions. These are based on the values of collective interests and responsibilities, social duty and social equality. Collective interest can only be based on a system of compensation which is linked strictly to labor efforts, and on public (collective) ownership, aimed at mass forms of labor activity. Most Western sociologists believe that collective interest, as opposed to private, is a less natural and weaker form of economic interest. Therefore, the basic ways to mobilize it are the influence of political organizations and the mass information media, nationalistic, populist and socialist ideology, socioeconomic promises, and the influence of charismatic leaders and various elites (religious, cultural, etc.). Some Soviet researchers adhere to this viewpoint (see, for instance, the article by Yu. Levada, "The Dynamics of Social Breakthrough: Possibilities for Analysis," *KOMMUNIST*, No 2, 1989). However, several others currently are focusing attention on a search for forms of social ownership which can create a truly collective nature (see, for instance, the article by S. Alekseyev, "Democratization of Ownership," *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, 6 September

1989). It is a question of a kind of social relation which will shape collective interest as an effective motive for economic activity.

The psychological prerequisites for this have been retained and have deep roots. First, the orientation toward collective forms of economic management, ownership and labor organization predominates. According to the results of a VTsIOM survey, the majority (72 percent of those surveyed) approved of the existence of enterprises belonging to labor collectives or leased by said collectives; at the same time, roughly one-third related positively to cooperative enterprises, as well as to enterprises belonging to individual citizens or to foreign companies. Second, we must keep in mind that a complex kind of motivation took shape during the difficult years of our history. It does not fit the classical Western (or rather, North American) scheme, where motivations for "achievement" (efficient work), based on individualism, are opposed by a motivation for "membership," closely linked to psychological inclusion in a group. Incidentally, the Japanese type also does not fit this scheme. According to numerous observations made by our sociologists, directly collectivistic, rather than individualistic orientations are characteristic of the most efficient workers.

It should be noted that any method for mobilizing social potential is effective only when a social consensus is created (among various social groups, between the state and trade unions, between entrepreneurs and trade unions, and between private and state sectors). The use of cultural and ethnic traditions of conscientiousness, diligence and discipline (Japan) may acquire special significance. Many researchers note that under certain conditions authoritarian (even totalitarian) regimes are effective for mobilizing social potential, not only due to strong ideological influence, but also because they guarantee a compulsory consensus ("order").

However, the development of political culture, of a "culture of citizenship," and of the masses' active participation in political and economic decisions plays a decisive role in solving the consensus problem. It is assumed that political culture is not synonymous with the political system. The former is the system for the individual's perception and comprehension of the sociopolitical world, a kind of "information map" for evaluating his world. The main role in shaping these perceptions and assessments belongs to the mass information media (therefore, in particular, they are often called the "fourth estate"). A mixed, heterogeneous political culture is typical of transitional societies, both in terms of content, as well as structure, i.e., according to the correlation of known and estimated elements. The political system here is surrounded by an atmosphere of unpredictability and explosiveness, particularly due to the weak differentiation of political roles. For example, we can observe how our opposition cannot limit itself to the role of criticizing the government, offended that "it does not listen" to them, while the government is trying to play the role of critic, exposing and revealing that for

which it ought to answer. Legislators cannot restrain themselves from constantly interfering in the actions of the executive bodies. Meanwhile, the latter secretly remake the laws by using directives. All of them together happily experience an insuperable attraction to the excellent role of prophets, of spiritual leaders, alas, a role not belonging to them.

Therefore, one of the basic tasks is to develop the "culture of citizenship," in which the "mania for destructive participation" is balanced by "passivity, trust, a capacity for subordination to authorities, restraint, moderation and self-control," which should not, however, prevent one from standing up for one's interests and seeing to it that they are taken into account. At the same time, some researchers note the possibility and, in a number of cases, effectiveness of "tardy" modernization implemented "from above," predominantly via political means.

A flexible and dynamic social structure is the second basic prerequisite for society's efficient conversion to a new qualitative state. To form such a structure, it is necessary to create and expand a middle stratum, a middle class, as a constant source of economic activeness, and to increase their role in society and in the economy. In a modern society, this is possible on the basis of long-term state policies (tax, investment, etc.), aimed at raising the share of those who have "average" incomes (in a very broad range, of course), and ensuring vertical mobility.

According to one viewpoint, sufficiently numerous unrooted ("without roots, without kin or tribe") groups, which identify themselves with neither a family nor a community, but with a class or professional group, are needed for vertical mobility, forming a "modernized" type of personality. These might be intellectuals oriented toward "foreign" values or semi-intellectuals, as well as "foreigners" or "migrants." There is another viewpoint that relates economic and socioeconomic ascent above all to national (ethnic) revival.

Two fundamentally different stages are usually observed in the process of creating a "middle class." In the first stage of "tardy" modernization, i.e., in the transitional period, social differentiation increases. This is due, above all, to the strengthening of spontaneous processes in the distribution and redistribution of social wealth. Such processes, as everyone knows, develop according to law that "the rich get richer, and the poor—poorer," in the direction of increasing social differentiation and social inequality. In a transitional period, this is related to the inevitable lag in the social infrastructure under conditions of radical restructuring of the economy, to the need to freeze wages, and to the growth of inflation and unemployment. Often, the need arises for a serious curtailment of social programs. Moreover, economic reform, as a rule, is aimed at enhancing entrepreneurial activity, in the sphere of which incomes are always distributed less equally, than in the sphere of hired labor. The concentration of income among the wealthiest 5

percent of the population is stronger in countries with predominantly private enterprise, than in countries with a mixed economy and large state role. The strengthening of spontaneous differentiation at this stage is not controlled in practice, since such control may prevent the accumulation of capital, increased investments in economic development, and economic activeness on the whole.

However, the growth of inequality in itself is seen as a negative factor that destabilizes society. The assumption that increased differentiation positively affects the worker's payment not only is not discussed in contemporary literature, but is not even advanced. The last attempts seriously to consider this dependency occurred in the mid-1950s. To make up for it, the opposite influence, reducing inequality while raising the level of economic development, is being discussed quite extensively.

We know that the link between economic growth and the distribution of income in society is nonlinear in nature. Along with an increase in the average per capita income in a country (per capita GNP), at first there is an increased differentiation of incomes, but later (in the 1970s, this turning point equaled an average income of 300-700 dollars per capita) there is a reduction in differentiation. This means that the transitional period has ended and that modernization and the political and economic reforms are beginning to bear fruit. The reduction of inequality occurs due to many processes: structural changes in the economy (decreased differences in payment for labor among sectors and within them), scientific and technical development, which opens up new economic possibilities (high-paying jobs in particular), growth in the population's educational level, which facilitates vertical mobility, and an active redistribution (above all, tax) policy, which is characteristic of developed countries. As a result of all this, the share of income which is distributed more equally (wages, salaries, etc.) in society increases, and the share of unequally distributed income decreases.

However, this process does not occur automatically, merely following economic growth. The state's social policy and the political factor on the whole have great significance. The appearance and strengthening of social-democratic and socialist parties as defenders of the interests of hired labor, above all, forming a highly-paid working class, is an important process.

Some Western researchers believe that rapid industrial growth in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe after the war was in many ways related to an active policy aimed at reducing income disparities, expanding the opportunities to obtain an education, lessening differences in the prestige of physical and non-physical labor, and decreasing the transfer of inequality from generation to generation. However, this was a short-term effect, since structural inequality did not decrease in proportion to industrialization and political stabilization, but grew, and new privileges took shape.

Our middle class is very small, no more than 20-30 percent of the population, or by some estimates, no more than 15 percent. It is weak and, in terms of its professional make-up, a large share of it consists of workers who are not highly skilled (for instance, highly-paid workers in especially difficult and dangerous industries) and are not related directly to economic activity (the administrative-party apparatus). Moreover, the privileged strata of our society ever more "reproduce" themselves in the next generation, making these strata ever more "closed." All this means that in practice the middle class has ceased to perform its basic social function—to accept the most active people, to create a possibility for social advancement and vertical mobility.

In the period of stagnation, the "inheritance" of social position and protectionism led to the fact that our traditional apparatus (administrative-party) social "elevator" began to function worse. Free vertical mobility was pushed ever more into the shadow and semi-shadow economic sphere. A new middle class of active people was created. However, because of its specifically criminal nature, it once again consisted of people with inadequate professional skills, leaving out the better entrepreneurs and skilled workers.

If the natural and necessary trend toward expansion of the middle class and reduced differentiation does not make a way for itself at the start of the transitional period, an "irrationally modernized" society arises, economically inefficient and (or) socially unstable. As a rule, the inflexible behavior of the political, economic and administrative elite is the social cause of this. It makes effective social policy, aimed at blocking the inevitable social tension of a transitional period, impossible. The elite's irrational behavior is expressed not only in growing corruption, but also in a lack of desire to "share" their growing incomes with the middle strata (entrepreneurs and skilled workers). Hence, the growth of inequality, constant (open or concealed) political instability, extraordinary situations, overthrows, and changes of regimes.

Positive interaction with the foreign, international environment is the third important prerequisite for successful "tardy" modernization. In a transitional period, both the socioeconomic and the geopolitical aspects of this interaction are important. The former is related to the fact that a society which is modernizing, as a rule, requires economic aid from more developed countries. In certain cases, the process of modernization is generally impossible without such aid, and in others—it strongly facilitates the process. However, it is common knowledge that the more pronounced the "development," built on foreign loans and by attracting multinational corporations, the more difficult the transitional period is in a social sense. The strengthening of social tension, which even without this accompanies modernization "in pursuit," is intensified in this case by the fact that society is being restructured "selectively," only where this is profitable for those helping the country or for an international financial organization. Therefore,

intersectorial, inter-regional and "inter-strata" inequality increases. A debtor state, as a rule, does not have possibilities for successfully blocking the social instability that appears due to this, compensating for disparities. This is not only because financial and economic resources in a transitional period are quite limited, but also because the international organizers-creditors (for instance, the World Monetary Fund) set the rejection of state regulation of incomes and prices as a direct requirement. Moreover, foreign capital can actively enter into a union with the local state elites against local entrepreneurs, as well as with the latter against the former. In either cases, it complicates the achievement of a consensus in society, needed to mobilize social potential, and the integration of society's forces. Therefore, the purposeful state regulation of the process of foreign economic interaction and its consequences is also necessary.

The second, geopolitical aspect of interaction is related to the fact that (according to many researchers) the "tardy" modernization of society, if it is done in an accelerated manner with great absorption of resources, low yields and internal conflicts, is a basic source of international threats. Some researchers even believe that fascism and its consequences were the result of "tardy" modernization in the backward countries of Europe at that time. Therefore, developed countries try not to become greatly involved in the chaos of modernization "in pursuit." At the same time, they are forced to assist in it, so that internal conflicts do not grow and splash outside. Thus, the world community is forced to treat transitional, modernizing societies variously, internally contradictorily. Therefore, the reaction of transitional societies to the international environment cannot be simple, consistent and linear either. It tends either toward situational solutions, or toward very non-traditional strategies (the "new thinking").

Finally, there is management, the most important factor in a successful transitional period. Analysis of processes related to the mobilization of social potential, to formation of a flexible social structure, and to interaction with the environment confirms the special role of management. However, the question of what precisely its specific nature consists of is not simple.

We must consider the fact that transitional social systems are very dynamic and unstable. If management does not cope with instability, does not find compromises for constantly changing and conflicting interests of different groups, and does not control the situation, a social crisis will arise, the basic manifestations of which are a distrust in social institutions and an increase in crime and violence. In addition, an irrational growth in the trust of individual social institutions is characteristic, for instance, in our time, trust in the mass information media and hopes for the media's direct interference and assistance. Obviously, they can in no way compensate for distrust in other institutions, and their own information functions may collapse under this

burden. In a complete crisis, the entire system goes beyond the management's control.

"Crisis" crime is not simply an increase in serious and organized forms of it, but also the loss of control over it. "Crisis" violence is also a consequence (although, in addition, also a cause) of the social system's uncontrollability, of the ineffectiveness of social institutions. Under these conditions, violence becomes an increasingly widespread means of solving social problems, resolving social conflicts, and supporting group and individual interests.

Another possible consequence of the instability and shakiness of transitional structures is the appearance of an authoritarian regime. The possibility of this lies not only in people's psychological reactions to a crisis situation, in their aspiration for social decency, reliability, and predictability at any price. In the opinion of some researchers, it is more important that, in unstable situations, such a regime can be functional and is "not the worst variant."

For instance, the connection between the nature of the political regime, income disparity, and collective political violence (possibilities of "revolution from below") was studied in 49 countries. It was discovered that collective political violence often arises with an increase in income disparity. The connection between violence and the degree of repressiveness of the political regime (lack of guarantees of political and civil rights) is more complex. However, a political regime has a certain critical state in which it is weakest, since it is switching from a state of low repressiveness to high, or vice-versa. Therefore, serious political instability is most likely when a regime of "average" repressiveness (neither democratic, nor totalitarian) appears against a background of increasing income differentiation.

What characteristics should social management have, such that the transitional period will be effective and will be able to bring society to a higher level of stable development?

A precise answer to this question sounds rather paradoxical, because the primary goal of management in a transitional period is to stimulate, to ensure and to protect economic reforms: it should concentrate its attention on the problems of social stability. The appearance and escalation of instability is the most severe limitation to a dynamic, internally contradictory and hard-to-control process, such as modernization and the radical restructuring of economic relations.

Social tension and conflicts in a transitional period are related mainly to the inevitable sharp increase in social differentiation and a possible reduction in the standard of living. However, the source of instability is not so much these processes themselves, as an acute violation of the existing, customary balance of interests among different social groups and an unsuccessful search for compromise.

This happens as a result of the purposeful or spontaneous actions of a certain group or groups, striving to change the balance in their favor, to "hog the blanket." We are seeing precisely this process in the discussion of many laws at the USSR Supreme Soviet meetings. However, a different, more radical situation is possible, in which the balance is violated "by itself," due to objectively determined changes necessary for society and for "everyone." As a result of such changes, someone suddenly loses, while someone else gets an opportunity to gain. This is quite typical of transitional periods, when economic mechanisms (for instance, forms of ownership), legislation, and political institutions are changing.

Social institutions must constantly seek and suggest a new balance, and culture, as a system of values and standards of conduct, must adapt people's concepts of social justice to the new situation. We are seeing these concepts become ever more rigid, even if it is because social comparison is becoming more intense. This universal process, needed by a person in order to orient himself in the social world, occurs everywhere and always, even on an uninhabited island, so long as there is one Robinson Crusoe there who has not forgotten about the big world.

Social comparison will not lose its regulating strength, as long as we have not denounced envy, the "green eye disease," and "looking in others' pockets." However, in a transitional period this process becomes more extensive and more contrasted, since it is increasingly harder for a person to understand in what direction society is changing. A comparison reacts not only to the real position of other social groups, but also the level of their pretensions ("seek that which you wish"), their possible profit, and their probable profit: rational management should take this into account.

The difficulty of finding a new balance of interests relates to the fact that "tardy" modernization does not recognize the classical "Pareto's optimum," in which no one loses, but someone still gains. It always (mandatorily, in the first stage) occurs at someone's expense. It is a question of sociodemographic, socioprofessional, and socio-income groups, not simply of "poor," "lazy" or "incapable" workers. The first modernization in England and our modernization in the 1930s occurred by no means at the expense of "poor" peasants, and the last structural rebuilding of England's economy occurred by no means at the expense of the "worst" miners. The amounts of this expense depend primarily on objective conditions: the country's level of economic development, degree of technological backwardness, and the duration of the transitional period. The lower the economic level, the stronger the lag and the longer the transition (i.e., the slower the rates of economic growth), and the greater the number of people who pay, and to a greater extent, for said modernization.

Of course, "subjective" factors are also significant: state social policy and the activeness of various social groups, the appearance of new, fairly unpredictable social

unions. For instance, we observed the interaction of striking miners, who only recently had demanded the closing of cooperatives, and the USSR Union of Associated Cooperative Workers. Let us note the real fact that the cooperative bank is already offering generous financial support to the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic. This attests to a rapid change in the correlation of interests, as well as to the rapid reaction of groups to such a change. Therefore, it is hardly worthwhile to attempt beforehand "theoretically" to determine which social groups will gain or lose from restructuring and which blocs they will join.

Under such conditions, social management usually proceeds from several basic elements. First, it tries to determine how influential and "dangerous" the losing groups are for social stability and, depending on this, compensates for their losses. Second, in as much as possible, it resists the pressure of all groups, but especially of those on the right and left political wings, since these wings presume, as a rule, the least stable balance of interests. Third, it hastens to stabilize economic structures. This is especially important because only on the basis of such structures are rational group interests and pressure groups formed which are capable of constructive talks, compromise, and achieving a stable balance. Fourth, by strengthening democratic institutions it shapes a pluralistic society (in the precise, political meaning of the term), in which political processes are orderly and are an expression of the ordered interaction of organized and conscious group interests.

It should be taken into account that even the presence of pressure groups by no means ensures that the interests of all strata of society are represented and considered in the political and economic processes and decisions that shape social policy. Such a guarantee the more so does not exist, if such groups have not even formed. From this viewpoint, the poor representation of certain basic strata in our society (youth, workers, peasants) in the echelons of power which are being formed is an extremely undesirable phenomenon which provokes the use of strict and illegal ways and means of pressuring the balance of social interests.

The feeling that the economic reform and, with it, society is on the verge of seriously, with all its might, rushing toward social restrictions, also creates a stereotype in mass awareness, expressed in the images of an "abyss" (which we "cannot cross in two leaps") or a "burning corridor" (which we "must run through as quickly as possible"). However, we simply cannot leap over or run through this most unstable period. It requires not jumps, leaps or bounds, but precisely central, intricate management, movement "along the knife edge." The basic conditions of such movement, it seems, are as follows:

First, overcoming management "by restriction." This may create the impression that the management process is not well-considered, "has no concept," "has not formulated its goals," etc. However, "backsliding," even

revoking recent resolutions, is an inevitable and necessary reaction on the part of management when it encounters the undesirable or dangerous social consequences of its own actions. Especially if it has approached the critical values of social parameters. A prediction of these dangerous consequences (which our people's deputies, for instance, demand so frequently and persistently) is by no means always possible, since a transitional system is a "non-linear," unpredictable, "unformed" object.

Second, we need an efficient management structure in time, i.e., the singling out of qualitatively different stages in a transitional period. From the viewpoint of management, conversion to the next stage is a change in priorities and in the criteria by which social processes are regulated. Such well-considered, consistent change makes the system more flexible. Therefore, the argument "just yesterday you stated what is most important..." becomes obsolete in a transitional period before we even set it in motion.

The rates of restructuring of economic, political and social structures and institutions is a most complex problem in "tardy" modernization. The basic, objective requirement is that they should ensure a continuous (albeit somewhat) economic growth and social development. In principle, modernization is a long-term process, but the need to accelerate it may arise, so as to more rapidly obtain economic results and thus alleviate growing social tensions. However, as world experience shows, the strict, accelerated models being suggested in these cases (rapid accumulation of capital, freezing of wages, uncontrollable growth of prices, holding back the development of social protection, the ban or strict control of trade unions, etc.), although they accelerate the process of modernization, are fraught with serious instability. At the same time (as is also apparent from experience), attempts to lessen social tension otherwise, through slower modernization or structural rebuilding (for example, by gradually replacing old structures with new ones) cause, as a rule, attacks against the state, trade unions, and certain political parties or social groups as being to blame for slowing changes and for the appearance of crisis situations. Demands may intensify to reject state interference in the economy, to curtail social programs (as a source of "social parasitism" or, as we put it, "dependency"), to give "free play to market forces," and to strengthen the discipline of hired labor. This is also fraught with social tension. Therefore, the problem of rates happens to be closely linked to management "by restriction." Apparently, accelerated modernization is possible not by jumping through stages, but by reducing the duration of each stage.

Third, a rational assessment of the placement of social forces (we are not concerned with political forces, which is a special problem) is very important, as well as difficult, since the mass awareness of transitional periods successfully imposes a sharply estimated picture of these forces. Left and right, minority and majority, active and passive, supporters and opponents—in general, the good and the bad: what is there to argue about here? Today,

however, while two people might begin an argument, any third person might turn out to be good for one by all criteria, but bad for the other.

Even if this estimated division conforms to something, we must realize that the specific social content of any of these assessment groups (in other words, the representation of real social groups in them, and precisely this is important for social management) continually and rapidly changes. This is natural, since joining such a group, as a rule, is only an outward expression or method (not always adequate) for defending one's social interests. The latter are not determined by a person's objective social position or his membership in a certain social group. In a transitional period, the picture of social forces and interests is eroded not only because the social groups themselves (their membership, structure, organization, role in social division of labor, etc.) and their interests are changing dynamically. The groups that are starting to win are interested in having their gain look like a gain for everyone: therefore, they protest against "setting some groups against others." It could, moreover, be shown that, for the vitally necessary consolidation of society, we should not emphasize differences in the social position of people (especially workers), in standards and quality of living, and in interests. However, this is a mistake.

Today, in a society that is becoming more political, solid and effective consolidation is possible only on the basis of acknowledging the differences in the interests of social groups, on the basis of the rational formulation and support of these interests, and with the help of a persistent search for the elusive balance among these interests.

Footnote

1. See, for example: Almond, G.A. "Progress and Its Discontents." Univ. of California Press, 1982; "Development Theory: Four Critical Studies." D.L. Lehman, editor. 1979; "Disparities in Economic Development Since the Industrial Revolution." Macmillan, London, 1981.

Analysis of literature on development sociology was devoted to a number of INION reviews: see, for instance, the review by L. Volkova, "The Theory of Modernization. A Review of Liberal Views on Sociopolitical Development" in the collection "Kriticheskiy Analiz Burzhua-znykh Teoriy Modernizatsii" [Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Theories of Modernization]. INION, Moscow, 1985.

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Human Dignity and the Meaning of History

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[Text] The question of the meaning of history seems so vague, broad and, strictly speaking, inexhaustible, that its formulation may seem useless. It is one of the so-called accursed eternal questions, almost unanswerable, but persistent: What is life and the development of human society, what is truth, good and evil, love, and what is the meaning of man's existence? Nonetheless, we are committing a kind of act of self-betrayal by avoiding these "vague," abstractly general and, moreover, perplexing problems in our own thoughts, consciousness and feelings. For, by avoiding their formulation, somehow we acknowledge the meaninglessness of existence and daily life and unwittingly give everything good and sacred to us in this world and in ourselves to the kindness of concepts on the absurd.

If existence is meaningless, is it generally worthwhile to live, love, and devote one's efforts to anything? The concept of meaningless life is an ethic, or rather, an anti-ethic that sets first priority on an unbridled delight in material wealth and the hunger for power. However, if one sees in all surrounding reality only a collection of objects and things, which it pleases us to delight ourselves with and to command, only a chaotic set of objects for caprice, we inevitably fall into a state when meaning and purpose, the beauty of nature and man, the works of man's hands and his spiritual creations begin to be perceived as something semi-spiritual, immediate, and worthy of exclusively egotistical use. Then the vital, organic connection to the world collapses and no pursuit of delights and power whatsoever can restore it. In satiety with or bitterness against the world only one thing remains: consoling oneself with aphorisms about life as being thoroughly meaningless, the vanity of vanities...

Consequently, the question of the meaning of existence, and thus of history as well is an urgent question for man. It is urgent because, thinking about it, he sometimes saves himself from self-isolation, from egotistical opposition to everything around him. Existence, which presumes meaning, is worthy of respect. It is also important that existence is given to each not only and not so much as a theoretical abstraction, a point for discussion, but also as a living diversity of specific phenomena, full of definite historical events and real, unique human faces. Each of us is a real part of and genuine participant in this by no means abstract existence, which Goethe once likened to a living fabric. However, if the living of fabric of existence includes man as a self-aware entity, internally correlated to others, consequently, our inner life and our connection to other people should be meaningful and worthy (i.e., moral) in nature. The meaning of existence and man's moral attitude toward life, other people and himself, in the final account, are inseparable.

This is the most general theoretical premise for our future consideration of the problem.

However, before speaking of the meaning of history, we must define the concept of history in its most general outlines.

In the works of Herder, Hegel, Marx and Engels, history is treated primarily as the "history of people." History is thus interpreted as a special, human measurement of existence, in the form of a sequence of epochs, generations and human accomplishments. The Egyptian pyramids and ancient Russian cathedrals, Biblical phrases and Pushkin's lyrics, stories of ages long past and our senior contemporaries' living testimonials of the Great Patriotic War or the horrors of the concentration camps—everything in the past and present has a kind of inter-connecting, intimate relationship to each of us, although not ever, one is able to decipher it and experience it internally. This is a profoundly human relationship. Each person grows through the millennia not only biosomatically, but also spiritually: the universal and eternal baton of linguistic, social and cultural experience is passed along through each of us. It did not begin with us and, we hope, it will not end with us. The realization of our own momentary, yet nonetheless deeply personal involvement in this baton relay and, consequently, of our responsibility for its future path is, at the same time, an indicator of the level of man's historical awareness, the level of his spiritual and moral condition. We are born, we live and we die in history, i.e., in the conscious succession of generations.

While experiencing daily relations with those around us, while experiencing our own inner lives, with one or another profound understanding, to one or another degree of gratitude, we experience everything good and beneficial that was included in history by previous generations, and we bitterly disentangle the consequences of previous mistakes and failures (to recall a Biblical phrase, we are tormented by the aftertaste from the sour grapes our fathers ate). True, the difficulty is that the specific circumstances of past and present life are so multifaceted and conflicting, so confused in their premises and motivations, that it is sometimes hard to measure them by today's yardsticks, especially so with directly linear, black and white evaluations. Of course, history knows absolute monsters and scoundrels, and it also knows people who are morally beyond reproach. The content and structure of any historical phenomenon or event are extremely diverse and internally contradictory in terms of elements and connections.

Rather, if it is a question of the complexity and confused nature of specific historical phenomena, we should not dwell on one radical aberration in historical consciousness, which we often have to encounter both in historiography, as well as in literature and everyday life. The most perplexing problems of history tempt many to conclude that it is essentially chaotic and, consequently, meaningless. However, its pain and contradictory nature are far from always meaningless: even the creators of the ancient Greek tragedies and the Book of Job realized this. The meaning of many things and events may be understood and expressed with difficulty, but it does exist. Rejecting the meaning of existence and, with it, the meaning of history leads us, as already noted, to devastating cynicism.

An even more terrible tribute to the concept of life's meaninglessness is the aspiration to treat the content and predetermination of existence's historical measurement prematurely and simplistically, to thrust the missing meaning on reality in its development and movement. Simplifying the problem may cost mankind even more than simply denying the meaning of history.

In this regard, glancing into our country's recent past and reading the numerous texts left for us by Stalin's political mythology, one discovers with horror that there was a definite "historiography:" even though it was inhuman and primitive, it was consistent and well-considered in its own way. Its creators, distorting Marx's views, saw all of mankind's past experience as only the "prehistory" of communist society, the basic meaning of which, in dogmatic thinking, is only the class struggle. They assumed that everything hindering advancement toward "genuine" history must be destroyed, annihilated. For the sake of its efficient implementation, the entire fullness of power in a definite (or rather, indefinite) historical period should belong, with some provisions, to an organized and centralized apparatus of "Genuine Experts on the Meaning of History," who have taken the responsibility for turning "prehistory" into "real" history.

In fact, however, the uncompromisingly materialistic promises turned into a mystique of unlimited power for individual people.

In my opinion, we should not absolutize the connection of the social mystique that existed with the previous tradition of Marxist thought. After all, the "mystique" of the Stalinist historiosophers ignored one of the all-round and highly significant schemes of the entire collection of works by the founders of Marxism—from Marx's early works to Engels' last works before death. It is precisely: settlement with the injustices of the past should not only include decisive social transformations, but also the profound cultural continuity needed for the proper life of future generations. In particular, P.V. Annenkov wrote of this in a letter to Marx on 28 December 1846, in which he stressed that the meaning of changes in "social forms" lies in the people's aspiration to protect themselves from the threat of losing the "fruits of civilization" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 27, p 403).

To some, the theme of continuity may seem purely academic and doctrinal. However, its vitality and indestructible nature have made themselves known since the first days of our revolution. Millions of sacrifices, irretrievable losses in cultural memory, and social and ecological disasters have paid for the "concrete" consistency in rejecting the past in both theory and practice. It was a consistency, irresistible to some, fascinating others with its pretensions, and paralyzing still others with horror. The teaching of the meaning of history as an organized, forced breakthrough from the fading class "prehistory" to "real" history, full-fledged and classless,

could not help but display an aggressive denial of mankind's traditional spiritual and moral legacy: according to this teaching, it had to be overcome as "drivel," "metaphysics," and "religious superstition." Some tolerated the legacy of the past only as an emasculated attribute of state grandeur or, as happened with religious institutions at the start of the Stalinist period, as a somewhat useful, although also somewhat dangerous tool for political and psychological manipulation.

One way or another, however, for instance, by permitting selected publications of Hegel's works or a very small circulation of Tolstoy's philosophical works, subscribing before the world to a love of humanism and democracy, and releasing clergymen and the creators of science and culture, guilty of nothing, from the camps in homeopathic doses, the adherents to the teaching of history's "concrete" class-related tread thus indirectly acknowledged that mankind's pre-October development and, consequently, history as such are indestructible, that the hasty claims of the simplicity of truth can neither exhaust, nor eclipse the problem of the real meaning of existence. Thus, the nagging question of what history is has remained open.

As everything knows, the question of the unity of universal history was raised in European culture under the influence of Christianity. Substantiation of this thesis is a subject for special discussion and not within the scope of this article. Nonetheless, let us note that the theme of the meaning of history came into world culture precisely with Christian universalism. This does not mean that the ancients and the Eastern (for instance, Chinese and Arabic-Islamic) cultures had no profound speculations on history. Of course they did. The elements of the discrete analysis of sociohistorical phenomena developed by the historiography of the ancients and the East have not lost their value even today. However, the idea of history as a continuous unity, occurring in stages and having to do with the fate of all people and of every human spirit, was developed mainly in Christian patristic studies (St. Augustine, the *"Areopagitica,"* etc.). However, a tormenting question came with this theme: If the One God, having renewed and spiritually reunited people in Christ, is leading mankind to the overthrow of evil and death, why is there so much injustice and evil in the world, particularly in the historical fates of peoples and of society? How can a good God tolerate such a quantity of evil?

In traditional European culture, for a long time the question of the meaning of history was predominantly a question of evil and suffering, and was interpreted, above all, theologically.

In time, the medieval world outlook collapsed under the blows of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. The secularized 19th century preserved the traditional understanding, but moved the examination of the question from the theological sphere to, above all, the anthropological and consequently, also the sociological spheres: How does man create evil and tolerate it

in history? Precisely this interest in the human sources and manifestations of historical evil was typical, regardless of all their differences, for the works of many 19th-century thinkers: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Feuerbach and Marx, Dostoyevskiy and Tolstoy.

Nevertheless, for the people of past centuries the problem of substantiating the meaning of history was not as keen, as it is for those living in our century, already drawing to a close. Before, historical life, even with all its disruptions and evil, did not seem so problematical. Only the paradigm of thinking has changed. The traditional European culture identified the idea of historical meaning with that of a definite Kingdom of God, while the 19th century identified it with the concept of Progress. Yet, the reader has probably already noted that the above-mentioned "concrete" teaching was nothing more than a simplified version of the old teachings of a joyous Kingdom and progress, wittingly or unwittingly adapted to the sociohistorical realities of the early 20th century.

Near the end of our century, on the eve of a new millennium, the ardent interest in the meaning of history was sparked, as opposed to previous centuries, by the fact that not simply the concepts of separate aspects of people's historical life (moral, socioeconomic, esthetic, etc.), but also history itself as such turned out to vacillate. Today, its integrity in an epoch of world wars, cultural barbarism, ruthless dictators, genocide, and ecocide and its future development have been called into question.

How do we discover the meaning of historical movement among all this "plague-ridden" nonsense? Is it possible to overcome the latter? How do we find the internal connection to everything creative and spiritual that was displayed in man's historical life in the past, which is unquestionably being revealed again in the merciless present, and which might show up in the future, if only we have it? This is the persistent theme of works by various, dissimilar 20th-century thinkers: Benedetto Croce, Henri Bergson, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Robin George Collingwood, Karl Jaspers and many others. It was also central to the works of two of our countrymen, who unwillingly abandoned their country, Nikolay Berdyayev and Pitirim Sorokin.

As far as I remember my historical and philosophical education, one unchanging thought was persistently instilled in us. Its essence reduces to roughly the following: the citizens of the world's first land of socialism have no intellectual grounds or moral rights whatsoever to take seriously either the thinkers listed here, or their views. The concepts which they developed are beyond the framework of "concrete" historiosophy, so the whole circle of their ideas is knowingly condemned and insulted as reactionary, idealistic and other criminal things.

Indeed, the works by these thinkers contain a number of debatable, paradoxical and sometimes even shocking theses, especially for us, raised in the spirit of Stalinist ideological fideism, which was called Marxist conviction for some reason. We believed in linear progress, but they, emphasizing the repetitive nature of historical situations and thus asserting the legitimacy of historical typology, relativized the concept of progress itself. To us, therefore, they seemed its enemies in general. It was beaten into our heads that "the individual is nonsense, no one is irreplaceable." Yet they claimed: History is inconceivable in isolation from the inner experience of the individual human spirit and personality. We saw this as an almost zoological individualism. Essentially, we were brought up on the absolutization of struggle and violence (Marx's conventional image of violence as the "midwife" of history was interpreted distortedly as an immutable dogma). They insisted, in particular, on the possibility of the spiritual resistance of evil as the most important structural element of history, while we perceived them as insidious compromisers, irresponsible conciliators.

I repeat: This does not mean that the works of these thinkers are irreproachably correct. They were and still are a source of many theoretical debates. However, this is a separate topic, since it is hardly expedient to list the debatable aspects of their work in this article. Let me note only (fully, it seems to me, in the dialectical tradition of both Hegel and Marx) that the development of human culture and, with it, of history on the whole is inconceivable without certain "distortions" and "deviations" in the area of the human spirit. When things suit our tastes, we rejoice, we see an unquestionable rightness in them and we make haste to identify them with our own interpretation of the vital needs of historical life. In the opposite case, we repudiate them and often bear them malice, seeking out all possible intrigues and the machinations of our enemies within them.

In our enthusiastic credulity or, conversely, in our rapid embitterment against ideas or opinions that are unpleasant for certain reasons, one can glimpse a distinct hint of the fact that a person, with his limited space-time framework and social, intellectual and cultural experience, does not pass through the expanses of history with a master's iron tread. No person is the absolute master of the circumstances of his own life and activity, the more so of history. Rather, he is a responsible participant in it. Precisely this is, in a most general form, the formula for human dignity, a formula directly related to the concept of the meaning of history. However, we will say more about this later. Meanwhile, there are a few considerations on what the philosophical historiography of the 20th century, which we formally spurned, offered for understanding man's historical condition.

No matter how diverse the views on one manifestation of history or another may have been, whatever the proposed forms for its periodization and articulation may have been (large universal-historical epochs, civilizations, phases of social development, etc.), history, with

its integrity and specific qualities, has a certain general spiritual content. This lies in the fact that historical existence and historical time are not experienced by man as something external, isolated from his inner life and his spiritual condition. To a significant extent, the objective processes of history are mediated by the human personality, because they occur through his intimate world, his individual experiences and concealed inner conflicts. In this sense, history is personalistic (from the Latin *persona*—personality). History is completely independent of human arbitrariness, but, in developing and internally enriching itself through the person, it always has his unique face.

As soon as man, in all his specific manifestations, participates willy-nilly in the continuous baton relay of the generations, the living transfer of their consciousness and deeds, and as soon as this continuity determines the specific nature of historical life, then objective universal history simultaneously acts as the personal history of each individual. The sphere of truly human interactions among people, appearing in this regard, is always determined to one or another extent by its participants, by the specific features of their personalities and characters. In this interpretation, history, like the "history of people" (Marx), is the sphere of human interaction, and in this regard it is understood in its special temporal, historically prolonged, centuries-long measurement. The personality does not dissolve completely in this sphere but, conversely, determines its specific nature in many ways.

Of course, it is impossible to retain all the personas from thousands of years of history in our historical awareness. A large segment of mankind that has left the face of the Earth is not reproduced in popular legends or historical studies. It is rare that one of the participants in a historical drama receives his deserved glory for even a century. Nonetheless, many of those who gave creative meaning to the fates of their contemporaries and descendants are famous. For example, we revere the names of Socrates, Shakespeare and Pushkin. At the same time, we also remember names that are said and will be said for centuries with horror and repugnance. Petty, ambitious people, adventurists and egomaniacs who have claimed a significant place in history sometimes surface for an instant in historical memory. However, all the hundreds or, at best case, thousands of them among millions and millions have left us. The history of mankind on the whole is anonymous. However, the anonymity of the historical process does not eliminate the question of the personal, individual nature of history—its human spirituality.

In order better to clarify this thought, let me refer to a discourse by the 17th-century French scientist and philosopher Blaise Pascal, which was later refined in the last century by our contemporary, Petr Chaadayev. Both philosophers believed that the successive replacement of people is permeated by the community of the work of consciousness, which lasts for centuries. Of course, the activeness of the human spirit is determined in many ways by the activeness of the most profound and gifted

people, but it is also true that there are no inert souls and minds, souls standing outside the unity of human thought and psychology, beyond the unity of interaction.

No matter how cruel one or another historical state or event may have been, no matter how alienated and oppressive the power of certain social or spiritual trends in social development may have been, man cannot be self-alienated from historical life. The paths of history run through each of us.

There is a certain fundamental duality to our cast of mind. On the one hand, we are turned toward our direct social environment (family, small groups, society), and on the other—toward ourselves. However, the experience of external interaction and the experience of innermost life (that which, in the jargon of 20th-century philosophers, is often called subjective time or duration) are inseparable. Inner life is far from a passive reflection of external conditions. Being shaped by a number of diverse and sometimes contradictory natural, social and spiritual prerequisites, in the final account, it takes on the features of a sort of unbreakable, self-preparing and self-leading integrity. The human personality is formed through inner experience and its ceaseless correlation to the world of other circumstances. Yet, the personality, having realized itself and answering for itself, ceases being a slave to the "environment," its automatic functionary: it does not unwittingly subordinate itself or mindlessly oppose historical circumstances, but itself becomes a part of them. At least, it does so in the sum total of circumstances under its direct auspices. If not for this gift, the world long ago would have suffocated from time-serving and baseness, and would have been socially and spiritually degraded. Thus, existence in its historical measurement is not simply reflected in or realized by the personality, but is re-created and substantiated in it and through it. Outwardly weak, statistically imperceptible and quantitatively incommensurate with the enormity of history, the personality is qualitatively equal to it in a certain sense. After all, the one does not exist without the other.

In this connection, we can scarcely agree with the statement that freedom is merely a realized necessity. Rather, it is the realized possibility of the subject of will, feeling and action to implement his dignity in the world, to rise above the shameful status of a foolish puppet for other factors and conditions. In our debates, by eliminating from history the personality's profound inner content, a content which is not superficial and is hard to reconstruct theoretically, we thus risk emasculating everything important that it carries along from generation to generation, for instance, values and the concepts of honor, conscience, law, justice, charity and creativity. So, wittingly or no, both in theory and in practice we are banishing the basic core, the idea of human dignity, from the concept of history, which means that we are depriving it of meaning.

In our opinion, it is proper to draw the following two conclusions from everything said. First, from the viewpoint of understanding history, human dignity and genuinely human interaction among people are actually inseparable concepts. Dignity is not asserted through inner emptiness or meaninglessness, just as through misanthropy; it is inseparable from and is implemented only through interaction; it is the spiritual correlation of man to man, of man to existence and, thanks to this alone, of man to himself. From this viewpoint, the concept of human dignity and of the human in the personality are synonymous.

I especially insist on the importance of singling out these inseparable concepts, since I see this as security for the adequate comprehension of history precisely as a process of continuous interaction among people, unfolding in historical time.

Second, an attempt to answer the question of the meaning of history proceeds from the previous thesis. It could be defined as the implementation of personal dignity in the continuity of the historical experience of generations which replace each other. We have already noted its organic link to the world of true values: spiritual, social, moral, behavioral, intellectual and aesthetic. Man's struggle to assert and develop the profoundly moral, higher values of life is, essentially, the process of implementing the meaning of history. The more so, since man himself is typified by an immutable inner historicism. The world of truly humanistic, non-imaginary values never has existed and does not exist in any worthy community as something once and for all prepared, frozen, and dismissed.

The values of past and present life cannot be mechanically copied, since they exist in human spirits as something profoundly inborn and personal. An ineradicable act of creativity, love or charity, sanctifying and illuminating the decades and centuries, the collective experience of the world community, is always profoundly individual, is always correlated to the unique manifestations of the human mentality, to a unique social and cultural environment. It goes without saying, one or another act of self-sacrifice or compassion may be reproduced in various excerpts from history, but the people who accomplish them are unique both in terms of their external conditions of life, as well as in terms of their internal states. For instance, artists from different historical epochs have tried hundreds of times to depict the very same image of the Madonna. However, regardless of the identical theme, its embodiment, passing through the innumerable unique internal worlds of genuine artists, has enriched human life with the inexhaustibility of new content.

Consequently, the meaning of history (equivalent to realizing man's moral-humanistic and creative dignity in the historical process) can also be defined as the assertion and development of history's property, reflected in the concept of the "multi-unity" of "the history of people."¹

History consists of human interaction. Genuine interaction, touching the heart of the human spirit, is inconceivable without some temporal measurement of it. The three measurements of historical time (past, present and future) should conform to three forms of interaction, most secret, internally full and, moreover, far outstripping biological, social and other empirical frameworks, which I call **filiation, fraternity and paternity**.

Let me dwell in more detail on this triad of concepts, which grows in many ways from the old Russian philosophical tradition. In this respect, of course, they are substantiated in their own, new way.

Filiation. It was mentioned above that each of us develops through the millennia. For those living today there are centuries and centuries of biological, linguistic and sociocultural evolution, centuries and centuries of history of nature and of society². We have received the tremendous material and spiritual wealth of our world from previous generations. We are linked to the thousands and thousands who have passed away—known, but for the most part unknown to us—through profound relations of filiation. Among the great-grandparents of each person, there are an innumerable number of people with different social and ethnic origins, beliefs and traditions. Each of us is connected to them by an amount of biological, psychological, familial and sociocultural continuity, by the commonality of language and homeland.

However, it seems to me, the connection of filiation is not something automatically given to a person once and for all. In order to understand and assert it in life, he should develop within himself a feeling of nobility, reverence and compassion for the fates of the people who preceded him. However, this is not all. A person must experience this feeling of filiation not only with regard to his direct ancestors—relatives and fellow countrymen—but sometimes even to representatives of other regions and peoples whose accomplishments are, in one way or another, an inalienable part of his inner experience.

The creative achievements of those who left us long ago can be transmitted and are transmitted through the thickness of time, from people to people, from continent to continent. Gratefully received far from their places of origin, they are capable of inspiring, it would seem, a genuinely filial reverence in the minds and hearts of others. It is no accident that Dostoyevskiy admired Cervantes; it is no accident that many leaders of the Russian social movement related with filial reverence to the British ideals of legal freedom, or that artist and thinker N.K. Rerikh united the spiritual legacy of both Russia and India in his own inner experience. This is the most spiritual filiation, related to an awareness of the fact that we answer for everything that has reached us, for the inherited world and for our own honor in this world, which is one of the important characteristics of the universal meaning of the human personality and, at the same time, of history as the successive and realized interaction of the generations that replace each other.

Fraternity. This is the immutable principle of the relation of people horizontally in time. This principle presumes not so much even the biogenetic unity of the human race, as a profound and complex kinship in people's psychological and spiritual organization, a kinship without which the possibility of inter-human interaction is inconceivable either within a small group, or in the context of inter-group relations. The possibility of an unshakable contract, a consensus among people, the possibility of the transfer of artistic and other images, scientific ideas and moral values from person to person, group to group, and people to people—all this unambiguously confirms the profound kinship of the participants in continuous history, which may sometimes seem stronger than external barriers.

In earlier days (and, unfortunately, sometimes in the present day), the idea of all-human fraternity became part of ordinary awareness with the greatest difficulty, since a different person, dissimilar to oneself, was above all an extraneous fellow-traveler and nothing more. The dignity and human essence of the "foreigner" has always seemed debatable and conditional. Nonetheless, the idea of all-human fraternity (equal in strength to the ideas of the unity of human nature and the commonality of the dignity of all peoples) was imminent in history long ago. True, previously it could have been seriously experienced and interpreted, perhaps, only by those who usually are called the select—prophets, philosophers and poets. However, under present conditions, when any thinking man can ascertain through experience the smallness of our planetary home and the inseparability of its inhabitants' fates, the idea of the relation of different fates and of all-human fraternity is becoming understandable to many and being recognized as an imperative for the survival of the entire human race. That which was once only an abstract, although high spiritual truth, is now entering the realm of common sense, becoming a vital alternative to the still-possible destruction, the still extant danger of universal destruction. It goes without saying, not all of this path is smooth. Cases in recent history attest that contemporary awareness of the truth of fraternity still comes with difficulty: the element of hate, of ethnic intolerance, in particular, is still too strong in the world. However, in this case let us recall Hegel's severe verdict: "The worse for the facts." After all, it is also human dignity to know how to see the difference between the truth of self-awareness and the deformities of external life.

Paternity. If we do not lead the human race and our planet to destruction, then (one would hope!) future generations will follow us. Each of us has a physical, a social and a spiritual forefather. We are related to our children through bonds of paternity, just as our historic predecessors are related to us. The time of paternity is a time of responsibility for the future. We are far from master of the conditions of our life. However, in many ways the fates of our known children, and of those unknown due to historic distance, in many ways depend on how we conduct and will conduct ourselves under the conditions offered to us by history.

Each generation is a link in the chain of historical continuity. However, the relations inherent in it are not re-created by themselves, since human self-awareness, words and actions, conscience and creativity, and other manifestations of the personality that are part of immutable historical circumstances play a tremendous role here. In other words, there is freedom for man's inner self-determination, which organically incorporates itself in the conditions of history. Yet, historical necessity is not given apart from our own inner freedom. In choosing for ourselves under specific circumstances, we are thus also choosing the method for our influence on our children's fates. Later, they will judge us, their fathers, and thereby also the whole history of the world that they will inherit from us. A natural question arises: Will we really leave our children a world where social oppression, ethnic hate and ecological decay still weigh heavily on life?..

The theme of historic responsibility for the conditions of life today and tomorrow is linked to the problem of the meaning of history, of human dignity and the interaction of people. Over the course of centuries, the morally interpreted, innate tie among them inserts elements of collectivism and spiritual unification in the temporal continuity of existence, often breached by mutual misunderstandings, rivalries and hostility. Strictly speaking, this transforms the sequence of generations into a history, full of meaning and open to understanding, in which man perceives the past, witnesses its present results, participates in the present and thus takes part in people's future fates. In short, the inherent conflicting nature of history and the possibility of overcoming it are not mechanistic or biological, but sociospiritual in nature.

The history of the great human family inherently includes conflict, just as the fate of any family has conflict. Of course, it is silly to deny the presence of conflicts, especially in the material, social or sociopsychological areas of historical reality. This is obvious. However, we still know little about the spiritual, semantic conflicting nature of history. It is hard to understand the living and the spiritual, since it is always unique. There cannot be complete coincidence, complete reciprocal harmony among personalities, self-awarenesses, and individual and group values. History is full of the conflicts that arise here, and it develops through them and through their resolution. This is an immutable fact. It is almost beyond the strength of a person living in a world of external circumstances to free himself of involvement in inter-individual and inter-group conflicts in the spiritual sphere. Intense study of historical existence shows that its living fabric is constantly tested, that the tendencies of continuity and accumulation of spiritual values are accompanied by tendencies of alienation, sclerosis and decrepitation of one or another historical force or structure. The forces of erosion sometimes lead to catastrophes, to painful processes of restructuring requiring further reformations of structure and content.

A conflict-free society or conflict-free history does not exist. However, something else does: the spiritual possibility of seeing in a person, different from and often conflicting with me, his inalienable personal status, his human dignity and fundamental fraternity with regard to my "I" or to people like me in terms of spirit, even if he outwardly rejects them. This possibility contains one of the tendencies of self-restoration, succession and development, of the inner self-cleansing of the human community, which is usually considered a conditional, loose concept of progress. It cannot help but affect the entire nature of interaction among people, since otherwise it remains only to crawl willy-nilly toward the savage "us-them" antithesis and, in the final account, toward a totalitarian-fascist attitude toward human reality. Yet, this is equivalent to an utmost cancellation of the human meaning of history, of the sense and understanding of the principle of unity of people in mutual respect and love. If we speak of the theoretical aspect of the question, without such a sense or understanding, we risk reducing all concepts of the dialectics of historical conflict to the concept of mechanical confrontation. In this case, however, all discussions of history as the "history of people" are meaningless.

Any display of morality (as well as thought, creativity and sincere charity) includes a certain coded message of human dignity. Each lofty manifestation of spiritual and moral self-realization of an individual contains a certain appeal both to oneself and to one's fellows. I will even be so bold as to reveal this coded message. Each of these manifestations contains some sort of information about the lofty spiritual standards of the person (in this case, I am not afraid to use the concept of inherent aristocracy) and his benevolent, sometimes even sacrificial openness for others. That is why "aristocracy," as an inherent property of an individual, and democracy, as the only worthy form of interaction among sentient entities, are the invaluable principle for human community life, being two faces, two manifestations of historical reality and the common idea of man's unquestionable status. Aristocracy and democracy are an individual and collective measurement of one and the same lofty spirituality. In each living, thinking, loving and suffering individual, we are called on to see his greatness: "Greatness!" Boorishness, as a particular kind of attitude toward the world, based on self-assertion at the cost of humiliating someone else, is the only general alternative to the "aristocracy" of inner life and democracy in external relations. Boorishness or, which is the same, lordliness, are an arbitrary self-elevation to the detriment of the people. However, even in ancient times it was noted that, by elevating himself arbitrarily, a person lowers himself, degrading the sacred element of humanity within himself.

In the old days, people used to say: "The temple is not in the beams, but in the ribs." That is, in you yourself. It goes without saying, culture and, with it, history cannot be thought of without an external realization of the spiritual content of the personality, relatively speaking,

without a "temple in the beams." However, without the human spirit's inner work on itself, without its inner search for truth and self-cleansing, even the latter is worthless.

The temple, if we recall the graphic structure in Tengiz Abuladze's famous film "Repentance," is above all our inner path through history, a path which we carry in and with ourselves. Here, external social truth is inseparable from the intrinsic condition of human self-awareness and the human spirit. Internally, it is not transferred aside from the individual experiences of the spirit (one's own spirit!). Externally, it should not be imposed by the entire complexity of social relations. After all, a Temple into which people are driven forcibly is only a profanation of the idea.

The image used here is a metaphoric symbolization of the idea of the meaning of history. In our discussion, we are once again trying, proceeding from this symbolic image, to return to the definition of the question at hand. In my opinion, the meaning of history can be identified with a profound, personal experience of experiencing and knowing Truth, Goodness and Beauty, which, comprising the heart of man's inner life, one way or another enter the experience of interaction among people and make their mark on the connection of successive generations. Or, one could put it as follows: the worthy spiritual correlation of man, intersecting time, to himself, to his fellows and to all of existence determines the meaning of history. Although there is sufficient place in life for the forces of alienation and evil, the unity of history endures precisely by overcoming them.

I fully allow that these theses may cause misunderstanding or even irritation on the part of some readers, if they adhere to the ideological stereotypes that were purposefully instilled in us, en masse, in past decades. In this case, the sum total of probable questions and objections could be reduced to the following two: 1) Is a personalistic interpretation of the meaning of history isolated from life by intellectual moralization, having nothing whatsoever to do with cruel reality? 2) What, strictly speaking, did our fathers and uncles fight for then, and how does all this moralism correspond to our society's revolutionary traditions?

I would answer the first as follows. Many years of historical and philosophical research, added to living observations, which are also a scientist's conscious experiences, lead to the thought that the historical drama is subject to some kind of spiritual measurement, thanks to which human life represents something more significant than a century of hostility and bloody rage. Obviously, this measurement should be designated the meaning of history.

Regarding the second question, let me note that research on the development of social movements and social thinking in our country, as well as on the course of current world history confirm that the hasty and historically transient idea of the absolute concentration of

ownership and power cannot act as a true goal for the selflessness and self-sacrifice of thousands and thousands of our best countrymen, despite all their possible delusions or frustrations. Really, is the infamous administrative-command system the goal and final word of all searches for social truth and inner freedom? Of course not. The idea of human dignity, which forms the living essence of history, has remained unchanging.

Thus, the meaning of history is the "living truth" of human dignity. In each epoch, it manifests itself in the form of specific and unique imperatives. Our generation is also faced with an especially unique imperative: to justify itself to our ancestors, to our contemporaries and to possible descendants, having devoted all our strength, knowledge, conscience and reason to renovating our Fatherland and healing our planet.

Footnotes

1. The term "multi-unity" as applied to general human history was introduced by historian and philosopher L.P. Karsavin. Berdyayev has an equivalent term—"monopluralism."

2. Perhaps, from the viewpoint of the teaching of historical movement as a personalistic process, it is not quite correct to speak of the history of nature, since there is no self-awareness in it as such. However, it is nonetheless difficult to study its evolution, first, without applying the historical method, and second, ignoring the idea of some natural scientists who insist on the impossibility of an adequate understanding of this evolution, apart from using the "anthropic principle," with its thesis on the non-accidental nature of the appearance of human consciousness in the course of millions of years of nature's gradual development. Thus, once again we must return (but at a qualitatively new level of philosophical and scientific knowledge) to the idea of the human personality as highly problematical, but all the same a "crown of creation," or peak of the Universe's evolution.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

The Risk and Hope of Renovation: Thoughts After the Congress of Italian Communists

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[Article by I. Levin and G. Smirnov]

[Text] Achille Occhetto tried in vain to hide his tears from the television camera. He bent his head ever lower toward the scarlet barrier of the presidium's box, but on the gigantic screens over the stands of the Bologna Palace of Sports it was obvious that the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party had lost his self-possession for a minute. This is how it happened: he had just finished

his concluding speech. Applause burst out and the photographers' cameras began to flash. Suddenly, his main political opponent, Pietro Ingrao, who only the day before had sharply criticized the report, appeared next to the speaker. Somewhat awkwardly, as though embarrassed by his gesture, he firmly hugged Occetto. The hall exploded with applause and the "Red Banner" began to play. Then, the general secretary turned out to be a person just like everyone else.

The psychological atmosphere of the 19th (Extraordinary) Congress of the ICP [Italian Communist Party] was, in general, uncommonly strained. Two days earlier, the opposition co-speaker, Aldo Tortorella, collapsed with a heart attack while leaving the rostrum. The young "apparatchiks with no nerves," as well as veterans experienced in political squabbles were worried. On the eve of the congress, the specter of a schism was looming, caused by the sharpness of debates. For this reason, the simplest, most natural manifestations of mutual sympathy were perceived as a sign of victory over this threat.

The congress was extraordinary for the following reason: last autumn, only 8 months after the regular 18th ICP Congress, A. Occetto came out with an initiative-minded "re-substantiation" of Italy's leftist forces. Supported by a majority at the November 1989 Central Committee Plenum, this initiative took the form of a proposal to open a "constituent period," in the course of which the Communist Party should transform itself into something new, a formation, somewhat broader than now, of leftist forces, should change its name to a different one (which still remains to be found), and should join the Socialist International.

The extraordinary congress was needed to approve this strategic proposal, the more so since far from everyone in the party's leading bodies agreed to support it. This time, the majority that had formed at the 18th Congress was divided. Occetto was supported not only by leaders who had expressed similar ideas before (J. Napolitano, L. Lama, L. Iotti, J. Chervetti, U. Peccoli and others), as well as young secretariat members who agreed with him (K. Petruccholi, V. Veltroni, F. Mussi, P. Fassino, M. D'Alema), but also leaders such as A. Reikhlín and A. Bassolino, more closely related to mass work in enterprises and trade unions. Not only the left-wing elder, P. Ingrao, and the like-minded L. Magri, L. Castellina and others, but also a group of influential leaders who had previously supported Occetto, including party chairman A. Natta, J. Paietta, A. Tortorella, J. Cuarante and A. Minucchi, were against it.

This second group, while not denying the need for profound renovation of the party, wanted to implement it on the basis of the ICP and with the same name. Yet a third direction formed: A. Cossutta, J. Cattsaniga, L. Pestalotta and others, who centered their demands on strengthening the party's traditional image and its directives, proven in the struggle.

These three positions also formed a basis for three draft resolutions, along which the pre-congress discussion unfolded. Three and a half months later the picture was as follows: according to the results of discussion in the conferences of federations (we would say in the rayon and city party organizations), about 65 percent of the party members voted for the first resolution, slightly more than 31 percent—for the second, and roughly 3 percent—for the third.

More than 1,000 news correspondents were accredited on the eve of the congress. The stands were crowded with those invited: leaders of other political parties, ministers, cultural leaders, and representatives of the business world. A large group of photographers persistently occupied the foot of the rostrum.

Was interest in the congress kindled to some extent by an expectation of "sensational" scenes of disagreement and disruption? This cannot be completely ruled out. However, the main point, of course, was something else. At an open and democratic discussion, the communists aired their differences on issues of vital importance not only for their own party, but also for left-wing forces in Europe. Hence, the tension, size and "thickness" of the debates. Even now, weeks later, it is hard to "categorize" the basic themes and views that shaped the debates at the

In particular, it is hard because of their inter-weaving with our own debates, thoughts, doubts and paradoxes. There is one curious detail. Occetto had not yet finished his report, but the reporters had already made a rating, traditional in such cases: the person quoted the most was M. Gorbachev. There was a time, quite recently, when any mention of "Kremlin officials" was made by leaders of a number of Western communist parties with difficulty and with some fear of being counted among the "hands of Moscow." Today, at this congress (even after an appeal was made to not put our problems and theirs "on the same plank"), rare was the speaker who did not try to enlist the Soviet leader as an ally.

Events in Eastern Europe—"unforgettable 1989," as Occetto designated this central theme—concern the Italian communists no less sharply than us. The consequences of these events are geopolitical in nature and are forcing us to choose a strategic, not a technical level. On the one hand, as Resolution No 1 verifies, the prerequisites for "classical" anti-communism and the opposition of socialism of "Western civilization" is being violated, and favorable opportunities are opening up for left-wing forces as never before. On the other, East-West interdependence may display itself unexpectedly: in the form of chaotic, uncontrollable processes to overcome the lack of freedom in Eastern European countries, accompanied by a strengthening of right-wing conservative, as well as reactionary tendencies, and by the increased vitality of nationalistic and chauvinistic moods. Under conditions in which neoconservatives still hold power in most Western countries, such trends, in Occetto's words, may "destructively influence the entire structure of political relations in Europe."

Left-wing forces and the workers' movement cannot be passive in the face of such a prospect: "The task is clear... We must do everything so that the chaotically occurring processes enter solid channels of democratic evolution." It is a question of aiding the people's of Eastern Europe, but aid not only through economic cooperation, but with a policy of accelerating disarmament, strengthening security and carrying out progressive reforms. For the sake of this, the left-wing forces of Europe must be united, and for the ICP, in practice, this means joining the Socialist International ("Our originality, no matter how valuable and viable it may be, is not enough to make us a pole of attraction, around which it will be possible to recreate a new camp for Europe's left-wing forces. If the threat of our isolation is real, the entire specific nature of the ICP will inevitably be doomed to emasculation").

The authors of Resolution No 2 also agree that "a democratic revolution in the East is opening up new opportunities for implementing democracy in the West through the realization of man's basic rights (for the time being only partially won) and its spread to all areas of social life." At the same time, they realize that the "tectonic shifts in Eastern countries may head in different directions: the tormenting search for a new type of society, in which socialism and democracy will really be united, or a turn toward the simple restoration of mechanisms and values, typical of capitalist countries, which would entail serious consequences." The decision itself to join the Socialist International does not increase chances of influencing this situation, since it is possible to go there to assist in making the existing left-wing forces among social democrats more active, possibly also by way of "accepting the cultural hegemony and organizational form already established there."

Finally, the supporters of Resolution No 3, in acknowledging that the assertion of interdependent relations and a multi-pole system in international affairs is favorable for overcoming the consequences of the historical schism in the workers' movement, sharply reject joining the Socialist International—an organization "unsuited to the ongoing renovation of the world socialist movement, within which openly reactionary parties continue to operate."

This is only one part of the problems of interdependence in the contemporary world. However, after all, changes in an enormous area from the peaks of the Hartz to the Pacific Ocean are directly influencing Western left-wing forces. It is no secret that these changes are often generalized in mass consciousness by the summary concept of "the crisis of communism." It is important to consider the 19th ICP Congress from this point of view.

It is hard to dispute the fact that the concept of "communist," has sharply devalued today. The communist parties have suffered serious losses in virtually all Western countries. Against this background, the Italian party, with almost a half million members and 10 million voters, seems to be in fairly good shape. Being the country's second political force in terms of influence,

as before it is the core of opposition to the ruling Christian Democratic Party. Its name, communist, as it were, does not keep its representatives from controlling large areas, provinces and cities from heading mass trade union, women's, youth, cultural-educational organizations, and associations of cooperative workers and craftsmen, from actively participating in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where the ICP deputies form a basic force (22 of 27 people) of the third faction in terms of size.

However, it is just as true that the ICP's streak of continuous successes and the growth of its influence, which lasted 3 good decades since the late 1940s, was changed by the period of aggravated difficulties and the alternation of declines with small upswings. Since the late 1970s, the membership of the party (320,000 people in all) has been gradually decreasing, and the share of young people in its ranks is declining. It was missing more than 2 million votes in the elections. All this is true. However, after all, the above losses are not at all the exclusive distinction of the party that calls itself communist. Roughly the same has happened to large Western social democratic parties and to the leading trade-union and mass workers' associations.

The 1980s went down in history as the so-called long wave of neoconservatism. The fact alone that this wave brought politicians of a conservative bent to power both in countries with strong communist parties, as well as in countries where social democrats play the leading role in left-wing opposition, indicates that the advancement of the neoconservatives was stipulated and prepared by profound, objective factors. Their operation, it seems, has still far from exhausted itself.

Moreover, the ideological and political positions of the Italian communists differed long ago, and substantially, from that which until yesterday made up the ideological baggage of most communist parties. Italian Marxism was more resistant to the corrosion of dogmatism and more capable of self-development. For this, it is unquestionably obligated to Antonio Gramsci, a remarkable thinker who devoted great attention to the development of problems of the political hegemony of the working class, to the significance of the intelligentsia and culture, and the correlation between the state and civic society. Gramsci was an irreconcilable opponent of economic determinism and considered one of Marx's chief merits to be his interpretation of the laws of historical development as trends, as probable laws. In other words, as natural laws which, despite all their objective immutability, are not implemented without the active and conscious participation of the person, and under no condition whatsoever cancel out the space of his choice and will. (Here, one could add that a similar vision of history and the role of man in it was inherited by Gramsci from a noted Italian Marxist philosopher of the end of last century, Antonio Labriola. Whereas, for instance, for G. Plekhanov, his junior contemporary in Russia, Marxism embodied a completely monistic view

of history, for Labriola historical materialism was a "tendency toward monism.")

Gramsci's "*Prison Notebooks*" (Soviet readers will receive their full text, presumably, on the author's 100th anniversary in 1991) fertilized not only the ideology of the ICP, but also Italian culture on the whole. Precisely thanks to this, in the course of the entire postwar period, and to a great extent even now, the ideological and theoretical positions of the left remain so strong in the national culture of Italy.

Relying on Gramsci's ideas, Palmiro Togliatti introduced many new things in the political practice of the Italian communists; primarily the criteria of the inseparability of democracy and socialism and of democracy and progress. After the upheavals, caused in the international communist movement by our party's 20th congress, it is no accident that the ICP did not dwell on the thesis of the "cult of personality" in its analysis. The Italian communists had intensely analyzed the deformations of socialism, their causes and conditions: a great deal of that which they developed is topical to this day.

At the same time, the late 1950s to the 1960s-1970s, the explorations made by the Italian communists and their practical conclusions gave rise to a growing alienation between our parties. The ICP reacted to the role of the USSR in the Hungarian events of 1956 with restraint, suspiciously viewed the replacement of Khrushchev, energetically condemned the overthrow in Czechoslovakia and, finally, after introduction of the extraordinary resolution in Poland in December 1981, decisively broke off relations with the CPSU and the communist parties of East European countries.

However, the Italian communists' creative search was not limited only to protests. "Memorial Note," written by Togliatti in Yalta in 1964 just before his death, contains his thoughts on the need to review the concept of "proletarian internationalism" and leave its "Comintern" framework, which had become too narrow. In the early 1970s, Enrico Berlinguer advanced the idea of "historical compromise": a proposal to unite the efforts of the three main directions of popular movement—communist, socialist and Catholic—for the profound democratic transformation of society. Essentially, this was a forewarning of that which we later called the new political thinking: the philosophy for the foreign policy of perestroika. However, at the time, these ideas were perceived extremely unfavorably in Moscow, and Moscow nearly gloated when they encountered difficulties in the first attempt at their practical implementation—in the form of the so-called "national unity" coalitions of 1977-1978, which were supported by the Communist Party. Right now, to the good fortune and glory of perestroika, we are admitting that we were wrong in that famous debate with the ICP in the early 1980s.

In brief, the Italian communists, as opposed to some East European communist parties, had no grounds for

disavowing their own past. The supporters of all three resolutions justifiably made this argument at the congress. However, why do they disagree in their assessments of the past? Why are diametrically opposed conclusions being drawn from a seemingly identical statement?

The whole problem, apparently, lies in what is considered primary in its ideological and political legacy. For the supporters of the second and third drafts, evidently, the main thing is faithfulness to certain basic theses of Marxism: primarily, its anti-capitalist orientation. The adherents to Resolution No 1 stressed something else: Marxism's capability for self-renovation, not halting before "self-determination," before radical review of its own positions. All creative Marxism is permeated with this capability: from Marx and Engels to Lenin, with his noted turn-about from struggle along with legal Marxists against the enthusiastic adherents to the uniqueness of Russian conditions, the narodniks, to a struggle for the possibility of a revolutionary turn in Russia (precisely due to the uniqueness of conditions existing in it) against the mensheviks, who assumed that the capitalist transformation of the country had not yet occurred, and later, already after October, to the NEP and "changing of our entire viewpoint on socialism."

For Gramsci, Marxism was not a set (or combination) of eternally the same "component parts," but a regularly self-renewing synthesis of the utmost, peak achievements of world culture. In Marx's time, these were the German classical philosophies of Kant and Hegel, the English political economy of Smith and Ricardo, and the political theories of the creators and thinkers of the Great French Revolution. In Gramsci's day, the components for new synthesis already included Freud, with his theory of psychoanalysis, Bergson's philosophy and the political theory of Sorel, the economic concepts of Keynes, and the production organization principles of Taylor and Ford. Today, for instance, as J. Kieza, Moscow UNITA correspondent and author (along with R.A. Medvedev) of the first two books in Italy on our perestroika, said in his speech, this list must also include Brodel's (France) theory of profound historical processes, MacLuen's (Canada) sociological analysis of the influence of mass communications media on society, the concepts of the American economists Galbraith and Leontyev, and the "political practice of Swedish social democracy and the experience of Gorbachev's perestroika—if it succeeds in prevailing."

Naturally, haste and dashing about are contraindicated for a theoretical operation of such scale, although any such discussion of this type cannot, of course, get by without certain costs. However, there can hardly be anything more destructive for a party than a vow to "preserve the purity" of its own theoretical baggage. At the congress, the conflict of these two approaches was reflected in the "duel" between two permanent representatives of the Marxist intelligentsia: A. Azor Rossi, editor-in-chief of the weekly RINASHITA, and B. De Giovanni, a professor at Naples University. Incidentally,

this theme ran through the entire course of the congress, since the ideological and theoretical tools of the party are either constantly "in work," constantly being tested for accurate conformation to reality, or are suited only to be museum exhibits. The correspondence of its political policy to the interests of the social strata which it represents also depends on this.

The fact that the ICP has grown and developed as the party for the working class, the proletarian party, is common knowledge. To this day, workers make up the largest group in it—approximately 50 percent (if, along with industrial workers (36.2 percent), we also count farm laborers (3.2) and at least one-third of the pensioners who were workers in the past). The share of workers in society's structure is decreasing: in this regard, Italy is no exception among the developed capitalist countries—and this cannot help but affect the number of members in the Communist Party and its voters. However, the point lies not only in quantitative changes. Qualitative characteristics are changing as well. Just one example: until relatively recently, the basic mass of Italy's industrial workers was concentrated in the so-called "industrial triangle"—Milan—Turin—Genoa—in the Northwest of the country. Now, more than half of them are located in the Central and Northeast areas, and a part is in the more backward Southern Central regions. This is not simply a geographic shift. In these regions, mid-size and small enterprises predominate, with different professional-skills structures and different relations between owners and workers, between workers and trade unions, workers and the church, etc.

What is the social soil, in which the new or renovated party will put forth roots? In seeking an answer to this question, the discussion at the congress repeatedly touched on the basic cause of the above-noted changes (unfortunately, it only touched on them, but, after all, a party congress is not a sociological symposium). This reason is the change in types of labor. The creation of a value-added product today is ensured not so much through psychophysical efforts, as by the intellectual potential of the worker, by his knowledge. The traditional "motivations" of both an administrative-disciplinary, as well as a material and economic nature are ineffective for mobilizing this potential. Incentives of a different level are required, more subtle and diverse: a feeling of professional satisfaction, a sense of independence and responsibility, and self-realization in labor. Flexibility and diversity are the leading criteria in organizing production and labor. The usual, generalized image of a person in a working setting (or "white collar") is breaking to pieces, as though seen in fragments of a mirror, into a number of images.

The situation is additionally complicated by the fact that low-prestige, poorly paid labor is not disappearing: resolutions Nos 2 and 3 stress this in particular. This is nearly always the lot of unemployed youth (especially in the South), foreign workers (and in Italy right now there are almost 1.5 million of them, especially immigrants from Asian and African countries), and victims of

"black" employment—various forms of the semi-legal, "underground" or "informal" economy (Italy is the recognized leader in this area among developed capitalist countries), as well as outright criminal business. A broad range of various intermediary structures, statuses and systems of expediency is taking shape along the boundary between employment and unemployment. Here, numerous hybrid, mixed social figures are appearing which cannot be reduced to a common denominator: semi-employed, semi-unemployed, employed in a second or third job, illegally employed, working informally, etc., etc.

So, as opposed to the past, a highly mixed, contradictory picture is coming to light. There is an opinion (hinted at in some speeches) that the current trend will change fairly soon to the reverse, and will lead to the restoration of mass homogeneous detachments of hired labor, comparable to the central core of the working class, such as the metal workers were even relatively recently. Possibly, such "cores" are being formed out of workers in services: employees, teachers, workers in health care and the communications media, placed in rigid, "neo-Taylorist" frameworks for labor organization, reminiscent of the former factory systems. In this case, the party would once again have its customary environment and support, "built" into the system of conflict between labor and capital.

However, judging by the works of specialists, the complexity and mixed nature of the social structure will be retained and may even increase in future years, if not decades. Meanwhile, not a single political party is being created to "have its day" in the opposition. Allowing for the brief period of participation in the first postwar governments (until 1947) and several months of being in the parliamentary majority in 1978, the ICP has invariably been the main force for powerful left-wing opposition. Italy is the only developed country (not counting Japan) in the West, where opposition parties from the left did not immediately succeed in coming to power. The reins of government have been in the hands of the Christian Democratic Party for almost half a century already, leading to overgrowth in its ranks, its splicing with state structures, and an endless string of scandals, and paralyzes the passing of necessary reforms. The informal nature of this situation for a country with democratic procedures is perceived very sharply in Italy. Whereas one-fourth to one-third or more Italian voters have been giving their votes to the communists for many years, this was dictated not only by a feeling of protest, but also by an awareness of the possibility for and reality of changes.

Really, there is a far broader range of left-wing forces in the depths of Italian society, than that which can be judged from the list of parties competing in the elections. The Communist Party has accumulated significant experience in arranging unions and cooperation with such forces: independent left-wing members elected on its lists make up one of the most influential factions in the

parliament. However, today it is a question of mobilizing the new and only partially explored resources of the left-wing camp. There are the so-called horizontal, or unexposed left-wing forces: movements, clubs, circles, and groups not attached to any party, or people united independent of membership in one political organization or another. These include ecologists and, in particular, the "Greens;" women's movements; volunteer associations, most often made up of Catholics performing various acts of charity; youth movements and groups, sometimes disbanding after performing a one-time, local task, only to come together once again for the sake of achieving another similar goal, be it a struggle against the mafia or for the democratization of procedures at a certain university. Essentially, such movements and groups are inspired by the ideals of humanism, democracy, solidarity and a nonviolent world, where man will be able to exist in harmony with nature, with those close to him, and with himself. However, repeated attempts by the ICP to establish an organic union with them to this day have not yielded real, significant results.

The point is that the participants in such social movements, in their overall mass, shun politics in its "part," form, considering it "dirty business" and a usurpation of citizens' rights, and they see parties with their programs, each of which claims the title of "only true," as carriers of the totalitarian principle. According to data from recent surveys, more than one-fourth of Italian "informants" consider "discussions about politics" and the pre-election intrigues a meaningless waste of time, if not a threat to human relations in their own group; almost four-fifths assume that they are engaged in preaching values far more important, than those for the sake of which parties are organized; slightly more than three-fourths deny that any social association in the final account is inevitably close to one political party or another. It is noteworthy that the flow of voters out of the ICP was caused not so much by the strengthening of other parties, as by the increased number of people not participating in elections.

The chief idea of Occetto's report and of Resolution No 1 lies in the invitation to "informals" to become full-fledged participants in the "constituent process:" not simply to compare their views to those of the communists, but also jointly with them to draft specific forms and conditions for their participation in the new political formation. Whether their membership be individual or group (according to the labor model), or whether to subscribe to a federative structure for the new party—these questions should be decided jointly; the main thing is that those who really are capable of actively struggling for real democratic alternatives to the present-day government should not feel infringed on in the new political organization, as supporters of Resolution No 1 emphasized.

This address did not remain without response. Following Occetto's initiative, certain prominent social leaders of various persuasions in the left-wing orientation—from

the liberal, former editor-in-chief of the largest bourgeois newspaper *KORRIERE DELLA SERA*, A. Cavallari, to the left-wing trade-union socialist A. Lettieri and the Jesuit priest E. Pintacuda, who is devoted to the struggle against the mafia—appealed for a switch from words to action and for making a specific contribution to building the new party. This appeal was supported by more than 300 leaders of Italian culture: they include famous sociologists, philosophers, musicians, actors, architects, doctors, economists, etc. Another group of the intelligentsia also spoke in parallel, supporting Resolution No 2. This list also included many prominent names. On the whole, broader circles of society than before are already being thus involved in the "constituent process." In this regard, attention was directed, especially on the part of supporters of the Resolution No 2, to the left-wing Catholics; many of them are acutely experiencing the gap between words and action, between proclaimed programs and everyday activities of politicians from the ruling parties—the CDP [Christian Democratic Party] and, in particular, the ISP [Italian Socialist Party].

Relations with the ISP could not help but take the center of attention at the congress. The oldest working-class party and generally one of the oldest parties in the country, the Italian Socialist Party has left a long, winding track in history, marked by the scars of schisms: deviations rightly gave rise to retreats to the left and vice-versa. The fluctuations of the ISP in postwar Italy were determined by the opposition of two powerful blocks: the CDP and the ICP. The middle position between them constantly tempts the leaders of the Socialist Party to use their location in order to obtain a kind of "position rent."

Speaking arithmetically, the ISP, with 14.3 percent of the votes, is really capable of deciding who will come to power: the CDP with its allies (43.1 percent), or the left-wing opposition headed by the ICP (30.9 percent). It is precisely this circumstance that B. Craxi had in mind, uniting a five-party coalition in the early 1980s under the slogan of ensuring the "controllability" of the country, without which it was threatened by destruction in an abyss of anarchy. The gradual accumulation of "position rent" has changed, however. The order of its priorities and, recently, the slogan of redistributing the share of influence in the left-wing flank of the political spectrum have begun ever more distinctly to move to the forefront. Taking the leading role in the left-wing camp away from the communists, who collect nearly twice the votes than the ISP, does not seem a very realistic task. However, everything is seen in historical retrospective: in 1978, when B. Craxi entered the ISP leadership, the ratio was 9.7 to 34.4 percent. Yet, appetite comes with eating. Already, the prospect of the "French path" and the successes of the Socialist Party in France are urging on some leaders of the Socialist Party, and on the other hand, are evoking serious concern and an aspiration to effectively resist it on the part of ICP leaders.

B. Craxi designated his own variant for association with the communists by the formula "socialist unity,"

meaning that the Communist Party should not simply "join" the ISP, but also publicly condemn, having acknowledged a historical error, the split in Livorno in 1921, which started the independent existence of the two parties. True, before the ICP Congress itself, B. Cracsi tried to make this formula somewhat milder, having made it known that it would be possible to get by without preliminary conditions. However, Occetto's report proposed a different variant: "Pluralism in the left-wing camp" with the "display of a renewed aspiration toward unity on the part of everyone." The outlines of this proposal show up clearly, apparently, against the background of the ICP's other intention, that of joining the Socialist International. Within the framework of a unified organization, the interrelations of the two parties, one would assume, could not help but undergo changes.

How will this "mass reformative" party, which should be created now, look by the end of the "constituent period?" Specific indications to this account at the congress were sufficiently scant (as one should have expected, since the search for an answer is entrusted to the course of the "constituent process" itself), although sometimes it was felt that the discussion most closely approached the core of dissent precisely on this point. A maximally broad opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas and to hold a discussion, which would ensure the "productive coexistence of differences," should take first priority, Occetto emphasized. The party's organizational strength is important, he emphasized, but at a certain time it may start giving a result, opposite to the expected result of expanding ties with the masses. The growth and solidity of these ties may be better realized by way of "increasing the role of civic society in drafting and making political decisions with the simultaneous creation of more narrow leading bodies, which would guarantee greater efficiency and a more collective nature." Apparently, it was no accident that the word "formation" was heard more often at the congress than "party."

For some this formulation of the question seemed unacceptable, for others it even seemed somewhat frightening (for instance, one of the authors of Resolution No 2, G. Andzhus, spoke of the almost inevitable bureaucratization of the ICP, of its transformation into a "light party with a top-heavy command"). The majority nonetheless followed the general secretary and did so, in our opinion, not only from a feeling of discipline or enthusiasm for the prospects depicted by him. Apparently, the results of the organizational experiments already done in the ranks of the ICP (the formation of parallel structures, thematic associations, etc.) was telling, as well as the realistic analysis of the situation (is it really possible to ignore, for instance, the fact that the breadth of the electoral support for the chief opponent, the CDP, is stipulated, and in no small part, by the presence of several, sometimes almost 10 different trends within it at various moments?).

Be this as it may, the results of voting on the basic resolutions essentially confirmed the correlation of forces that had taken shape: 67 percent of the votes were

for the first draft, 30 percent—for the second, and 3 percent—for the third. Correspondingly, of the supporters of Resolution No 1, 236 people became part of the Central Committee, of the second—105, and of the third—12. Achille Occetto was elected general secretary, but, on a majority initiative, Aldo Tortorella was elected Central Committee chairman.

So, the party came to the congress disunited, but left it united, openly, publicly and correctly having acknowledged the presence of three trends in its ranks. It still remains to accumulate experience in their interaction, but even now, apparently, we can say that we are seeing the first attempt to gently overcome the traditionally interpreted principle of democratic centralism in the party, which intends henceforth to be the leading force of the left-wing camp.

In addition, it is understandable that the vanguard force presumes, above all, a clear view of interrelations with the "known" masses. Who does the party see them as: only voters, or active citizens? How will it address them: with a request for support through the voting ballot or with an appeal for independent initiative? In general, how should political action and social movement be correlated? The always complex solution of these problems seems especially difficult under today's sociopolitical circumstances. On the last day of the congress, one of the most dramatic episodes, when they voted on foreign policy resolutions late at night, reminded us of this.

As one could easily guess, the swift changes in Central and Eastern Europe and their consequences, still far from clear, for the political configuration on the continent and in the world on the whole, stood at the center of the proposed drafts. For instance, from the interior of our own Fatherland, we do not always feel the degree of anxiety of West Europeans and of the Italians themselves over the prospect of the unification of the two Germanies. Under the arches of the Bologna Palace of Sports, the heavy bulk of the German question could be sensed almost by touch. How will we prevent a growth in the threat, proceeding from it, to the still-fragile building of European security? The authors of the first draft answered this question (we will leave out the details) by universal support for the Helsinki Process (J. Boffa, a well-known historian and publicist, leader of the ICP Research Center for International Politics, in particular defended it). Mobilization of the masses for a struggle against unilateral steps and, in particular, for the withdrawal of Germany and Italy from the NATO United Command was, once again limiting ourselves only to the essence, the answer offered by supporters of the alternative draft (L. Castellina, member of the ICP leadership, deputy to the European Parliament, and organizer and spirit of numerous anti-war demonstrations, rallies and marches on all five continents of the world, supported it).

The supporters of the second resolution criticized their opponents for timidity and backwardness ("today, the missiles established in Italy are aimed at Dubcek's

Prague and Walesa's Warsaw"). They responded with accusations of poor consideration, risking the exposure of the most valuable outcome of the new political thinking—a productive treaty process—to attacks. In the final account, the first variant came through with the personal support of the general secretary—an outcome, which could be easily depicted, if one so desired, as a success of the opportunists over the revolutionaries, of the ardent supporters of summit maneuvers over the champions of "heading for the square" etc., etc.

However, I would like to caution against the deceptive simplicity of such conclusions. Rather, the question lies elsewhere. The debates on foreign policy at the congress reminded us once again of the newness and unprecedented nature of the situation that is forming. At the same time, processes, at first glance mutually exclusive, such as the strengthening of ethnic isolation and the aspiration toward integration (which reveals the limited nature of ethnic-state prerogatives and the growing pull toward unification on a regional basis), seemed to be meeting each other halfway. Support for the slogans of "demolition," "dismantling," and "disbanding" bloc structures is swiftly changing its orientation toward stability, toward insurance against unforeseen shifts and upheavals. Hopes for the "opening" of borders and markets are giving way to fears of the possible scale of migratory flows and perturbations in the market for loan capital...

The list could continue. However, that which has been said is enough to understand: the fusion of responsibility and policy initiative is being tested today by unprecedentedly strict criteria. The foreign policy positions of the new party, which should appear upon the completion of the "constituent period," cannot escape this test. Meanwhile, one thing is clear: the development of the international (as well as domestic) political situation is leaving considerable room for the acceleration and growth of the mass left-wing political force. It is a question of its mastery.

Will the "different voices" of the ICP in the new party retain the ability not simply to hear, but also to listen to each other? Judging by the course and outcome of the congress, yes. Now, it is time to return to the episode with which we began: to a moment of human weakness on the part of a political leader, "treacherously" espied by the television and news cameras. It goes without saying, statutory norms and principles are necessary: great tolerance, civilized inter-party relations, reciprocal guarantees, etc. However, possibly, nothing conveyed the essence of the changes in the ICP as convincingly as the embrace of two comrades in the struggle, each of whom has stuck to his own positions.

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The CPSU and Social Democracy: New Aspects in Interrelations

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[Text] In our day, interest in social democratic experience, traditions and values has grown considerably. It is no accident, since discussion of the historical fates and ideals of socialism, of the contemporary interpretation of the socialist idea in practice has involved all strata of our society and become an organic part of our spiritual life. Hence, the obvious need for us communists to determine the essence of contemporary social democracy, to relate our own originality to it, to see the differences and similarities, and to single out the practical developments of social democracy that can be used in the interests of perestroika.

In a Changing System of Coordinates

Recently, new points of convergence have been noted in relations between the CPSU and the parties of the Socialist International (SI). This is natural. Both the CPSU and social democracy, each in its own way, are undergoing a crisis of adaptation to the new conditions and are finding themselves in an ideological and political search for paths of renovation and continuity. True, elaboration is necessary here: the crisis of social democracy is, rather, a "volte-face," although it does retain the threat of losing its political and cultural originality in its world outlook; the serious situation in which the CPSU finds itself today is based on profound deformations of the socioeconomic, political, and moral and ethical principles of socialism.

The broadening gap between ideals and reality, the alarming phenomenon of "disillusioned socialist consciousness," and other difficult questions that life has raised for both the CPSU as well as social democracy, have forced them to look at the past in a new way, to realistically assess the present, and to try to glance into the future.

The evolution of the positions of both the CPSU as well as of social democracy is occurring against a background of unprecedented changes in the world, which are making a profound impression on their evaluations and concepts, in a number of cases eroding the former distinctness of the watershed between them. Hence the paradox: only a few years ago, it was not especially difficult to show the differences in the positions of the communists and the social democrats. In our day, conversely, it is easy to reveal points of convergence and extremely difficult to find the essential differences, which are often concealed behind an outward coincidence of assessments and formulations.

The fundamental idea, advanced by life itself, of the priority of common human values and the unity of civilization is breaking, from both sides, the crowded

framework of the ideological canons of the previous period. This is the more important, since in the course of decades the relations between the two main detachments of the socialist movement were based on mutual rejection, intolerance and a kind of fatal opposition. The new thinking has created prerequisites for conversion to a constant and effective political dialogue.

The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism" avoids dogmatic stereotypes of a negative attitude toward the social democratic parties, noting their contribution to the progressive development of countries and peoples. The significance of this departure is determined by the fact that, previously, evaluations of social democracy were formed under the pressure of pointed ideological symbols, simplistically interpreted class and revolutionary concepts, and exaggerated ideas of the potential and prospects for the "explosive" conversion to socialism. The resolution of such evaluation optics was defined by the orientation toward a theoretically "ideal" line of historical development, any deviation from which, even reflecting objective contradictions of reality itself, was seen as opportunism, complicity and neglect of the basic interests of the working class.

Meanwhile, pragmatically oriented social democracy has traditionally relied on a diversity of flexible ideological forms and concepts. Let us admit: it has turned out to be free of mythologized versions of a social structure, related to the paralyzed political culture whose lack of feasibility was confirmed by the changes in the East European countries.

Perestroika is stimulating thought on the competitive political process of coexistence of different concepts, theories and teachings. Both the CPSU, as well as the SI parties agree on this, believing that different ways to implement the basic values of pluralistic democratic socialism exist in different societies.

Interrelations between the CPSU and social democracy are strengthening and being enriched due to an expansion of the circle of questions, on which their positions are gravitating toward convergence, displayed by no means mandatorily within the framework of alternative comparisons of accumulated theoretical and practical experience. The following factors favor this: the strengthening interconnection of the functions objectively performed by both trends, and their contribution to social progress; the processes of constructive co-development of various sociopolitical systems, the intersecting reciprocal influences of which are becoming increasingly tangible; the CPSU's concepts, which are changing in the course of perestroika, on the correlation of revolutionary and evolutionary forms and criteria for social progress; the theoretical and political renovation of the SI and the parties belonging to it; the imminent raising of the question of reducing basic antagonisms to non-antagonistic contradictions; and the realization by the communists of the destructive consequences of the thesis that violence is the midwife of history. In short, today

there is an organic exchange of approaches by the communists and the social democrats toward the basic tasks of the workers' movement, as well as in the choice of preferable ways to handle them. For instance, the constructive positions of the CPSU and the SI, agreeing on the whole, on solving the key problems of war and peace and on many military-political and foreign political problems are well known.

The growing importance of "qualitative" historical progress, particularly the ecological, spiritual-personal and moral aspects of it, along with "quantitative," i.e., strictly economic and scientific-technical growth, is drawing the CPSU and the SI parties together. It is entirely obvious that the CPSU could glean much of value from the practical experience that social democracy has accumulated in this area in past decades. Today, the guidelines for "ecosocialism"—ecologically balanced development, harmony of the economy and ecology, growth aimed at a comprehensive solution to ecological and social problems, ensuring quality of life, industry and labor—are becoming more distinct in the SI party programs. For the CPSU, the fact that the nature of this platform is determined by the programmatic formulation of the SI is fundamentally important: efforts in the area of ecology should be based on the basic ideas and values of the working class and should take into account the interests of all the poor and the unfortunate.

There is much in common in the interpretation by the CPSU and the SI of economic democracy. With all the doctrinal innovations of the SI, its essential content remains unchanged: this is social control of the economy, presuming, in particular, the democratization of industrial policy, the participation of working people in joint decision-making at the level of both enterprises and the work place, public supervision of investments, and the participation of trade unions in determining economic policy on a country-wide scale.

In the current situation, our country needs a strong social policy as never before. Hence, the CPSU's heightened interest in the social, economic and administrative experience of social democracy, than in its achievements, which are related primarily to protecting the material position of the working people, to raising their well-being and to the development of measures that lessen the consequences of crisis phenomena in the economy, of radical modernization of industry, of inflationary processes, etc.

A humanistic interpretation of socialism, the concept of man as the goal itself of development, as the criterion of social progress, and the aspiration to eliminate his alienation from ownership, power and cultural wealth is drawing the CPSU and the social democratic parties together.

The SI's declaration that social democrats claim no monopoly on the draft of the social future warrants special attention. This the more so is important since the CPSU has also rejected the monopoly on "socialist"

truth. The expanded, essentially global interpretation by the SI of the concepts of freedom, justice and democracy as the means and goals not only of socialism, but also of "democratic world society," of solidarity as the imperative for "the survival of mankind," of culture as a requirement for access to the "world cultural legacy," also answers the CPSU's positions.

The renovated conceptual vision distinguishes today's interpretation of human rights by the social democrats. The SI offers an integral concept of these rights, proceeding from an understanding of them as a fundamental value of socialism.

A great degree of similarity can now be traced in the views of the CPSU and the SI on the place and significance of the market and on the correlation of social, personal and state ownership within the context of a mixed economy. As far as the Socialist International is concerned, as before it supports "collectivization and public ownership within the framework of a mixed economy." As opposed to the CPSU, whose interpretation of the entire complex of ownership relations was previously determined, as everyone knows, by strictly assigned ideological parameters, social democracy, which does not grant self-sufficing significance to the form of ownership, long ago (particularly after the "programmatic turn" at the turn of the 1950s-1960s) essentially demarcated the possession, disposal and utilization of it.

In addition, the following position is typical of most SI parties: in key sectors which determine the nature of the formation of a citizen (school, university and television) and living conditions (housing construction, health care, nature), the assumption itself that "market logic" can be decisive is rejected.

It is noteworthy that, comparing the market possibilities in West and East Europe, the social democratic circles support the introduction of market mechanisms in the economic structures of East European countries, cautioning along with this, on the one hand, against neo-liberal distortions and twists in economic policy and, on the other, against extraordinary hopes for a rapid yield from the market given the type of socioeconomic planning and distribution that is still preserved here for the time being.

Of course, the fact that both the CPSU and the Socialist International parties are departing from old concepts does not mean that all disagreements on basic questions of strategy and tactics have been overcome.

The CPSU's departure, under the conditions of perestroika, for new boundaries in understanding socialist values by no means signifies the party's rejection of its primacy and does not deprive it of its identity. Regardless of substantial convergence on international and, partially, on world outlook issues, the CPSU and the social democratic parties continue to preserve organizational independence and ideological and political originality, operating in qualitatively different social systems,

from which proceed possibly not eternal, but for now very serious differences (for instance, the CPSU is not faced with one of the strategic tasks of social democracy: harmonizing relations between labor and capital).

Naturally, differences are also retained in the understanding of socialism itself, which social democracy is inclined to see as a constant process of asserting a sort of sum total of ethical values, and not as society's condition. As opposed to social democracy, the CPSU proceeds, as stated in the draft of the new Statutes, from a communist perspective; it bases its activity on the creative development of the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin (the social democrats reject Leninism and see Marxism as only one of the forces of democratic socialism). Whereas the CPSU is striving to be a party for the working class and working people, social democracy is striving to be a popular party, a kind of political front, a "party-coalition." Finally, social democracy does not recognize either the concept of a vanguard party or the organizational principles of building (democratic centralism), accepted in the CPSU.

Considerable differences remain in political cultures, stipulated to a significant extent by historical traditions, by the specific features of socioeconomic and political development of the countries of the East and West, and by the different attitude toward the concept of "civic society."

In short, there are differences, and it would be an illusion to believe that they will disappear in the blink of an eye. In our opinion, something else is important: as opposed to the recent past, we are now seeing behind the differences that which brings us together and unifies us, and we are seeing the differences themselves as an incentive for co-development and mutual enrichment. We owe perestroika for this approach. Perestroika, as emphasized in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, opened up an opportunity to overcome the historical schism of the socialist movement, for its revival as a world movement on a contemporary basis.

On the whole, the considerable convergence of views of the SI parties and the CPSU is following the positions of the new thinking. This similarity, we repeat, does not at all presume an identical nature. Such a conclusion would hardly calm the hearts of those, for whom ideological purity is more important than truth and the real state of affairs. However, it does introduce clarity: the renovation of the CPSU is security for preserving its own face.

Is an Anti-Social Democrat Syndrome Appearing?

Let us be frank: a large share of communists are cautious and distrustful in their perception of the interpretation of socialist ideas, cleansed of distortions of the past, and the orientation toward a democratic renovation of socialism, toward giving it a humane, human image. Those who adhere to mythologized views of socialism, which were firmly rooted in scientific and public awareness during the decades of Stalinism, see an "erosion of ideals" and the "forgetting of our spiritual values" in

such aspirations. An argument has even appeared (it can be encountered in the press and heard both from certain titled scientists, as well as at mass rallies) concerning the threat of "social democratization" of the CPSU, its "unnoticeable crawl toward social-democratic approaches," and an "uncritical borrowing of social-democratic postulates."

What is it that worries those who claim the role of keepers of the purity of the socialist idea? Above all, it seems, the fact that forces in the CPSU and in society on the whole, oriented toward giving socialism a new quality, have taken up in earnest, in Lenin's words, the "radical change of our entire viewpoint on socialism." However, after all, things could not be otherwise, since perestroika has revealed the full depth of the structural crisis and the full historical doom of the state-bureaucratic model of socialism, which long ago exhausted all of its creative potential. It has become clear: cosmetic repair of the system's facade will not do. To act thus would mean to doom the country to slow extinction, a sharp decline in its role in international affairs, and to conversion into an insignificant outsider in the progress of modern civilization.

However, precisely the radical renovation of our society is not in the plans of those who, accustomed to an authoritative way of life, can think of nothing different and cannot or do not want to free themselves from the long captivity of habitual ideological dogmas and stereotypes. If we look at the root cause, of course, it is neither question of the "social democratization" of the CPSU's directives nor of Soviet society's awakening interest in the instructive socioeconomic experience of West European social democrats. The point lies elsewhere: in the non-socialist essence of the views of those party and societal strata which insist on socialism's compatibility with phenomena alien to it, such as total statification of economic, social and spiritual life, the non-acknowledgment of every human individual's self-value, alienation of the working people from power and ownership, and muteness of creative thought.

Often, by "concessions" to social democracy and the "threat of the capitalization" of Soviet society, they refer to the orientation of the CPSU's progressive forces toward common humanistic values and democratic socialism. For example, doubts are voiced on the subject of the new interpretation of our ideology: the concept of "socialism," they say, incorporates democratic and humane values from the start and, consequently, we simply have no need for a different socialism.

Alas, it has been convincingly shown that we built precisely a "different socialism"—inhumane, undemocratic, and deforming the individual—at the beginning in "one country, taken separately," and we later exported it, often without asking permission for this, to many countries in the world. In our opinion, that is why the pointed orientation of the draft Platform toward a new interpretation of the essential features of socialism, toward an understanding of them not only as a powerful

means for renovation, but also as the natural conditions for the daily activity of any socialist society, is so important.

They also see "social democratization" of the CPSU in the restoration of rights to universal regulators of social life, such as commodity-market relations, equal rights for and competition of different forms of ownership, competition in elections, and political and economic pluralism. Here, we should remember that both the market, as well as rights and democracy, not even to mention elementary and eternal standards of morality (which we previously scornfully called "extra-class morals"), are not the discovery of international social democracy. Moreover, they cannot in general be attributed to either socialist or capitalist values, since they are a product of mankind's historical evolution, the civilized foundations for the existence of any society that develops along a natural path. Whereas they complain of the CPSU's return to the humanistic and democratic essence of the socialist idea, we can only regret that this is being done so late and at a time when the attractiveness of socialism as a practice and system of values has become noticeably tarnished.

It is relevant, it seems, to emphasize that we came to the present understanding of the socialist idea on our own, on the basis of our own, sometimes bitter and tragic experience, as a result of our own exploration, which continues even now. In leading this exploration, the CPSU has finally shed the cloak of arrogant omniscience and messianic infallibility. This has enabled the party's leading forces to see the world as it is in fact, not as it "should be" according to the speculative schemes of Stalinism. Thus, perestroika has not only revealed Soviet society to the world, but in fact has also revealed the world to us anew and has returned to us the lost understanding of socialism as an intrinsic part of civilization.

Once again, as in the distant past when Marxism was an open teaching, creatively absorbing the highest achievements of human genius, we are turning (as is directly stated in the draft Platform) to the wealth of "all social thought and the historical experience of the 20th century." In this context, the ages-old reform experience of international social democracy, especially instructive experience, was regarded with close attention, taking the priorities of perestroika into account.

Does this mean that the CPSU, in preparing its plans for perestroika, is doomed to copy plans already implemented and the ideas of the social democrats? Of course not. The decision to imitate someone blindly would be an unforgivable mistake. Figuratively speaking, seedlings cultivated in a social democratic greenhouse can hardly be quickly transplanted to our native soil: its cultural soil is too exhausted and the skills of most of the gardeners, unfortunately, are too low. This is not the only problem: the CPSU, as everyone knows, is operating in a completely different system of socioeconomic

coordinates, relying on a fundamentally different historical experience and on different political realities and traditions. This statement does not at all keep us from acknowledging the great contributions of international social democracy to the theoretical development and practical implementation of a number of socialist ideas under the conditions of advanced Western societies where, thanks to its role, reinforced by the efforts of the workers' movement, the elements of socialism are represented so strongly today. The essence of the problem is that, after many decades of seclusion and a confrontational attitude toward the surrounding world, we are finally returning to the track of world development processes, and once again seeing socialism not as the antithesis, but as the creative synthesis of civilization's highest spiritual and material achievements.

It goes without saying, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the supporters of dogmatic socialism are aiming their criticism precisely at social democracy. Both the historical memory of the causes of the profound split between the two directions of the international socialist movement after the collapse of the II International, as well as the genetic influence of the past Stalinist anti-social democrat syndrome and the consequences of many years of purposefully discrediting the social-democratic way of thinking and acting are telling. Let us be direct: the communists, to prove their ideological rightness, became accustomed through inertia to blaming a great deal on social democracy's anti-communism. Meanwhile, its level of anti-communism was always, essentially, identified with the communists' anti-social democracy. Indeed, in our day, simplified views of the social democrats as mere "loyal managers" for the capitalists have still far from been eliminated. From this viewpoint, we cannot avoid the fact that the draft Platform has essentially become the first programmatic document in the history of the CPSU that has taken a noticeable step toward putting an end to false concepts about contemporary social democracy.

We are sure that one cannot help but notice anti-social democratic views. Moreover, one notices it with alarm, since such views are among the prejudices inherent in the totalitarian-ideocratic consciousness, which is probably the most persistent opponent of the democratic concept of perestroika today.

Our Social Democracy: Guidelines for Exploration

The lively interest of a large segment of our society in the original ideas and ideals of socialism, as well as in the experience and traditions of social democracy, is being displayed in various ways: in a theoretical, discussion form, in numerous articles in the press, and also in practice, stimulating the appearance in different regions of the country of formations that consider themselves part of the social-democratic trend. Apparently, since the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies has created the necessary constitutional prerequisites for a multi-party system, the day is not distant when a party (possibly, more than one) of Soviet social democrats will be

officially registered. However, even now the CPSU party organizations and communists are facing the problem of working out their own approaches to new issues in political life. In this regard, while not claiming a complete analysis, we would like to share some considerations about the image that is being drawn and the prospects for domestic social democracy.

According to press reports, in the USSR (in February of this year) there were up to 100 formations of a social-democratic persuasion (parties, clubs, associations, and centers) which operated in 50 cities throughout the country. The establishment of social-democratic parties has been announced in Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. However, judging by their leaders' declarations, at the present stage these formations are not so much pursuing social-democratic goals, as national goals, seeing their main task to be ensuring state independence for their peoples outside the framework of a renovated Soviet federation.

Among the new social-democratic formations, the Social Democrat Association (SDA) stands out. Its constituent congress was held in Tallin in January 1990. According to its creators' concept, the SDA is not a political party, but a kind of "Soviet Socialist International," i.e., a supra-party structure that coordinates the activity of the independent member organizations on a union-wide scale.

The "first forum of Soviet mensheviks," as SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, the Estonian CP Central Committee newspaper, christened the congress, approved its statutes and Declaration of Principles and declared the association a legal entity. Who are they, the "Soviet mensheviks?" To what do they aspire, what do they reject?

Even a most superficial familiarity with the documents leaves no doubts that conceptually they are "built" according to the model of the Socialist International's 1989 "Declaration of Principles" and the West German SDPG Program. The association shares the key values of classical social democracy (freedom, justice, solidarity, democracy, peace); it favors the creation of a democratic rule-of-law state based on parliamentary democracy, a multi-party system and real separation of the powers; it rejects violence and ideas of ethnic exclusiveness, and claims to monopolistic possession of the truth. In the opinion of the Declaration's writers, "the CPSU is not coping with the situation" and is in no condition to restructure society's foundation. Nonetheless, the social democrats state their support for communist reformers, believing (it is hard to agree with this) that the "interaction of honest forces in the CPSU with independent people's political movements will reinforce the base of perestroika and may bring it out of a stalemate condition."

How should we regard the appearance itself, after a 70-year hiatus, of groups and organizations in the country's political arena and, in the future, even of parties of

a social-democratic persuasion? Let us assume, above all, that we will regard it as an objective reality, reflecting the processes of democratization of our political life, society's first steps toward a party multi-structural system, pluralism of contemporary socialist thought, and a growing differentiation in the views of the politically active part of Soviet society. Moreover, it seems, perestroika will only gain from the appearance of intelligent, civilized opponents to the CPSU, interested in real renovation of the country. To judge by the programmatic intentions of the SDA, the social democrats, at least those who adhere to responsible, constructive positions and are open to dialogue and cooperation with other restructuring forces, may not only be a competitor for the CPSU, but also a loyal partner. Such a joining of forces, acting under the banner of the socialist idea, could be of great benefit to the country.

A realization of the expediency of exploring paths for mutual understanding and interaction with other social forces interested in fulfilling the potential of perestroika, it seems, is penetrating ever deeper into the ranks of the CPSU. After all, the section of the draft Platform which notes that the party is "ready for political dialogue and cooperation with anyone who supports the renovation of socialist society" orients communists precisely toward this. In our opinion, the basic line of political demarcation in the country is appearing today not at the junction between the CPSU and social democracy, but between supporters (within the CPSU and outside it) of the new paradigm of socialism, interpreted as a humane, democratic, self-renewing and self-improving society, on the one hand, and supporters of the command-administrative model of socialism, on the other.

While establishing a dialogue and cooperation with new political partners, it is important for the CPSU to preserve its own primacy. In our opinion, the two clauses in the draft Platform which give a contemporary interpretation of the party's identity acquire particular significance in this regard. First, there is the fact that it will keep its "unshakable adherence to the socialist choice and the ideas of October." Second, a renovated CPSU is seen as a party which "will build its policy based on a scientific analysis of new realities, creatively developing the legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin in the context of all social thought and the historical experience of the 20th century." These essential characteristics, together with the contemporary vision of socialism, also shape its originality, giving the CPSU the possibility of keeping its own face and sovereignty of thought and action, to not lose itself in the future against the mixed background of a multi-party society.

It would be naive to assume that the process of establishing contacts, not even to mention cooperation, between the CPSU and other sociopolitical forces will occur painlessly and smoothly. There are many obstacles to this. It seems, the lack of flexibility in our political structure, better suited to confrontation and demarcation, will inevitably make itself known. Relapses of its own infallibility complex—entirely natural for a party

that has had a monopoly on power for decades—may also affect the actions of the CPSU. However, we must rid ourselves of this, since the party is called on, under changing conditions, to work not for the rejection, but for the attraction of independently thinking people, including those who, while supporting a different viewpoint, rejoice at the work of perestroika.

Dialogue and cooperation, as everyone knows, are a two-way street. Therefore, a great deal depends on the representatives of the political opposition that is forming, above all, its constructive wing. However, even among the latter, including those who state their readiness to cooperate with progressive forces in the CPSU, some are already appearing who, while seeking their own political identity, put the basic emphasis on a demonstrative distancing of themselves from the ruling party. Most delegates to the constituent congress of the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (SDPR), held early this May in Moscow, set out along precisely this counterproductive path. In its Declaration of Principles and Manifesto, as opposed, incidentally, to the pathos of the SDA documents, the stress was obviously placed on a struggle against the CPSU, in whose history and results of whose social activity the Russian social democrats saw not even a single (!) "bright spot." It is no longer even a question of dialogue and interaction "with honest forces in the CPSU." Moreover, cooperation with the CPSU was qualified as an "immoral" act and the CPSU was declared the "only organization," with regard to which the SDPR "openly announces its opposition."

We can only guess at the motivations inciting the leaders of the "Soviet mensheviks" (basically, one and the same people are joining the leadership of the SDA and the SDPR) to make their positions so much more strict in the only 5 months that have passed since the Tallinn forum. Probably, someone found it possible to borrow the experience of the new East European social democratic formations, which are trying with all their might to distance themselves from the communist parties along with their successors. However, this same experience indicates that this method of self-identification, not handing laurels to even one of the social-democratic parties, has only strengthened the disorder and scattering of left-wing forces on the whole.

There are also problems of another order. For instance, in approaches to domestic social democrats, one must take into account the fact that the ideological and political boundaries that are appearing in our country for associations today are extraordinarily eroded and more than conditional. "Political labels," one could say, are scattered about underfoot. It suffices merely to bend down and pick one up, in order to pass for a liberal, a Christian democrat, a "Green" or a social democrat. Therefore, there may be many people among those who consider themselves social democrats, in particular, who are alien to it in terms of their views on classical social democracy, not sharing its values and rejecting the

socialist idea itself. Understandably, productive interaction between communists and those who hold such views does not seem possible.

So, judging by the speeches at the SDA and SDPR congresses, even among their activists there are many people with very confused concepts of the history, traditions and values of social democracy. We are referring to people whose aggressive intolerance of the socialist idea, not even to mention the Communist Party, under conditions of a Western pluralist society would have indicated their membership not in social democratic formations, but in those of a conservative or right-radical persuasion. Here, we should remind this kind of "social democrat" of the well-known statement made by V. Brandt and U. Palme: "If we dare not speak more about socialism, we can believe that the opponent has already half-way won."

In our opinion, the prospects for social democracy as an independent political trend are also unclear. Judging by the congresses in Tallinn and Moscow, the active social-democratic movement is quite narrow in a socioprofessional respect, small in number and weakened by intra-group contradictions. The SDPR has 4,000 members, of whom about 2,000 are from Volgograd and 500, from Moscow. Regardless of the fact that the association has proclaimed itself a "people's organization for labor," it does not (nor, incidentally, does the SDPR) have roots or solid ties with the workers' movement, i.e., it lacks one of the main support points inherent in Western social democracy. Meanwhile, it is hard to clarify where the programmatic uniqueness of domestic social democracy lies, or its concepts on ways to adapt traditional social democratic values to Soviet reality. In any case, it will not be easy for an inexperienced ordinary voter to understand what specific intentions the Russian social democrats are concealing, for instance, behind their key formulation: "Support for education and progress, with simultaneous concern for protecting society from upheavals and egotism."

Of course, this kind of difficulty is not accidental. Not only an artificially interrupted historical tradition, but also, in particular, our society's economic situation, social topography, level of political culture and psychological condition, which are unfavorable for establishing a strong social democracy, are telling.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to disregard the appearance of the first upshoots of a social democratic trend in the country. It is important that this trend, having inherited the values and non-confrontational culture of classic social democracy, assert itself on the soil of socialist ideas and operate in the interests of fulfilling the complete potential of perestroika.

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ECONOMICS

Economic Policy and Convertibility of the Ruble

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[Text] Today as never before it is clearly impossible to build a modern, efficient economy using old methods. It is also impossible to further see the national economy of a huge country as a big factory, where it is possible to issue orders to increase development work, transfer workers from section to section, dismiss the foreman, etc. With such an approach, the higher bodies of power inevitably "coordinate" the work of specific sectors, enterprises or collectives. Larger, more profound problems remain beyond their field of view. As a result, there is only the illusion of economic management. Really, there may be even more spontaneous elements, than under the conditions of an uncontrollable market.

The way out of this dead-end lies in the radicalization and acceleration of economic reform, aimed at creating a full-fledged regulated market economy with corresponding social protection mechanisms. One of the most important features of such an economy is convertibility of the national currency.

What Is Convertibility?

Convertibility is usually defined as the possibility of free use of the national monetary unit for all operations and its unrestricted exchange for other currencies. In this interpretation, convertibility presumes the mandatory presence of a number of elements: a real and unified exchange rate, free access to foreign currency (revocation of the hard-currency monopoly), an official or free hard-currency market, the removal of restrictions on using the monetary unit in foreign economic activity, and fulfillment of its monetary functions within the country. Let me comment immediately: there is no commonly accepted definition of convertibility. Western experts, for example, distinguish among dozens of actually existing and more than a hundred theoretically possible variants.

As a rule, they distinguish between financial (into other currencies) and commodity (into goods), as well as external and internal convertibility. External convertibility signifies the absence of restrictions on the use of the national monetary unit by foreigners (non-residents) in the country and beyond its borders. In this regard, the market mechanism guarantees conversion of sums in the local currency, by choice, into other currencies, goods or securities. The developed capitalist countries started the movement toward convertibility precisely with this form. Internal convertibility refers to the rejection of limitations on the use by physical and legal entities (residents) of their own national currency in foreign

economic relations, for instance, to pay for imports or for the purchase of foreign currency.

They also distinguish between partial and complete convertibility, by this meaning the abolition of restrictions only on current transactions or on all items of the balance of payments. As a rule, there are combined forms of convertibility in practice, for instance, external convertibility of currency may be ensured, but only for current transactions. Sometimes, internal convertibility is interpreted as the reversibility of money into goods within a country, i.e., its purchasing power. This is a faulty point of view, since it generally makes no sense to speak of the convertibility of money that cannot be turned into goods or services.

As world experience shows, the main indicator of convertibility of a monetary unit is the absence of currency restrictions, i.e., of measures called on to regulate the balance of payments via non-market means (quantitative quotas, licensing, restrictions on making foreign payments, import taxes, plurality of currency exchange rates, and requirements for sale to the state of foreign currency receipts). All developed countries have approached convertibility by weakening restrictions, starting with current transactions (trade in goods and services), i.e., by ensuring the free conversion of non-residents' receipts into the local currency. An indispensable condition for membership in the International Monetary Fund is the mandatory achievement of convertibility in current transactions by revoking bilateral payment agreements and plurality of currency exchange rates. Incidentally, presently, of the 152 IMF member countries, 67 have achieved currency convertibility in trade transactions, about 15—in the majority of financial transactions, but only Luxembourg has complex convertibility by all criteria.

In the final account, convertibility is a definite procedure for foreign economic ties, including currency and monetary elements and operating in a market economy. Consequently, the program to introduce convertibility of the ruble simply must stipulate a radical restructuring of the entire economic mechanism and the creation of a normally functioning market. It cannot be reduced to technical questions of establishing currency exchange rates or standards for hard currency deductions. Foreign experience shows that the introduction of convertibility is always viewed in the overall framework of economic policy and is achieved by a series of consecutive government measures. In this regard, each new element of convertibility has stimulated economic development.

Therefore, the main goal in introducing convertibility of the ruble lies in creating favorable conditions for the maximally effective development of industry and for reducing the lag behind world standards in all areas, including standard of living. Such conditions include the possibility of direct competition with foreign companies and the search for "niches" in the international division of labor, the existence of a choice between the domestic and foreign market on the basis of comparing price

factors, and access to the best world technology. In short, it is a question of creating conditions and incentives for developing initiative and raising competitiveness.

The path to convertibility is a political path to an open market economy and money of full value. The question of convertibility is an indicator of sorts for the market direction of the reforms. If we put off solving this problem for the indeterminate future, the overall motion toward an efficient economy will slow down.

The Status of the Soviet Ruble and the 1986-1989 Reform

Presently, our foreign economic policy has 100 percent currency restrictions, i.e., in practice a full official ban on using the ruble in international operations, including a ban on the export of bank notes, a strict limitation on hard currency exchange, and administrative distribution of hard currency. All features of convertibility, which has been officially prohibited since 1926, when the foreign functions of the 1922-1947 ruble note (chervonets) were abolished, are absent.

That which is sometimes humorously called "planned convertibility" i.e., the existing policy of purely administrative distribution and exchange of hard currency which appeared more than 60 years ago in the name of protecting the ruble, has created conditions such that convertibility has existed... in the "black" market under conditions extremely unfavorable for us. As a result, tremendous sums in rubles (estimated at several billion) are circulating abroad illegally, and there are hundreds of millions of dollars within the country, at an exchange rate higher than the official rate by a factor of 25-35.

Essentially, not all the elements of a hard currency system are functioning here: currency exchange rates and plans, auctions, and control, which under the conditions of our administrative system coincide only in name with the corresponding realities of a market economy. Thus, in practice the currency exchange rate reflects nothing and regulates nothing, i.e., it acts as a meaningless coefficient for conversion, which makes statistics inaccessible for analysis. The redistribution of hard currency receipts (to 95 percent) is implemented administratively through budget allocations. Partial liberalization of foreign trade procedures is not accompanied by the necessary changes in hard currency policy, which has not, moreover, been coordinated with monetary and credit policy.

As everyone knows, the restructuring of the USSR's foreign economic ties started in 1986. The new hard currency policy was extremely inconsistent and even erroneous. Many measures were obviously anti-market in nature, led to economic fragmentation and were unable in practice to encourage foreign ties, since they were virtually uncoordinated with domestic economic processes. The reforms were not comprehensive and there is not even an elementary assessment of their results.

On the whole, we can say that 1986-1989 not only failed to bring us closer, but rather took us even farther away from solving the convertibility problem, having evoked a number of negative consequences.

A graphic example is the establishment of a hard currency exchange rate. In 1987, more than 3,000 differentiated hard currency coefficients (DVK) were introduced for internal export and import computations. Already in December 1988, the proper decision was made to revoke the DVKs and to introduce in 1990 a standardized estimated exchange rate for trade payments, which was reduced by 50 percent, and in 1991—a new official exchange rate. However, the decision to revoke the DVK was not implemented, and the introduction of the new rate was attached to the price reform, which threatens new delays.

Even in 1987, a decision was made on the possibility of circulation of hard currency resources among enterprises, and a direct instruction was given in 1988 to hold hard currency auctions. A year was required to organize the first of them. The economic significance of the first auctions was insignificant and the system for holding them (the absence of free formation of currency supply and demand, as well as of free access to trade) fully preserved the principle of administrative currency monopoly. Since an insignificant share of hard currency lies in the hands of enterprises, such auctions will never lead to the creation of an economically significant hard currency market. Moreover, the purchase of hard currency does not automatically signify the possibility of importing anything.

However, the problem is not only the contradictory nature or delay of the reforms. It seems to me that the basic positions of the new currency policy, in addition to purely internal factors, directly contribute to devaluation of the ruble. Hard currency cost-accounting, self-support and self-financing, and the existing mechanism for hard currency deductions all represent a course toward fragmentation of the economy. Even today, an enterprise with a considerable share of exports has no interest in developing the domestic market and is not oriented toward selling its output for rubles. After all, it is clear that in fact only exporters can receive hard currency today, including in the form of credit, and can make qualitative leaps directly because of imported technology. What sense is there in working for a devalued ruble under conditions of commodity scarcity, when one can earn hard currency that will be accepted in any country in the world? Cost-accounting in hard currency today is economically isolated from cost-accounting in rubles and, after all, convertibility presumes precisely the destruction of such barriers. The use of foreign currencies in domestic circulation along various channels (legal and illegal)—from currency calculations between enterprises to the hard currency "berezka" stores and cooperatives, etc.—entails considerable negative consequences. If, let us assume, there are 500 billion dollars in illegal circulation, which is equivalent to 10 billion rubles at the "black" market exchange rate, this

then comprises almost 10 percent of the volume of the entire cash monetary mass in circulation. In fact, this necessitates an absolute increase in the quantity of money with the same mass of goods which, naturally, also aggravates shortages and devalues the ruble, since commodities always "seek" money of full value.

The task, in no way justified, of procuring hard currency at any cost under conditions of an empty market and the introduction of foreign currency in domestic circulation have sharply reduced incentives for earning rubles and has accelerated their devaluation (literally in the last 2 years, the rate for the dollar on the "black" market has jumped from 5-7 to 15-20 rubles).

Add to this the careless increase in foreign loans, as well as the virtually unchanged, purely administrative procedure for distributing currency (through "common stock" in the form of a hard currency plan), and the situation could be called critical. Meanwhile, we continue to seek the answer in strengthening the hard currency monopoly, "tightening the screws," and in administration, but not in changing the strictly economic mechanism in accordance with world experience. The situation with glasnost is also unfavorable: as before, standard statistics, without which there can be no objective analysis of the situation, are entirely lacking in the area of hard currency.

Paradoxically, the opening of the economy is seen from without (and quite extensively) as the granting of rights to enterprises themselves to sell production... with the removal of a large share of hard currency in favor of the state. However, this has not made the economy more open, yet incompetence has increased noticeably. Whereas certain liberalization steps were taken, they concerned foreign currency, not the ruble. As before, the domestic market is reliably isolated from the world economy by currency restrictions, administrative monopoly, state orders, etc.

We must realize that the situation is complicated by the rapid expansion of official and unofficial foreign contacts on the level of organizations and citizens and by the increase in emigration. Under these conditions, the demand for convertible currency increases in a nearly geometric progression and is heated by the official currency policy. This intensifies the disorganization of monetary circulation and makes steps toward convertibility of the Soviet ruble an urgent task for the present day, not an abstract goal for the distant future.

What Should the Program to Introduce Convertibility Be?

Despite the fact that this question was raised at the July (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and that the USSR Council of Ministers and the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies gave the appropriate instructions on its practical implementation at various times, to this day there is no effective program to introduce convertibility.

We can hardly hope seriously to introduce convertibility by decree in the course of a month or two, having "prescribed" a so-called "shock therapy" for the economy. Obviously, for the USSR it cannot even be a question of complete convertibility (i.e., both in trade, as well as in financial transactions), even in the fairly distant future. Moreover, due to the uncompetitive nature of a large share of the links in our national economy, an ill-considered forcing of events could have dangerous consequences. First, for the time being the state still does not know how to regulate a market economy and almost completely lacks the appropriate mechanisms and structures. Second, a great many of our enterprises simply will be unable to endure competition and will close down, which is unacceptable from a social viewpoint. A more realistic path at present is to switch to partial convertibility in current transactions to the extent of implementing a broad-scale reform of the economic mechanism.

Taking world experience into account, it seems, the program to introduce convertibility should be based on the following general principles:

- Gradual development of market relations and a weakening of the system for strictly planned distribution, funding and price-setting; the active use of economic regulating levers and rejection of administration; decentralization and a decrease in the role of the Union budget; and separation of enterprises and banks from the state, even if it remains the proprietor;
- Opening the economy in stages through the weakening of trade and currency restrictions (expanding the opportunities for residents to operate in foreign markets and for non-residents to operate in the USSR), developing the ruble's foreign economic functions (its use by foreigners in commercial transactions and, later, also as an international means of payment), decentralizing foreign loans for purposes of raising their effectiveness and creating an adequate exchange rate mechanism; in this regard, the ruble should be the sole legal means of payment within the territory of the USSR;
- Implementation of a consistent course toward the unification of domestic and foreign economic, monetary-credit and currency policy, while granting the appropriate status and authorities to the USSR State Bank; careful arrangement and coordination of the conduct of measures of a general economic nature and the reform of foreign economic activity.

All these principles, essentially, reduce to the following: either we really take a course toward convertibility, and decisive reform of the economy should not then be restrained by any dogmas whatsoever, or the talk of reform will remain talk and our equal participation in the world economic community will not be feasible. The heart of a healthy economy is a healthy ruble, and it is necessary to consider all transformations of the economic mechanism in precisely this context. Evidently,

there is no "third," moderately radical path. Unquestionably, we must soberly assess the difficulties on the path of reform, but this does not mean that delaying their implementation will let us solve the problem less painfully.

Therefore, the claim that creating an export base, "real" integration in the world economy, stabilization of the economy, etc., should be mandatory prerequisites for convertibility, in my opinion, is unconvincing and reminiscent of the "chicken or the egg" argument. Real restructuring of the currency system can be conducted only in the context of an entire economic reform, in the process of implementing a unified "package" of general economic (including financial and monetary and credit) and foreign economic measures. Essentially, it is a question of building an open market economy, which also requires strict practical decisions, including administrative and legislative decisions.

The thesis on the need for a program to switch to convertibility in stages also seems debatable to me. There can be no clear temporary stages in this area whatsoever and it would hardly be possible to seriously regard stages, setting one's teeth on edge, attached to 5-year periods and invariably starting on 1 January. It could and should be a question of consistent practical implementation of a whole set of reciprocally coordinated measures which take into account a real and changing situation. The more rapidly we manage to implement the drafted program, the better, if the consequences in this regard are controlled. The main thing is that there be no unwarranted delay of the reforms, no variously timed and mutually exclusive "launchings" of their various elements.

General Economic Measures

World experience with anti-inflationary and stabilizing programs shows that these are all conducted in the briefest time periods and are based, above all, on reform of the monetary and financial mechanisms.

The central element of any economic improvement program lies in strengthening trust on the part of the population, enterprises and organizations. It is clear today that this can only be achieved by accelerating the radical economic reform. We must begin by establishing procedures for a strict budget economy, reviewing all centralized financing programs, analyzing their efficiency and expediency, and sharply curtailing the state's role in financing the economy and in distributing hard currency. We must also not rule out the passing of an extraordinary budget in the middle of this year in order to accelerate elimination of the deficit.

In the situation that has taken shape, the urgent task is to build strict limits on the state's inflationary activity into the national economic mechanism, capable of putting the government in a clear framework and halting unrestricted emission and credit and budget expansion and, consequently, the devaluation of the ruble. For these purposes, we should design and introduce an economic

mechanism to regulate the budget deficit. In our essentially one-sector economy, the budget deficit, even financed by securities, is an important cause of imbalance. Since we should not hope for the administrative system's good will, we need decisive and, perhaps, unpopular measures, including a legislative ban on the state budget deficit as of 1991.

Along with this, we should insure the existing state debt through bonds, i.e., make it payable and periodic with a gradual release of bonds on the market.

Another urgent step lies in removing the USSR State Bank from subordination to the USSR Council of Ministers, with its subsequent accountability only to the USSR Supreme Soviet and with the allocation of broad authorities in monetary and credit regulation. We should legislate against the granting of credit by the State Bank to the Ministry of Finances in order to cover budget deficits. Under our conditions, the central bank should be more independent, than in any country of the world, bearing full constitutional responsibility for the stability of the national currency and ensuring the uniformity of monetary and credit policy and currency policy.

In short, we are faced with a need to reform the entire monetary system, including to form a fundamentally new emission mechanism, to eliminate the separation of cash and non-cash circulations, to convert the State Bank into a genuine central bank, and to switch to regulating the total monetary mass and credit via monetary and credit policy.

Of course, it is enticing to "dump" the accumulated inflationary potential for purposes of accelerating the economic reform and for a less painful conversion to market prices. However, the monetary reform that is being extensively propagandized, involving confiscation of a share of the population's money, is utterly unacceptable. Elementary computations show that such a reform will have an insignificant effect and will not solve the problem in principle (it will have to be repeated in a year or two). Moreover, it is pertinent to recall that building a rule-of-law state must not begin with illegality.

Moreover, in itself the release of new money without any confiscation whatsoever would make sense as an important psychological measure, if it were one of the elements of a reform of the whole monetary system, including, primarily, a sharp curtailment in cash circulation, the introduction of the sale of bank notes by the State Bank to commercial banks, and the creation of a civilized mechanism for monetary and credit regulation.

The proposal to seek additional sources for removing several tens of billions of rubles from circulation by way of the sale of real estate, apartments, imported goods with high budget efficiency, hard currency, etc., subsequently eliminating part of the monetary mass, seems attractive in this light. This would reduce the excess of money in circulation and, combined with a comprehensive reform of the monetary system, could yield rapid and effective results. It is no less important to bring

percentage rates into accordance with inflation, i.e., to raise them considerably; otherwise, money will never become expensive. For a market economy, high rates naturally restrict the growth of credit and, consequently, non-cash emission.

Understandably, we can achieve a balanced economy and, thus, draw closer to returning monetary functions to the ruble only by consistently moving toward a full-fledged market economy.

The key question here is the real independence of economic agents, i.e., enterprises, banks and citizens, to perform economic activity. The point is not so much the form of ownership, as the clear legal separation of the functions of the state and of enterprises: the one should regulate without hindering, while the others should produce. The state can own an enterprise, yet this does not mean that someone thousands of kilometers away should indicate what to produce and how, where to sell it and at what price, how much money to leave for development, or what profit to receive and what salaries to pay.

One way to solve the problem lies in converting state enterprises into independent joint stock societies. At first, under conditions of the absence of a developed market for capital, the state in any case will remain the only or basic stockholder. However, with its rights limited by law and by statute, there will be a possibility for our inefficient enterprises to grow into the market more smoothly. The sale of stocks to "private owners" should be legalized, but this will not have fundamental significance in the near future. For accelerated implementation of a "auction" program, special legislation and an independent state body, accountable to the USSR Supreme Soviet, are necessary.

A New Currency Policy

The main path to convertibility lies, in my opinion, in the gradual weakening of hard currency restrictions on commercial use of the ruble, including trade payments and permission for foreigners to earn and spend rubles in the USSR and abroad. This will be a difficult process and may occur only gradually (albeit in connection with a need to control the inevitable fall in the rate for the ruble). In this regard, an absolutely necessary condition is a ban on circulation of foreign currency within the territory of the USSR in any form, along with the implementation of other steps to strengthen the monetary economy. Stability of the transitional period in the hard currency sphere will depend, on the whole, on the pace of decentralization of economic life, the size of the hard currency supply, and the influx of foreign capital.

The weakening of currency restrictions and convertibility in general, as already stated, are not very compatible with our existing systems of hard currency planning and deductions and our principles of hard currency self-support and cost-accounting. In order to straighten out the numerous distortions here, above all, we should provide free and equal access to foreign hard currency, at least for legal entities, reduce to a minimum the direct

distribution and use of hard currency by the state, and mutually coordinate the hard currency and foreign trade mechanisms.

All this requires the most rapid conversion to a new system for redistributing hard currency and the elimination of the existing practice of the "gracious" deduction to enterprises of part of the hard currency funds earned by them. Since such deductions in general are not stipulated by our basic articles of export, the government currently has the overwhelming share of hard currency receipts, which are distributed purely administratively.

A different approach presumes leaving all hard currency with those who earned it, in the hope that others will be able to acquire it on the market. Considering our export structure and the condition of the domestic market, we should realize that at first this system will not be able to be sufficiently effective (the demand for hard currency will be too great). Yet, in the final account, the future lies precisely with it.

The most suitable variant for the current period, it seems, presumes the sale of all or a large part (for instance, 90-95 percent) of hard currency receipts to a central or other fully authorized banks at an official exchange rate. The banks, in turn, will be obligated to provide hard currency for those who have received an imported license at the very same exchange rate (the issue of licenses will be coordinated with the condition of the balance of payments). In this formulation of the question, even budget organizations should receive allocations in rubles and purchase hard currency with them. This would in fact mean the formation of an official hard currency market as the first step in the formation of a free inter-bank hard currency market. In parallel, it would be expedient to immediately sell some of the centralized hard currency at auctions and distribute it in the form of credits.

For the sake of fairness, we should note that these suggestions are evoking much criticism and many objections. According to the logic of the architects of our existing hard currency order, such a system in principle is incapable of stimulating exports. They... are right. There really will be no incentives whatsoever with an elevated exchange rate for the ruble, which, unquestionably, we must significantly reduce at the same time that we eliminate the differentiated hard currency coefficients which have failed to justify themselves. There will also be no incentives without radically curtailing centralized hard currency incomes—to at least 10-20 percent of total receipts. Therefore, legal separation of official hard currency reserves from the hard currency funds of enterprises, organizations and banks, and the elimination of the Foreign Economic Bank's monopoly on hard currency transactions are necessary.

Essentially, it is a question of purposefully dismantling the administrative monopoly on hard currency transactions, including by using of new currency legislation

which would strengthen the introduction of a new currency planning system with a clear separation of the hard currency funds of the state and of economic agents, as well as by granting large banks the rights to carry out hard currency transactions.

An important question of the new legislation is decentralization of foreign loans in the context of republics, banks and enterprises. Above all, this implies that one and the same legal entity will take, use and expend credit.

Elimination of the hard currency monopoly, however, is not equivalent to a rejection of centralized hard currency regulation. We urgently need to develop and implement a comprehensive USSR hard currency policy, including on problems of hard currency control, exchange rates and the market, and to most rapidly join international organizations (the IMF, the International Reconstruction and Development Bank, the Bank for International Accounts). It seems to me that we cannot have a unified currency policy without concentrating the corresponding functions (management of official gold reserves, the issue of hard currency licenses, etc.) in a central bank—the USSR State Bank.

Yet another step toward convertibility is to introduce a more realistic standardized exchange rate for the ruble with respect to foreign currencies, at least initially in trade transactions. It seems that such a step could be implemented even before the price reform. This is explained by the fact that it is impossible to "calculate" an exchange rate based on our prices: under conditions of scarcity, they can in no way reflect the ruble's purchasing power. The main criterion for establishing a currency exchange rate is the condition of the country's balance of payments, the regulation of which, in turn, should be ensured by changing the ruble exchange rate. In the transitional period, the system of currency exchange rates should also (albeit temporarily) include a free joint stock rate and, possibly, a rate for non-trade accounts. The strategic direction here is convergence in proportion to the extent of stabilization of the domestic official and market currency exchange rate market (with the establishment of a standardized rate in the future) and the creation of a reliable mechanism for regulating market rate fluctuations. In parallel with this, a currency market should also be created in its two basic forms: auctions to sell centralized reserves, and a constantly functioning inter-bank market.

The pace of our movement toward introduction of convertibility depends decisively on the stable condition of the balance of payments, which cannot be ensured without curtailing inefficient centralized hard currency outlays and loans. Economically independent republics and enterprises should answer for their obligations themselves. The main means of stabilizing the balance of payments might be a program for attracting foreign capital in the form of joint or completely foreign enterprises, including in special economic zones. In this regard, the economic and legal status of Soviet, joint, and

foreign enterprises should not differ significantly. Such a program, long ago imminent, is more important than foreign loans for raising the competitiveness of our economy.

A complex and, for now, unresolved problem is the right of individual citizens to use hard currency funds. Consider an elementary situation: the exchange of foreign currency during foreign trips. The standards for this exchange have not changed for 30 years, but now hard currency costs more rubles by a factor of 10. Does this not acknowledge the degree of devaluation of the ruble? Of course, it is hard to expect increases in the standards of exchange in the near future under conditions of the rapid growth in trips and the balance of payments deficit. However, it would be possible even today to grant citizens the possibility of earning, importing and exporting, and keeping hard currency in a bank without the interference of bureaucrats but, naturally, with the payment of appropriate taxes. As stated above, there should be no domestic retail trade in hard currency—in the extreme case, orders from catalogues without cash transfers.

An example was given of the illegal circulation of convertible currency. In practice, it now circulates freely, destabilizing our domestic monetary circulation. If it is put in banks, even with the payment of interest, this will then bring the state a hard currency income and, primarily, will enable it to control the situation.

A realistic approach to the problem under consideration requires us to acknowledge that long-term planning to introduce convertibility is complicated today, since the development of events in the economy does not lend itself to accurate forecasting. In addition, the persistent implementation of the intended reforms is capable of rapidly providing the desired results. Partial convertibility of the Soviet ruble could already be possible by the mid-1990s. Yet, if we generally do nothing, a crisis awaits us, the solution to which will be accompanied by unpredictable consequences. It is finally time to convert to an economic policy befitting a great state.

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Can We Do Without a Food Market?

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[Article by V. Kiselev, laboratory chief, USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economic Mathematics Institute, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] In choosing ways to solve the food problem in recent decades, stress was placed on increased financing for the agroindustrial complex and on strengthening its material and technical base. As a result, the basic funds and circulating assets of agriculture grew by a factor of 5.1 in 1965-1988. Regardless of the impressive growth in production potential, the volume of gross agricultural

output increased by 62 percent (final agricultural output, without inter-economic consumption, loss and fodder imports, according to the author's estimates, increased less than 50 percent).

Technical re-equipment of agriculture alone turned out to be insufficient for significant shifts in the country's food supply. We still need an economic mechanism which productively uses the flow of materials and financial resources. Such a mechanism did not exist in the past, and does not exist even now. Yet, without it, no matter how great the allocated resources may be, no great yield will come of them.

The passing of laws on land, ownership and leasing has created legal prerequisites for radical transformations of production relations in agriculture and for raising its efficiency. It is a question of the equal development of different forms of ownership, of a radical change in the position of both the individual, as well as the collective producer: his transformation into an independently managing subject.

Under what conditions will restructuring of the APK bring the long-awaited abundance? After all, attempts were repeatedly made in the past to enhance market relations in the agrarian sector. Numerous decisions were made on intensifying cost-accounting, converting to self-financing and full economic independence for kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the right to sell agricultural production exceeding the state order at free prices, to store production on farms, to export on the basis of direct ties, etc.

In the final account, these decisions have changed little. The proclaimed laws remained basically on paper. Above all, in our opinion, the absence of a food market in the country is telling. Both small goods production and cost-accounting, together with economic independence, are elements of a market system and cannot operate, the more so effectively, outside of it. Without a radical transformation of the mechanism for implementing production, none of our innovations to better orient the agroindustrial industry toward commodity production will become widespread. The planning and administrative system will reject them as elements which are alien to it.

The problems and difficulties of creating a full-fledged food market are stipulated by the specific nature of social and price policy. There are six types of prices in the country for agricultural produce: state purchase prices, prices with additions for unprofitable farms, prices with additions for sale beyond an achieved level, Consumers' Cooperative Union prices, market prices, and state retail prices. The latter are the lowest and are supported by subsidies which comprised more than 60 billion rubles in 1989, and should exceed 90 billion in 1990. The maximum prices for the most important products are greater than the minimum prices by a factor of 2-4.

The unchanged state prices for food products are seen as a definite guarantee of the stability of all remaining prices and even of social stability. That is why it is so difficult to reject this.

In addition, one cannot help but see that the consequences of multi-level prices for the APK are not merely unfavorable, but destructive. They create a nourishing environment for machinations and speculation and for development of the shadow economy, a significant part of which is involved in the agroindustrial complex. After all, redistribution of production among the price levels is the simplest way to obtain shadow incomes.

Also, the economic independence of sovkhozes and kolkhozes is often displayed not in a search for reserves in order to increase production, but in finding every possible loophole to get high-level prices.

The subsidy of prices also complicates the saturation of the urban market, because it turns producers into consumers. In the vicinities of a few cities, recently still well-supplied with food products, the peasants in practice did not eat the meat that they produced. They sold all output from private plots to the state at high purchase prices, and then bought it in the city for personal consumption at low retail prices.

The main problem is that, with subsidized prices, an intermediary between the producers and consumers inevitably appears in the form of the state procurement system. It monopolizes the channel for the sale of production and in every way obstructs the development of storage and processing on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Right now, steers are driven up to 400 kilometers for slaughtering, thus losing up to one-third of their weight, not because they cannot be butchered at the farm, but only in order to bring them into the state procurement system and get a subsidy.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the procurement and trade workers, due to the absence of real cost-accounting relations in this area, not only have no incentives to reduce losses but, conversely, have a direct interest in keeping them high.

Production which enters the procurement and trade network is deprived of an interested owner. It becomes nobody's. It has an accompanying entity or temporary holders, who receive it according to a list, send it according to a list, and spoil or steal it according to standards. Having monopolized the only mass channel for the sale of production, the procurement workers thrust their own conditions on farms, underpaying in the final account up to 20 percent of the money owed to farms. Here, private incomes depend not on the quality of production or implemented volume, but on the sizes of losses and the degree of scarcity. Nowhere is the opposition of departmental and social interests displayed so openly as in this sphere.

The results are well-known. Over 30 percent of cultivated plant products perishes in the depths of the procurement and trade system. Almost as much, in absolute expression, is left in the fields due to failure to provide transportation or to delaying the harvest periods. About 1 million tons of meat is lost due to insufficient meat processing capacities and the shortage of refrigerators. The farms receive half their due, because of the overexpenditure of fodder related to forced delays in sending cattle to the meat combines, and there, due to a reduction of their weight in expectation of slaughter.

The procurement and trade organizations have not reacted in the best manner to the increased supply of agricultural output by small producers, as well as by kolkhozes and sovkhozes exceeding the state orders. Purchase directly at farms is restricted, and prices are reduced to such a degree that sometimes it is more profitable, for instance, to send scarce early tomatoes for processing, rather than sale. There are many cases in which the trade system will not receive production delivered according to contracts by the producer's transportation. Naturally, this does not raise labor collective's interest in beyond-the-plan production, and undermines the small producers who are now beginning to appear.

Common sense and world experience indicate that only a procurement and trade system operating on the principles of complete subordination to the market, forming their income from the difference between sales receipts and expenditures, will be able to ensure highly efficient commodity circulation. Losses should not be written off, but taken out of cost-accounting income. Under these conditions, it will be more profitable to store a significant share of production and, as much as possible, to process output and to do pre-sale processing (sorting, packing) at the farms themselves, and then send it directly into the trade network on a contract basis.

In order to prevent monopoly tendencies, especially a reduction in the number of varieties and in contract prices or the inflation of retail prices by restricting the volume of sales, it is necessary to develop alternative variants of sale and encourage the creation of stores (including by selling some of the existing ones to farms and associations) and cooperative and joint stock marketing organizations. The state procurement system could perform its functions on an equal basis with other organizations, attracting suppliers by offering a stable price and quality and reliability of service, not because of monopolistic rights.

Such a system would open up a road for small producers, would interest trade in increasing its volumes of sale and reducing losses (due to this, the volume of food sales could grow by 20-25 percent), would strengthen incentives in agriculture, and would put producers of all types under equal conditions. In order for it to work, "only" market (balanced) prices are needed.

Of course, prices can and should change depending on the quality, time and place of sale, amount of processing,

and ecological cleanliness of production, not on the owner's departmental membership or on organizational forms of production. Deviations from balanced prices are also possible due to subsidies or because of price controls, but on small scales, not substantially deforming the entire system of commodity and monetary relations.

However, how do we convert to genuine market prices, if people are annoyed even without this by increasing living expenses, growth of shortages, and social instability? The population sees market prices only as a worsening of its own economic situation and, as the results of sociological surveys show, will not accept conversion to them even with paid compensation. Under such conditions, fears of a social outburst are entirely substantiated. It is important to overcome the mass delusion that has taken root, to the effect that the existing structure for prices serves the interests of the poorer strata of the population. This can be done only by full glasnost on questions of the real nature of the existing distribution system.

Budget research shows that beyond the borders of Moscow and certain other large administrative centers, families with an income of up to 50 rubles a month per person are paying more for a kilogram of beef by a factor of 1.3, than families with a per capita income above 200 rubles. Consequently, the poorer categories least of all enjoy the "advantages" of low, subsidized prices. Under conditions of scarcity, above all he who has free access to the product gets the price subsidy. As a rule, such people are residents of capital cities, as well as administrative and trade workers. As a result, roughly 80 percent of subsidies are received by only 20 percent of the population.

Can we speak of social justice, if the entire population of the country pays taxes in order to feed only a small part of the population more cheaply, and not even the part that suffers the most? In Moscow, for instance, where inexpensive meat has not yet come to an end, the residents, according to budget studies, consume more than 100 kilograms of meat and meat products per capita, in practice more than in other cities by a factor of 2.

Given the existing conditions, society is faced with a choice: either to feed itself half-starving at low state prices, or to convert basically to market (balanced) prices and rapidly feed the country. The question is not whether there should or should not be a market in the APK, but how to really protect the poor strata of the population under conditions of a market economy. In our opinion, in order to do this it is necessary to implement the following steps.

First, we must compensate for the increased prices for meat, animal and vegetable oil, sugar and vegetables by paying the population an addition to its incomes amounting to the 90 billion rubles that now go to subsidies. It is important that this money already exists and there is no need to review the budget. This would be

about 300 rubles annually for every resident of the country, which would be more tangible for the poorer families. This is a good aid for those for whom the bazaar is their basic source of food. Only the few who consume more than 60 kilograms of meat per year at state prices will lose.

The compensation could be paid equally for all population categories, or it could be differentiated by income levels. It could be paid to one member of the family, or paid according to other social criteria.

Let us note that this will not only ensure great social justice, but will also create a certain reduction in the demand for food: after all, not all people will spend their assistance on meat alone.

Second, it is expedient to keep prices for products, which comprise the basis of nourishment, especially for the poorer strata of the population (flour, bread, and whole milk products), at a low level and to subsidize them from the budget.

Third, we should increase the differentiation of prices depending on the quality and social prestige of products. The highest quality varieties should "carry" the basic share of material outlays for production and should subsidize the lower varieties. The meat that the overwhelming majority of the population now buys at 2 rubles per kilogram will, most likely, no longer exist. To make up for it, the cuts that the ordinary customer never sees may cost not 5 rubles, but 15. Incidentally, they are sold at such prices, but only on the black market.

Of course, changing the prices in itself does not solve the problem. Without re-orienting both the producers, as well as the entire procurement and trade sphere toward market relations, we cannot expect prices to stimulate the growth of food production and a reduction in outlays.

The creation of a food market in the country will unquestionably give a powerful impetus to development of the agroindustrial complex. However, it will fade rapidly, given an absence of material and technical support. Right now, agriculture is not only suffering from the poor quality and shortage of equipment, but also from constantly increasing prices for it. Subordinating machine building to the interests of agriculture and creating equal economic conditions for all organized forms of production is possible only through a market for the means of production, a decisive step toward which is the expansion of wholesale trade. For the time being, wholesale trade is limited by the circle of unmarketable commodities. Its development is held back due to the excess of solvent demand over the supply of machines, equipment and other material resources.

A paradoxical situation is taking shape. According to common opinion, due to inequitable exchange between the city and the countryside, agriculture does not receive tremendous sums of money and its profitability decreases. Proceeding from this, a significant increase in

purchase prices is being prepared. However, even today the majority of farms cannot convert their money into commodities and buy what they need. The situation is intensified by the fact that the production of goods for agriculture has shown a tendency to decrease in the last 2 years. In 1988, for example, RSFSR agriculture received 5.5 thousand tractors less compared to the allocated limit, but this year production in Minavtoselkhoz mash was decreased by 1 billion rubles. The reasons, of course, are not so much the difficulties of sale, as the general disorganization of industry, violations of relations among enterprises, and low contract discipline.

A growth of prices is a natural reaction to shortage. In the last 5 years alone, the price per unit of useful effect for many scarce agricultural machines grew by a factor of 3-5. For example, there used to be a simple and reliable silage harvesting combine, the KSS-2.6, which cost 4.9 thousand rubles. As a result of modernization, a new and, in the opinion of specialists, less reliable model was developed: the KSK-100, which now costs 25.3 thousand rubles.

How are the decreased payment for agricultural production and high prices for production-related goods compatible with an elevated solvent demand for them? Basically, this happens because of an economic policy, in which the absence of money is no obstacle to acquiring necessary and even unnecessary resources. It is characterized by at least three distinct features.

First, it is characterized by a large volume of budget financing for production purposes, including permanent credit for many billions of rubles. Second, by low financial discipline which makes it possible to "buy" without money in general. For instance, farms in Taldy-Kurgan Oblast ordered equipment costing 7 million rubles more than they could pay in 1988. Nonetheless, the supply agencies continued to deliver the equipment without payment. On the whole throughout the country, the overall sum of non-payment for delivered production exceeds 1 billion rubles, making the concept of "buying" highly conditional. Third, by the practice of compulsory sale of unmarketable production, which often is foisted off in the form of loads on the deficit, frequently under direct party and administrative pressure. Taken together, all this creates an unlimited demand for material and technical resources and determines a low exigency toward their quality.

Today, the question is as follows. Either the farms, having a great deal of money, will obtain the basic types of equipment and materials through funds, reconciling themselves to the low quality and imbalance, or, experiencing a scarcity of money for production purposes, they will receive the possibility of a choice in this regard. Unquestionably, the latter is more important, since this is an absolutely necessary condition for subordinating producers to the interests of consumers. Given the existence of a choice, even a limited one, the farms will begin to purchase that which can really be useful. The

remaining resources will remain unsold both due to their unsuitability (which is happening already now), as well as due to the scarcity of money (which does not yet exist). This will cause financial difficulties for the corresponding enterprises and will serve as a starting point for reorganizing the production of material and technical resources.

Such difficulties are arising constantly, but to this day they are solved administratively: through various methods, a questionable product is foisted on the consumer or the enterprises' losses are covered out of the budget. The damage from such a policy is three-fold: the state loses money, the farm increases its outlays, and industry loses exigency for the quality of production and discipline. The difficulties that enterprises have in selling production should urge the planning and administrative bodies to develop economic, organizational and scientific and technical steps to modernize and reconstruct industry, with the necessary financial support from funds allocated for the development of the APK.

To expand the production of scarce goods, it is also expedient to use the farm's free resources. They are not small and are sometimes put to work. For example, the Crimean "Druzhba Narodov" agricultural company granted 60 million rubles in credit to the Volgograd Tractor Plant Association. Farmers in Penza and Ulyanov oblasts and the Chuvash ASSR have organized the production of the reliable and inexpensive KSS-2.6 silage harvesting combine, which industry had rejected, on share principles. These are a few examples of entrepreneurial initiative at the farm level which may considerably improve the market for means of production in the APK.

On the part of the state, it would be far-sighted to ensure maximum support for such initiatives. This could be expressed by granting tax or other financial privileges and by giving high priority to such enterprises in the allocation of construction capacities and material and technical resources.

Finally, the last, one could say, decisive question: with the conversion to the production and sale of agricultural output without administrative pressure, will its volume decrease and prices increase? In the opinion of some specialists, today the peasants are very apathetic and have no serious incentives to earn money—there is simply nothing to buy with it. Such fears are not without grounds. Right now, the ruble is not functioning in agriculture. The cultural level here is relatively low, which predetermines both the attitude toward labor, as well as the undemanding nature of needs.

Of course, it is necessary to increase incentives: not on account of money that cannot be turned into goods, but by selling an additional quantity of material and technical resources and improving the structure of the consumer market. This especially concerns durable goods such as housing, automobiles, motorcycles, televisions, construction materials, etc. We must send these into the

countryside, even to the detriment of the urban market. We must also reconcile ourselves to the fact that a certain share of the farms or peasantry will turn out to be incapable of maintaining production in accordance with contemporary agricultural and technical requirements. For too long, it has been possible for those who only pretend to work to get by in the peasantry. These people have lost the peasant customs and love of labor, and their living needs basically are reduced to a bottle. When doubts are expressed in the reality of a market mechanism in agriculture, willingly or no, they are aimed precisely at such people. It can be stated with certainty that many of them, just as they did not work before, will not work in the future.

In Soviet agriculture, an act of cleansing is inevitable, a release of weak, unskilled producers who do more harm to the economy than bring it good. They could be granted plots of land, so that they can feed themselves. The basis of the mechanism for the transfer of land and other production resources from weak farms (individual and collective) to strong ones is created by the Law on Land, which sets a requirement for minimally permissible levels of crop yield. We must use this point today.

It is expedient to disband chronically inefficient kolkhozes and sovkhoses and lease their land and other production resources to small producers. It is a question of 4,000 farms (less than 10 percent of the overall number of kolkhozes and sovkhoses), which produce, by the author's estimate, roughly 3 percent of commodity output. In the lease contract, we must stipulate the minimum required level of productivity. Failure to achieve it in a certain period of time should be considered sufficient grounds for contract violation. Such an approach would ensure the selection of the active segment of agricultural producers, who know how to boost the volumes of production achieved on their lands.

In addition, this year we should raise purchase prices for vegetable oil crops, sugar cane, cotton, and animal husbandry output, thus compensating for the higher cost of means of production, and we should convert to the wholesale trade of material and technical resources (except fuel and trucks). It is also necessary in the near future to reject subsidized retail prices for meat, butter and cheese, paying appropriate compensation for them directly to the population. Implementation of these measures will create conditions for the future conversion to free prices for most food products, and to market restructuring of all spheres involving the circulation of agricultural production.

The solution to the country's acute socioeconomic crisis requires decisive steps toward creating a planned market economy. We must start this movement in the agroindustrial complex. The production cycle here is short and results will appear rapidly. If we do not want to doom the people to a rationed food supply, and agriculture to a future collapse, we must not postpone the transformations. The time has come for specific action.

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The Problem of Planning and Balance in the Soviet Economic System

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[Excerpts from an article by economist L.N. Yurovskiy, published in VESTNIK FINANSOV, No 12, 1926]

[Text] The effective combination of plan and market methods to regulate economic activity in the conversion to a market is the most difficult task of economic reform. This problem itself is not new. It first faced economists in the 1920s. One of the greatest economists of that time, Professor L.N. Yurovskiy, was among those who did a great deal of fruitful work to solve it. He played a key role in developing and implementing the 1922-1924 monetary reform and made a great contribution to restoring and developing the credit and financing system.

The later fate of this scientist was tragic. Along with other outstanding economists of the 1930s, he was arrested on the accusation of participating in the anti-Soviet "Peasants Labor Party," and was shot after his second arrest in 1938. His works remained on shelves in special storehouses and remained inaccessible to the broad scientific community for decades. L.N. Yurovskiy was fully rehabilitated in 1987.

His ideas on the socialist commodity form of economic management and on the compatibility of planning and a market have retained their theoretical and practical significance. They are topical even today, as shown by fragments of an article of his, published in VESTNIK FINANSOV, No 12, 1926.

In our opinion, a planned order is conceived of in its full completeness and with the full elimination of the "law of value" (law of cost—Editors) from the economic system. Evidently, the fulfillment of one condition, important to the highest degree, is necessary in order to do this: reject free consumption, i.e., reject the consumer's right to select products from among a limited supply of them. If the consumer, as happened during the time of "war communism" or as is happening in the contemporary army, is given items of consumption in defined quantities in kind, not in the form of a certain "sum" with a right to dispose of parts of this sum at his discretion, the "law of value" will finally disappear and the state will need only to select a method of assessment, guaranteeing the expedient building of its economic plans. We are not saying that any value calculation will mandatorily disappear under such conditions. However, we assume that under these conditions its disappearance is conceivable. In this case, the planned method will not encounter any market element whatsoever and the state will freely (in this sense alone) execute any plan and set any value calculation, so long as its methods of management guarantee simple reproduction as a minimum.

However, it is worthwhile to grant consumers the freedom of choice of items of consumption via the disposal of a certain sum, be it not money, but any symbols which really represent something, and a market—even just a limited market for only a few items of consumption—will be present. The market will have supply and demand, and the question of balance in it will no longer be indifferent to the managing state, but will tie and obligate it...

This is a **perfected** planned economic system, which logically opposes the commodity economy system. Although it may have been conceived in the depths of the currently existing socialist commodity system, it differs from it profoundly and fundamentally, not because two regulators operate in the existing system, one from the past, another from the future, but only one regulator, the future, will function in it: this would be very simple. It is different because a regulator that does not function right now at all will operate in it (in a perfected planned system). This regulator forms the methods for "assessing mass consumption, which will be worked out under this form of production" (Ye.A. Preobrazhenskiy, "*Novaya Ekonomika*" [The New Economics], Moscow, 1926, p 24). Yet, right now they have not been worked out and are not even being sought. For the state is starting in this part of its planning work to consider solvent demand, i.e., market demand, and is relying on value correlations in its calculations. It is impossible to interpret the existing system as a mixture of the past and the future. It is a **commodity economy system**, but a special system of it. The standard planned elements of our economy by no means eliminate the commodity economy and do not supersede it. The state can establish an ideal plan to purchase grain for export and to supply the domestic market with flour, and it can fulfill it impeccably. Through the irreproachable and inexpensive operation of its grain-procurement and grain export organization, it can oust all grain merchants, leaving, let us assume, some cooperatives which operate as purchasers entirely within the limits of the plan. Grain will not cease to be a commodity because of this, nor will the phenomenon of price vanish because of this. There will be a market, goods, and a commodity economy here. In addition, there will be a plan here and, consequently, a planned economy. However, it will not be a planned economy which replaces the market, but something else. If a "single purchaser" worked according to the plan, collecting grain on the basis of law in the amount of all surpluses, distributing it among consumers according to an established distribution method, we would then have a planned economy, having ousted the commodity economy, and we would have the planned method as its basis, having superseded the "law of value." The one system is not separated from the other by a difference in degree, but by something far more profound and significant. The term "planned economy" itself may, obviously, have a double meaning, i.e., it may designate two different concepts, depending on under which system the plan will be implemented. Perhaps in the order of classification we should not say that the

capitalist commodity economy is the final form of commodity economy, but should place the socialist commodity form after it (having isolated the monopolistic subspecies in it)...

Regulation of the national economy, restriction of free competition, and the state's so-called interference in economic life also do not eliminate the commodity economy, but lead only to a replacement of some forms of commodity economy with others. This is proven, in particular, by the fact that there is a great deal of such interference in capitalist economies.

The economic planning in the Soviet economic system and influence on prices for raw materials, on export and import, and on the direction of capital construction also do not signify the ousting of the commodity economy, but do indicate its regulation. In the Soviet economic system, such regulation is incomparably greater than in a capitalist economy: the difference here is not quantitative, but qualitative. The economic system itself, due to this, is already becoming **different**. However, it is not different in the sense that it is no longer a commodity system or that the "law of value" ceases to play a role.

Any act of regulation is accomplished for some sort of goal. Obviously, the established goal is not implemented by the "free play of economic forces." Otherwise, the state would have no reason to interfere in this play. For a Soviet economic system, "interference" is not the exception, but the rule, since the introduction of the planned method into the elements of a commodity market forms one of the basic principles of its economic policy. Therefore, can we not say that the goals pursued by the Soviet state in its planning policy also form a factor in the economy which replaces the action of price, i.e., that the lawfulness of these goals also supersedes the "law of value?"...

The lawfulness of the goals, of course, does exist: at least, there are no grounds whatsoever to assume that it does not. Incidentally, we must note that a certain lawfulness exists with regard to acts of regulation by any state and that, if it were mandatory to **overcome** the "law of value" through the action of said lawfulness, this would in all cases be accomplished by regulation and monopoly. However, whatever these laws may have been for individual social forms and time periods, if their action occurs under the conditions of a commodity-monetary economy, they are implemented through its mechanism and the measurement of achieved results occurs using its categories, at least so long as the state does not give up the measurement of results in general. However, then the state's activity itself starts going beyond economic bounds...

As regards regulation, we should note the following in general. If the state, as its goal, pursues the greatest possible accumulation of resources in the state sector of the economy and relies on the monopoly (and quasi-monopoly) of state enterprise, it is really operating only within the bounds of the law of formation of monopoly

prices as a special corollary to the "law of value," i.e., the law of a commodity economy. If it pursues one or another redistribution of production or consumption resources as its goal, such redistribution may then be either economically profitable or unprofitable, and the state should define its results in terms of value.

The uniqueness of this system, of its methods of regulation and of its ways to manage a planned economy and influence the spontaneous elements of economic life should be sought in how it, **being a system of a commodity economy**, regulates the latter, not in how it overcomes it, turning into a system similar to this which was built during the time of "war communism"...

The planned economy of a contemporary Soviet economic system is implemented under the circumstances of a market and the laws inherent to this market. It can rule over the market within very broad bounds, i.e., it can fulfill its tasks in the market and through the market. However, this does not mean fulfilling them outside the market, not considering what the market's reaction will be and what the value consequences of the economic plan will be...

The consequences of faulty plans in the Soviet economic system should, it seems, be of a clearly expressed crisis nature. An error of, so to speak, a qualitative nature (overproduction of certain goods) will show its consequences in that work will have to be done at a partial load in the sector of the economy where the surplus was made. This would mean increased production costs and a national economic loss. However, such a loss would not lead to a widespread crisis, but would only influence the pace of economic life via the irrational utilization of existing resources. Errors, so to speak, of a quantitative nature, i.e., drafting plans which exceed the national economy's strength, should have far more serious consequences. Such plans can only be implemented at the expense of credit and monetary inflation, fairly rapidly violating the balance in a number of important parts of the economy. Correction of such mistakes is possible only by halting the work already begun, decreasing the number of workers employed in industry, re-shaping economic plans, setting credit restrictions...

A lack of balance may spark two reactions. One is the passing of measures to restore balance. The other involves attempts to make do without restoring balance in the market by introducing a new, non-market principle in the national economy. A shortage of goods means unsatisfied demand. However, if there is no possibility of satisfying demand, we cannot let it regulate the territorial distribution of goods, since this regulator operates correctly only up until the quantity of goods is sufficient to fully saturate the market. It is not easy to find the other regulator, since it always appears at moments when a shortage is being experienced in a certain sector of the economy. This regulator is "planned distribution" (not to be confused with a planned economy), which in its final form resembles distribution using ration cards... It is scarcely possible to view this

element of a pseudo-planned economy as anything more than a measure evoked by necessity and subject to revocation once the shortage passes and economic balance is established.

Of the entire system of measures to regulate our economy and manage the state sector, we must single out those that are passed "out of necessity." Only after doing this can we obtain the pure remnant of the planning, really inherent in and necessary for the existing economic system, not thrust on it by attendant circumstances, including those resulting from errors. We should note that it is characteristic precisely of these measures, not part of the pure remainder, but passed "out of necessity" and proceeding from the violation of balance in the market, to grow and multiply due to their inherent, internal logic of development. If the balance is disrupted and not restored, a measure to regulate, striving to fulfill its task through the evasion of market balance, cannot remain the only measure, but requires the passing of ever new measures, of which the last one, ending the chain and offering a genuine solution—not in a direction toward market balance, but in the direction toward balance in the market—is to eliminate the market and establish a perfected and strictly planned distribution in the corresponding sector with a complete denial of the requirements of the "law of value"...

Measures of the latter type should either be eliminated in our economic life or should grow. Eliminating them means that the existing economic system is developing as a socialist commodity system, while their growth means that it will inevitably and rapidly evolve in favor of a system with perfected planned distribution, i.e., a system of the type, the building of which was interrupted in 1921. If the first is true, the "law of value" operates in our system, even though it goes without saying that it does not operate as it would under conditions of free competition. If the second is true, the "law of value" will gradually cease to operate and we will be on a path straight toward its not operating at all: some other principle will begin to function in its stead.

Of course, everything is temporary and everything changes. The present-day form of the Soviet economic system is just as transient as all systems that have existed throughout history. However, a temporary system has different forms. Those who see the existing system as ousting the "law of value" and a commodity-monetary economy, viewing this as a characteristic of the system itself, interpret its "temporary nature" quite differently, than one who believes that it will be a commodity economy system "for a long time and seriously," with all the consequences hence ensuing. In any case, however, in all interpretations of the existing Soviet economic system we must distinguish among the types of economic regulation, profoundly different from each other, which are practiced in it, since this is an indispensable condition for clear analysis and well-founded conclusions.

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THE STATE AND SOCIETY

Through Pluralism to the Renovation of Society

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[Article by V. Pugachev, professor, Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] As we know, our history turned out to be not all that favorably inclined toward pluralism as a principle of social organization. Under the command-administrative system pluralism was simply considered a demagogic means, a trap of Western propaganda, the "Trojan Horse" of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

It is only now, with the renovation of Soviet society, that the situation is gradually changing. Thus, the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress "For a Humane and Democratic Socialism," emphasizes that the CPSU "does not claim to have the monopoly and is ready to engage in a political dialogue and cooperation with anyone who favors the renovation of socialist society." Significant steps are contemplated in the area of pluralizing socialist ownership. Such a change in assessments is a sign of the times. Nonetheless, today the attitude toward pluralism, political pluralism in particular, is heterogeneous, which is manifested, in particular, in its various interpretations in scientific and political publications.

I

Literally, pluralism means "multiplicity" (from the Latin *pluralis*). So far, it is precisely this etymological interpretation of the term that has been widely accepted by the ordinary mind. The discussions among social scientists, held in recent years, have also indicated that many of them actually identified this concept with multiplicity of interests, ideas, views, economic and sociopolitical institutions, etc.

The logical consequence of this stance is an acknowledgment of the initially pluralistic nature of any society, for a total similarity of interests, organizations, ideas and views is virtually impossible. As to the command-administrative model of socialism, which existed in our country for decades, given this etymological and literal (not to say literalist) understanding of pluralism, it should be considered as pluralistic, for there have always been in society various ministries, departments, enterprises, sociopolitical organizations, classes and social groups. Hence we are a single step away from denying the need for a radical democratization of society.

The actual equation of pluralism with a variety of opinions and different viewpoints and the struggle among them has also become quite popular. I believe that such an understanding is entirely possible but insufficient. Pluralism of opinion without the variety of real

social relations and a social organization is doomed to degenerate into meaningless talk.

A discussion about pluralism is not an argument about words but, above all, a struggle among defined ideological and political positions. As a system of principles of social organization, pluralism is incompatible with the command-administrative system, for which reason, naturally, it is actively opposed by the latter.

In our days, however, it is no longer possible to avoid the problem of the pluralizing of society or to restrict the understanding of pluralism to the realm of ideas. In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which have taken the path of radical changes, this is acknowledged by virtually all influential political forces. In our country as well, the ideas of pluralism are becoming widespread. The all-Union student forum, which was held at the end of last year, stipulated, for instance, in one of its basic documents the demand of considering the inclusion within the new edition of the USSR Constitution legal guarantees for the free development of political pluralism.

What is the essence of pluralism? What are its most important, its fundamental ideas?

The main one is that pluralism is based on the acknowledgment of **contradictions as the source of social progress**. The majority of Western sociologists proceed from the fact that pluralism is "a reconciliation of an essential inconsistency, but also a conflict which is resolved in accordance with the rules of a politically correct game.... Contradictions are a principle of European culture and the basis of its dynamics. It is a principle which applies in finding the truth in jurisprudence as well as in science. The contradiction is the legitimate principle of socialist organization" ("*Pluralismus. Legitimationsprobleme im Interessenwandel*" [Pluralism. Legitimate Problem and Changed Interest], Koln, 1983, p 237).

Based on the principle of contradiction are concepts, such as **conflict, opposition and competition**. They are considered not only as necessary but even as desirable factors in social development. However, the resolution of the conflict and the "struggle of opposites" must be civilized, i.e., be conducted within the limits of the law and the democratic standards. In that sense as well pluralism does not recognize destructive and coercive forms of resolution of conflicts such as, for instance, civil war or acts of terrorism. I believe that the pluralistic interpretation of contradictions as a source of social progress does not conflict with Marx and Lenin.

Also related to this concept is another fundamental principle of pluralism, which is **stimulating the variety of social life**. According to dialectics, in real life the area of contradictions is richer than the variety of interrelated phenomena. The many-faceted nature of social life enhances its productivity and the possibility of the creation and development of alternate options for

progress, and thereby finding optimal ways of development. Wherever uniformity rules there are no contradictions; consequently there is no impetus for development and stagnation prevails.

From the positions of pluralism the heterogeneity of society, the variety of economic, political and sociocultural structures and the development of interests, values and outlooks are considered the most important source of social wealth. As we know, Lenin related the victory of socialism not to any reduction but to an increased, by one million times, of the "differentiation" of mankind in the sense of the richness and variety of spiritual life and ideological trends, aspirations and shades (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 26, p 281).

In order for the individual elements within society to be able to compete with each other and for a struggle to develop among them, they must be relatively autonomous and equal. Their progressiveness and leading role must be proved not with the help of socially codified organizational, legal and other privileges but by attaining a higher economic or sociopolitical efficiency. Autonomy and equality presume the equal independence of every individual and of institution on the same level (such as enterprises or parties) in defining their objectives and actions.

Such autonomy is based on maximally possible decentralization and minimally necessary centralism. However, pluralism is not the opposite of democratic centralism, as it may appear on the surface. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the democratic nature of centralism and one of the guarantees against its degenerating into bureaucratic centralism or even into totalitarianism. For example, pluralism does not deny the subordination of the minority to the majority but limits the area of such subordination in such a way that the center, the majority, will not indoctrinate the primary organizations or minorities, converting them into the simple executors of its will.

Essentially, this is also the purpose of the principle of **maintaining the balance among social structures with the help of a system of restraints and counterweights**. Above all, this principle helps to block trends toward the monopolizing of power and its abuse, and to facilitating control over it by the people. A pluralistic balance is achieved, among others, as a result of the separation among the economic, political and spiritual powers and the creation of competitive counterweights in all areas of social life. In this case, the restraining institutions do not always have to be in the same area of activities. For example, the monopoly of a producer of a given commodity could be restricted not only through competition but also with the help of antitrust legislation, trade union and consumer union controls, taxation and tax policy, as is being practiced in many countries and, now, partially in our country as well.

The idea of pluralistic counterweights as guarantees against the abuse of power was adopted by Lenin. In the

final years of his life he stipulated in the plan for reforming the party and the political system the interaction among three party centers "which represent the maximal guarantee against parochial and individual influences, i.e.: the Central Committee Orgburo, the Central Committee Politburo and the Central Control Commission. The last institution, i.e., the Central Control Commission, would be answerable only to the party congress and would be structured in such a way that even the slightest combination of jobs of its members, related to any people's commissariat or any specific department or Soviet agency would be excluded" (op. cit., vol 45, p 200).

Unfortunately, as it were, these Leninist ideas were not implemented to their fullest extent.

The separation of powers and the autonomy of social structures are expedient, obviously, only under certain circumstances, the ignorance of which could even lead to the breakdown of the social system. Within our reality such fear is entirely valid: Would the pluralizing of society not lead to splitting the Soviet state into, perhaps, national-regional-departmental areas? In order to prevent this and in order for autonomy not to degenerate into autarchy and isolationism, and in order to make civilized forms for the resolution of contradictions possible, we need **the unity** of opposites. Therefore, there must be within society a certain unifying principle, a common interest on the part of the citizens in preserving and developing the social, the democratic system. In other words, a pluralistic organization is possible only where the unifying, the centripetal forces prevail over centrifugal trends. How to ensure this in practical terms?

It can be ensured, above all, with the help of objective integration factors, such as a unified Union market, the need for which is mentioned in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, sociocultural traditions, a commonality of the historical destiny of the peoples and a democratic standard which ensures the acknowledgment and observance by the majority of citizens of the standards of civilized political behavior.

Naturally, the pluralistic standards (also known as the "democratic rules of the game") include the rejection of political coercion and dictatorship, the acceptance of the people's sovereignty, the search for a consensus and readiness for compromise, the resolution of the most important problems by majority vote and, at the same time, tolerance of a minority, securing the basic rights and freedoms of the individual, etc. Therefore, without a developed unifying principle the conflicts which arise in society cannot be resolved and its integral nature cannot be preserved through democratic means. The creation of a unified market, the strengthening of economic integration relations, the shaping of a democratic standard based on universal human values, political tolerance and readiness to seek compromise are all necessary prerequisites for advancing toward a new image of socialism.

Naturally, the concepts of pluralism which exist in science are, in terms of their content, immeasurably richer than the general principles we expressed above. However, it is precisely these principles that are the bearing structures of the entire "building." They can be implemented in all areas of society and appear, on each separate occasion, in a specific manner. Therefore, it is legitimate to speak of economic, social, political, spiritual-moral and other types of pluralism.

Therefore, along with the market, democracy and other "social inventions" of mankind, pluralism becomes one of the universal accomplishments of civilization. This does not mean in the least that it should be "applied" faster in every country, regardless of the characteristic features of its development. For example, the absurdity of efforts to implement it in times of civil war or other extreme situations is obvious. Pluralism operates essentially under normal peaceful conditions of our contemporary age, distinguished by an awareness of the significance of universal human interests and values and the growth of the democratic and social aspirations of the broad popular masses.

We began this discussion with the claim that the theory and practice of pluralism were, in their time, as though surrendered to our ideological opponents. It is possible, therefore, for many people to have developed the view that the contemporary Marxists who, for many long years, had "denounced" and "exposed" pluralism are now trying to patch up or even to make the concept of pluralism "fit the dogma" of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In my view, there is no need to "repaint" pluralism in "Marxist colors" or else to use "capitalist pluralism" under our circumstances. Why? Perhaps for the fact alone that the principles of pluralism, as we already pointed out, are of a universal human nature and cannot be fully implemented under capitalism, at least not in its classical variant, as described by the founders of Marxism and based on incompatibility with the pluralism of a class-oriented monopoly of economic, sociopolitical and spiritual power in society. The main antipluralist factor, so to say, of this system is a profound socioclass inequality which is based on the dominance of private ownership. This puts a monistic class mark on all social processes and violates the opportunity proclaimed by pluralism for citizens in social institutions to display initiative and enterprise and make decisions on the national and local levels.

Today, at the turn of the 21st century, it would be wrong to ignore the evolution of capitalism and to define contemporary Western society as uniformly monopolistic. To begin with, the monopoly bourgeoisie strictly speaking accounts for a relatively small group among the population, including among the ownership class. Second, with the help of a pluralistic organization of society, the implementation, to a greater or lesser extent, of the ideas of the social and legal democratic state of the working class, the working people in the Western countries have learned how greatly to restrict the egotistical interests of that population group and its aspiration

toward the monopolizing and militarizing of social life, authoritarianism or even totalitarianism. Therefore, the real evolution of the developed capitalist countries takes place in the course of a conflicting unity of two trends: monopolizing and pluralizing. In my view, the latter is gradually but increasingly strengthening, for it is precisely through it that social progress is making its way.

Furthermore, under the contemporary conditions of the Western countries, pluralism functions as a form of their social evolution and marks the growth of the elements of socialism within the capitalist structure. Essentially, pluralism rejects a social organization structured on the basis of the domination by one part of society over another and the monopoly of power held by any given group in the area of economic, sociopolitical or spiritual life. It presumes equal rights and opportunities for the social assertion of all citizens. In that sense, the full implementation of the principles of pluralism demands socialism. Naturally, however, it should be not a command-bureaucratic but a humane, a truly democratic socialism.

II

The history of recent decades invariably proves that not only pluralism cannot be fully implemented without socialism but also that socialism which ignores the pluralistic principles of organization is doomed to stagnation and even to crisis. We believe that it is precisely the separation of socialism from pluralism and the many years of domination in the life of Soviet society of monopoly forms of social organization that were the deepest reasons for many of our present difficulties.

Although in recent years the opposite of pluralism—monopolism—has been frequently and justifiably criticized, its manifestations are usually noted as though in passing, incidentally, without linking it properly to the main reasons for the crisis of command-administrative socialism. Yet it is precisely the latter that is the main link in the mechanism of obstruction of our country's socioeconomic development. It was by no means accidental that Lenin saw the domination of monopoly as the main source of the crisis of capitalism and its decay. Although contemporary capitalism, as we pointed out, using the pluralistic forms of organization, is successful in restraining the trend toward monopolization in society, the Leninist assessment of monopoly as a form of organization which undermines the incentive for social progress has been entirely confirmed by practical experience. This, alas, also applies to the life of our society.

Monopoly is a form of social organization characterized, in particular, by the unchallenged domination of the producer over the consumer in all areas of activity, and the lack of rivals and of control exercised by the consumers. It could exist in any society in the contemporary world. For a long time our social scientists believed that the assumption of power by the party of the working class would put, once and for all, an end to monopolism.

However, monopolism turned out to be quite durable and not only did it painlessly slip within the new society but also assumed within it an inflated development and a number of features considered particularly dangerous in terms of social progress.

The elimination of monopoly and the assertion of the pluralistic principle of social organization are mandatory prerequisites enabling socialism to emerge on the cutting edge of social progress. In the course of perestroyka, the realization of this fact is making its way, albeit with difficulty, through heaps of utopian views, dogmas and prejudices related to the command-administrative vision of socialism and through the fog of mossy stereotypes, nurtured not only by a conservative way of thinking but also largely by the self-seeking interests of various "monopoly" groups. Such groups are quite numerous, including collectives of enterprises which profit from shortages and monopoly prices on the goods they produce, and departments which have become accustomed to functioning without any control and making decisions without, as a rule, bearing virtually no responsibility, as well as insufficiently competent or even unconscientious officials, who see in competition the threat to their carefree existence....

The adaptation of pluralism to our conditions is still being hindered also by the feeling of equalization, which has sunk deep roots within society and which ensures idlers a carefree life at the expense of the properly working part of the population. Many are those who fear real competition among producers, enhanced by pluralism in the economy, and their personal responsibility for the results of their toil. They have become accustomed to work at half- or even one-quarter strength, and find even rationing acceptable, as it, nonetheless, guarantees their "equality in poverty." The "rank-and-file universal labor army," which took shape over many long years, cannot immediately and voluntarily accept, in the words of J.-P. Sartre, the heavy burden of freedom, albeit alleviated by socialism.

Nonetheless, despite all obstacles, progress toward pluralism, although in different extents, is felt in our country in all areas of social life. How is it manifested and what are the most difficult problems that must be solved here?

In the course of perestroyka, the initial, albeit quite timid, steps toward equalizing the status of governmental, cooperative and individual forms of ownership and the free and equal competition among them have been taken in the economy. Leasing, individual farming and individual-labor activities have been officially recognized and have clearly become more popular.

In the public awareness, however, as the recent debates at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies indicated, to this day the war-communism fear of all various "nontraditional" forms of ownership, competition, the possibility of bankruptcy of economically inefficient enterprises, unstable employment, and so on,

remains strong to this day. This fear is shared not only by people uninterested in radical change. It is objectively based on the really low efficiency of the state surrogate of public ownership, which triggers in many people a fear of, for example, the "capitalization" of society.

Yet it is known that the socialist countries which took quite decisive steps toward economic pluralization have not suffered from the broadening of private enterprise initiative. In our country, concealed behind concern for the purity of the socialist ideals, the basic Marxist concepts are frequently forgotten, to the effect that socialism, as a level of social progress superior to capitalism, is possible and inevitable above all as a result of its higher economic and, on this basis, social efficiency and ability to create better conditions for the development of production forces in human life. This conclusion directly follows from the materialistic understanding of history, based on the law of the consistency between production relations and the nature and level of development of production forces. If the present actual forms of organization of socialist society do not ensure higher production efficiency, it becomes necessary to seek new and more advanced forms, and apply the progressive experience gained by human civilization. In my view, this also applies to the view on private ownership. In order for it to leave the stage of history, it should outlive its usefulness and become economically inefficient. So long as this has not taken place, it is entirely admissible to use private enterprises, kept under strict social control, in the interest of the people.

In the social area, the pluralizing of society is manifested in a certain increase in the differentiation of the social structure as a result of the recognition of the numerous forms of ownership and economic activities. It can be seen also in the gradual rejection of wage equalization. As a whole, however, the positive effect of the differentiation in labor income remains significantly distorted by the antisocial forms of appropriation: speculation, corruption, mafia means of enrichment, etc. Society is as yet to find the optimal measure in combining equality with efficiency and just wages and social protection of every individual. It is particularly important today to formulate a mechanism for efficient control over this, so that social inequality is not strengthened or becomes the monopolistic and privileged status of specific groups, and social protection may not hinder labor and social activeness by turning into social dependency, as was the case in the past.

The democratization of the political system is the most important guarantee for the humanistic line followed in the economic and social pluralizing of our society. For a long time Marxist social science underestimated the constructive possibilities of democracy and its tremendous and sometimes determining influence over the development of the economy and the entire society. Reality proved that it is precisely democracy that "rescued" traditional capitalism from total monopolization, stagnation and decay. In our country, the constructive potential of democracy and its antimonopolistic trend

have still not found extensive use. Strictly speaking, without democracy economic and social pluralism are doomed to degeneracy. In ensuring the victory of the most efficient, strongest and most viable enterprises and establishments, social institutions and groups under the current specific circumstances, it creates prerequisites for strengthening their future dominant position in society.

It is important to take into consideration the direct dependency of economic and social pluralism on the democratic nature of the sociopolitical system in the course of applying the perestroika strategy. With the intended conversion to a market economy, it is precisely efficient and democratic control which can prevent the appearance of parasitical ruling classes. It is precisely such control that can secure approximate equality of opportunity for citizens to display their capabilities and industriousness, initiative and enterprise. In other words, pluralism in the economic and social areas is impossible without political pluralism on which a contemporary law-governed state is based.

Today the question of political pluralism becomes particularly pressing. Arguments on this subject focus, one way or another, on problems of political opposition and, above all, the creation of autonomous parties, independent of the CPSU. Some comrades, who consider a multiparty system an inseparable element of democracy and pluralism, call for the faster creation of a multiparty system in order to channel the process of the growth of population political activeness, with its destructive meeting- and strike-based ways, into the channel of civilized relations within the framework of the law. Others consider the very idea of the creation of opposition parties antisocialist, claiming that there are no conditions in our country for a multiparty system which, allegedly, would split society, whereas what we need is the consolidation of our forces.

The study of the history of political movements proves that the organization of political parties depends not only and exclusively on the legislative resolution of problems of multiple party functioning. Essentially, this is an objective and even a spontaneous process which reflects specific social needs. Practical experience itself and the wishes of the popular masses will provide the definitive answer to the question of the time and ways of conversion to a multiparty system. We believe that there is no point in artificially accelerating the process of establishment of a multiparty system or the erection of legal and other obstacles to its creation. In advancing toward democratic socialism, we shall inevitably have to solve the problem of ensuring the actual equality of rights which will allow all citizens to set up different organizations and associations reflecting the broadest possible range of views existing within society. It is important for the country's legislation to be prepared for any variant of democratic development and not to encourage, through unjustified prohibitions and penalties, the development of undemocratic and extremist forms of ideological and political struggle.

On the other hand, given the lack of firm and unifying factors and democratic traditions and conditions of acute social contradictions, the unprepared introduction of party-political pluralism from above may lead to the destabilizing of society and to an increase of anarchy and may contribute to the growth of destructive forms of political struggle. Furthermore, today by no means does everyone take into consideration the fact that the power struggle among parties frequently leads to the unproductive waste of huge amounts of social energy and the loss, as a result of party rivalry, of the main constructive and political objectives and a certain neglect of the true interests of the people.

In my view, today we have in our country a rare opportunity significantly to reduce such possible costs of pluralizing and democratizing of society and to preserve and strengthen stability and unity "in the struggle between opposites," above all with the help of a profound qualitative renovation of an organization such as the CPSU, which is so vast in terms of structure and integration possibilities of organization. A significant step forward was taken precisely in this direction by the February Central Committee Plenum which approved the draft platform which, specifically, stipulates that the CPSU is the type of real political force which, while comprehensively contributing to the democratization of society, also performs a consolidating role on the scale of our huge many-faceted country.

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The NEP and Contemporaneity

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[Report by R.W. Davis, Birmingham University, Great Britain, professor]

[Text] I have been studying the establishment and consolidation of Soviet centralized planning or the "administrative-command" system for some 40 years. After the 20th CPSU Congress, which was held in 1956, I agreed with the opinion of Isaac Deutscher, who believed that the Soviet system will reform itself from above and will begin to develop toward a more humane form of socialism. Subsequent events indicated that his view was based on a serious underestimating of the power of the conservative bureaucracy. Thirty years after the 20th Congress, my hopes concerning the future of Soviet socialism were revived, when M. Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU Congress, which included an appeal for introducing something similar to Lenin's tax-in-kind under the new conditions, made it obvious that a fundamental change in the economic system was being contemplated. Ever since then I have followed with very great excitement the development of the debate in the USSR on problems of history and progress in the Soviet economic reform.

One of the key features of the discussion which has developed in the USSR is the revival of the debate on the NEP, a debate which was sharply interrupted in the mid-1960s. Today the basic line separating the Soviet participants in the discussion roughly coincides with the division separating Western historians and economists, which developed in the course of the scientific disputes which have taken place for the past 20 years. The prevailing opinion among Soviet intellectuals is that the NEP was a great success. For example, in quoting official statistical data, V. Selyunin claims that the prewar economic level was restored by 1925 or 1926, and that by 1928 the volume of industrial output was higher by 32 percent, and that of agricultural output by 24 percent, compared to 1913 (see NOVYY MIR No 5, 1988, p 171). On the other hand, a minority of researchers claims that the NEP was a failure: according to G. Khanin, in 1928 the national income was 12 percent below the 1913 level and accumulations were so insignificant as to allow an increase of the national income by no more than slightly over 2 percent per year, i.e., a pace which could hardly be considered adequate in terms of the population's growth rate (see RODINA No 7, 1989, pp 80-83).

The "optimistic" assessment of the NEP led many Soviet economists and journalists to the conclusion that the combination of planning with a market economy, which was achieved in the 1920s, would have made it possible, in subsequent decades, to achieve the industrialization of the USSR without the suffering and senseless losses inflicted by the Stalinist administrative system. The "pessimistic" assessment of the NEP, made by Khanin and others, could be used to justify the conclusion that the wrecking of the NEP was an economic necessity imposed upon the leadership by the circumstances. Khanin, however, claims that Stalinism could have been avoided only if the choice made by the bolsheviks as early as 1921-1922 would have resulted in the adoption of a different course which would make it possible, during the 1920s, to develop a market economy with a far lesser state intervention.

Both the optimistic and pessimistic assessments of the NEP could be substantiated and supported only by selecting among the mass of statistical data those figures which would maximally support one conclusion or another. I disagree with both. Naturally, the official data for 1928 exaggerate the successes of the NEP. On the other hand, however, substantial proof exists to the effect that by 1928 the national income had at least reached its prewar level (based on the average harvest for 1909-1913). Furthermore, the volume of capital investments, almost all of it domestic, roughly equalled that of 1913, although at that time a substantial portion had been contributed by foreign sources.

Both supersimplified assessments of the NEP explain the reason for which the Soviet researchers draw from the historical experience of the USSR rather naive lessons. Many of those who share the optimistic view on the NEP claim that simply returning to the market economy of the NEP would solve all current problems which afflict

the Soviet economic system. These researchers seem unable to notice that the NEP was a combination of the market with state planning (which included certain important elements of administrative control). The high level of capital investments in industry and agriculture was precisely the result of this combination.

In my view, pessimists such as Khanin are equally mistaken by assuming that the NEP led to a dead end. Had the NEP been prolonged, the level of capital investments reached by 1928 would have fully secured a moderate pace of development of both industry and agriculture.

Although from the economic viewpoint the NEP was dynamic, it does not follow that its elimination was exclusively the result of an arbitrary decision made by the Stalinist regime, and that no economic factors contributed to its liquidation. In my view, in the 1920s the Soviet economy encountered several very difficult problems. To begin with, the elimination of the landed-estate farming and, compared with 1913, a loss of wealth of the prosperous peasants shrunk the commercial sector in agriculture. The volume of sales of agricultural commodities dropped substantially below its prewar level. This led both to a scarcity of raw materials for industry and to a drastic drop in foreign trade: exports declined to under 40 percent of the prewar level and imports were reduced by the same proportion. Although the problem of sales of agricultural commodities was worsened by the inept policies of Lenin's heirs, it was in fact the result of the structural changes triggered in the economy by the revolution. Second, the mass unemployment among the urban population turned into a serious and a worsening social problem, much worse than the one before the revolution. Not one of the rivaling groups in the mid-1920s was able to offer satisfactory suggestions for the elimination of this calamity.

The third serious problem of the NEP may have been its worst. From the international viewpoint, the Soviet economy remained in a weaker position compared to that of tsarist Russia on the eve of World War I. The gap in the level of output separating the USSR from the developed capitalist countries remained as wide as in the past and, compared to the United States, had even widened. The technological gap was more significant than the gap in production levels. By the end of the 1920s Soviet industry relied primarily on prewar equipment which, furthermore, had suffered from decades of neglect. In the West, after the war the extensive building of new enterprises was undertaken and new industrial sectors were created.

Therefore, the Soviet Union was a relatively backward country beset by serious economic difficulties and was more or less alone in a dangerous world. All of these factors were used as powerful arguments in favor of headlong industrialization. In my view, the development possibilities provided by the NEP's market economy

were limited, and a fast industrialization program required the introduction of radical modifications in the NEP system.

This, however, does not mean in the least that the social upheavals and repressions of the 1930s were the result of economic necessity. The policy of the ruling groups of the bolshevik leadership was shaped by their practical experience and their ideology. They had grown up in a centralized autocratic state in which independent legal institutions and the freedom of speech and action and democracy had had a very short and truncated history. Both leaders and rank-and-file members of the Bolshevik Party had been tempered by the political persecution and economic exploitation to which they had been subjected before the revolution, the mass slaughter and chaos of World War I and the battles of the Civil War.

These authoritarian trends in bolshevik thinking were not the only ones which existed, for throughout the 1920s the traditions of the tempestuous debates, democracy and even tolerance remained strong within the party. To many party members, however, the methods for surmounting crises, which had been practiced during the "war communism" period, seemed natural. The efforts aimed at resolving the very complex economic problems of the end of the 1920s contributed to the strengthening of the authoritarian trends and the consolidation of Stalin's personal power.

Before applying the historical experience of the USSR to the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, it is important to distinguish among the economic, political and personality factors which led to the collapse of the NEP. Had the NEP been abolished as a result of the stupidity or the depravity of a single individual, Stalin, or even of an entire political trend, the clock could be turned back and, through the decisive actions of a humane and intelligent leader and his supporters, a return to the right way of the 1920s would become possible. This is one of the arguments cited by Soviet journalists who have suggested to the party leadership to assume authoritarian rights and, with their help, make a radical economic reform. However, if the end of the NEP and the triumph of Stalinism were the result of complex political, social, historical and economic reasons, modern reformers should not draw from history any simple (and, in my view, dangerous) lessons.

In turning to the Stalinist period which followed the "great change" of 1929, we come across a number of paradoxes. These were years of immeasurable human suffering and suppression of freedom. However, those same years were also a period of great successes in industry, a time when millions of people acquired an education. The social base of the present challenge hurled at the Stalinist economic and social system originated precisely under Stalin and in subsequent years.

These paradoxes were the main topic of the work "*The Revolution Betrayed*," which Trotsky wrote in 1935-1936. He positively assessed the achievements of Soviet

industry and tried to explain them in such a way as to block any historical justification of Stalinism. Trotsky claimed that these achievements were gained despite the existence of a caste of bureaucrats and were based on public ownership and planning. However, this effort at ascribing successes to planning and failures to bureaucracy are difficult to reconcile with available testimony. The people who achieved successes in industry included top government leaders, ranging from Ordzhonikidze and Kaganovich to Tevosyan and Gvakhariya, who were part of the bureaucracy.

The same problem is encountered by the contemporary critics of Stalinism. Some, such as Yu. Afanasyev, claim that, starting with 1929, the entire course of history had been destructive and counterrevolutionary. Others (such as I. Dedkov and O. Latsis) acknowledge that those years were both a time of accomplishment and a time of catastrophes, but explain the achievements not as the result of the strong aspects of the system but of the "conscientiousness and constructive toil of the people" (see the debate in PRAVDA, 26 and 31 July 1988).

It seems to me that any historian who deals with the study of the Stalinist period should acknowledge the complexity and contradictoriness of both the system and its results. I share the view of the now deceased British scientist E.H. Carr, who wrote: "The diagnosis which Engels provided concerning the historical role played by Napoleon III, Cavour and Bismarck who, in their pursuit of a reactionary policy, wearing military uniforms, completed the bourgeois revolution in their own countries, leads is to draw a curious analogy. The pompousness of Napoleon III, Cavour's cynical diplomacy and the 'blood and iron' discipline established by Bismarck were all reflected in Stalin's dictatorship."

At the same time, Carr points out, "Stalin's personality, combined with the primitive and cruel traditions of Russian bureaucracy, gave the revolution from above a particularly savage nature.... Cases in which such monumental achievements were paid for at such a monstrous price are extremely rare in history" (E.H. Carr, "*Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929*," vol 2, London, 1971, pp 448-451).

And so, what is the Stalinist economic system? In the report which M. Gorbachev submitted in November 1987, he described the system which was established at the end of the 1920s as the "administrative-command system of the party-state management of the country." This is a useful definition highlighting the basic features of an economic system which has been retained to this day. My personal studies of the Soviet economy of the 1930s, however, indicate the existence of two important aspects of the Stalinist economy, which are not covered by the term "administrative-command system."

To begin with, it is important to realize that the economy was managed, fully or partially, with administrative fiat, not only during the period of Stalinist power but also before 1929 (this was one of the aspects of the NEP),

as well as after Stalin's death. The concepts "administrative system" and "Stalinism" are not identical or interchangeable. Furthermore, as Soviet historians point out, under Stalin the economic system was not simply one of administrative command. Repressions and fear were inherent features of the Stalinist system, supporting it on all social levels, from the Politburo down to the plant shop. The Stalinist economic system was a particularly vicious and savage form of the administrative system.

Second, the economic system which existed under Stalin, nonetheless was not entirely administrative. In 1930 Stalin's supporters believed in the fact that they were coming close, at a fast pace, to something which could be described with total accuracy as an integrated, a total administrative system. They believed that soon a non-monetary economy would be established in its entirety, a direct barter of products would replace trade, while manpower and material resources would be distributed not through the market but through the state plan. In some essential aspects, however, it was necessary to abandon these concepts. To begin with, the kolkhoz market, the prices of which were based on supply and demand, and the produce of the private peasant plots became essential elements of the system and accounted for a substantial share of food supplies. Second, after 1935 (excluding the war years) the individual consumer received not a portion or a rationing card but his earnings in cash which he spent either on the kolkhoz markets or the retail trade stores where fixed prices prevailed but where the possibility of choice existed as well. This was a limited or quasimarket. Third, outside the system of corrective labor camps workers usually had the freedom to change jobs and were guided in their choice by considerations which included wages and other material incentives. This was a type of labor market. Therefore, the Stalinist economy, like the economy under Stalin's heirs, although essentially administrative, was a system within which the market had retained some important albeit limited functions.

It is also interesting to note that, at least until 1936, despite rigid restrictions imposed on independent thinking and activities, some influential people pursued their attempts at broadening the role of the market and of economic incentives. In 1932, the journalist Birbrayer, who had specialized in industrial problems, with the support of a number of officials of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, called for undertaking major reforms which would have resulted in the introduction of a kind of socialist market (see my article in the journal *SLAVIC REVIEW*, vol 42, 1984, pp 201-223).

In 1934, Bukharin cautiously defended the durable future of a retail market (*IZVESTIYA*, 12 May 1934). That same year, officials of the People's Commissariat of Trade called for competition among commercial establishments on the retail market and for the restoration of the previously closed private commercial bakeries and bread stores, for the sake of reviving competition. In

1935 Gvakhariya, the director of the Makeyevka Metallurgical Plant, daringly stated that it was no longer possible to manage through administrative methods and called for "total cost accounting." Following these actions, in October 1936 personnel of the emigre Institute of Economic Research, in Prague, classified the Soviet system into categories, thus anticipating the present radical economic reform. They described the "attempt to organize production and trade among governmental enterprises, based on the principle of a competitive economy, individual incentive, and profitability" (*BYULLETEN EKONOMICHESKOGO KABINETA PROF. S.N. PROKOPOVICH*, No 131, October 1936, p 108).

Therefore, the Stalinist economic system was more complex and more flexible than depicted in a number of recent Soviet publications. In my view, the deeper study of said aspects of this system, as well as the role of the different social groups and classes would help to understand why that system was able to achieve major economic successes despite its entire clumsiness and harshness. Such studies would also help to dispell the belief that simply replacing administrative planning with the market would solve all problems.

In discussing the future of socialism, many Soviet commentators justifiably note that state ownership, as it developed in the USSR, means "nobody's ownership:" no one, be he worker or manager, feels responsible for the enterprise in which he works. The alienation of the workers from the economic entities which employ them was another characteristic of the NEP. The successes or failures of enterprises had no substantial influence on the earnings of their employees. The workers bore no collective responsibility whatsoever for their enterprise. After the October Revolution, appointing enterprise directors from above and introducing one-man command instead of collective management were justified with the insufficient maturity of the Soviet working class. However, "management from above" became a permanent feature of the administrative system.

To me personally, the most exciting aspect of perestroika is the fact that in this important relationship there has been a turn not to the NEP but to 1917, and that efforts are being made in the USSR to replace "nobody's ownership" with a variety of forms of cooperation and self-management. The alienation of the worker from his job is a feature as inherent even to the most democratic capitalism as it is in the Soviet administrative system. As the Yugoslav experience revealed, achieving self-management and flexibility, introducing innovations and promoting growth turn out to be difficult. However, if Soviet socialism is to resolve one of the main unresolved problems of human society, it is a vitally important task. I regret seeing the way some outstanding Soviet economists, including Academician A. Aganbegyan, who have encountered practical difficulties in democratic self-management, have begun to distance themselves from it (see Aganbegyan's interview published in *EKO* No 9, 1989, p 77). Unless the reform

of the Soviet economy is not combined with self-management, the Soviet system would perpetuate one of the basic shortcomings of capitalism and strengthen the consequences of one of the main defeats in Soviet postrevolutionary history.

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THE RENOVATING PARTY

The Party As I See It; KOMMUNIST Precongress Survey

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May 90 (signed to press 15 May 90) pp 80-86

[Text] Following are further answers to the precongress survey made by KOMMUNIST 1990, (see Nos 5, 6 and 7, 1990). Let us recall the questions:

1. How do you see the ways the CPSU can come out of the crisis and the new aspect of the party? What to retain and what to abandon? What targets should the renovated party set for itself?

2. What type of internal party relations should there be so that the voice of the rank-and-file party members could be heard clearly? How do you conceive of the correlation between democracy and centralism in party activities and life under the conditions of renovation? Could we ensure party unity with the free formation of factions, and platforms, and how to achieve this?

3. What is your idea of the party's place and role in contemporary society? On what basis should relations be structured with governmental bodies, social organizations and mass movements? How do you envisage a democratic control over the ruling party?

Sergey Viktorovich Antipov, delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, party committee secretary at the Atomic Energy Institute imeni I.V. Kurchatov:

1. The results of some sociological surveys conducted in our country indicate that today only a small percentage of communists believe in the possibility of a communist future. Why? I believe that the main reason is not the faultiness of the idea itself but its vulgar, primitive and dogmatic interpretation which presents communism as a homogeneous society in which we have "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his needs" and the total socialization of all material and intellectual property. Indeed, it is impossible to build a society on the basis of such principles.

Actually, the communist idea is based on the principle of the spiritual, social and economic emancipation and the maximal well-being of the individual. It is no accident that in the "Communist Party Manifesto," Marx and Engels proclaim that "the free development of one is a prerequisite for the free development of all" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 4, p 447). This

provides a key to understanding the main, the strategic objective of human progress. Furthermore, this is the inevitable outcome of the evolution of any civilized society.

However, we must realize that achieving the objective could also turn out and will turn out to be a very distant prospect. Therefore, we must not try to guess or, even less so, to fabricate the specific features of this society. Suffice it to define merely the current trend and outline the real targets which can be reached within a foreseeable time. The building of a humane and democratic socialism, based on the priority of universal human values and on subordinating the objectives of the state to the interests of the development of the individual, must precisely become such a target. In this area the party not only can but must clearly indicate the way it conceives relations of ownership and the legal structure, taking into consideration the interests of the different social groups, and so on. Everyone would like to know in advance the targets which the state and he, as its citizen, will reach within a tangible period of time and what are the stages, difficulties and limitations which will be governing this progress. For example, it is entirely obvious that the establishment of market relations will be accompanied by increasing differentiation among the population and, at least during the first stage, that there will be a decline in the living standard. In such a situation what measures of social protection should be applied, above all in terms of low-salaried and deprived strata?

Under these circumstances, the question which arises in its entire magnitude is the following: Whose interests should the party represent, above all? Should it be those of the entire nation, as in the past? This is impossible, for today we see noticeable differences in the interests of the different social groups. Therefore, it will become necessary clearly to define who: not only "the workers and all working people," for there also will appear "working people-owners," such as lessees, "working people-members of cooperatives," and "private working people." Priority should be given to the interests of hired labor. This would mean a narrowing of the social base. However, this is natural and necessary under the conditions of a developing multiparty system.

I believe that this approach (communism as a prospect, a trend in the movement and a humane and democratic socialism as a really attainable objective) would help to remove any hint of seditiousness in raising the question of the party's name. We must discuss in a considerate manner, not conceiving this as an abandonment of ideals, what objective, the maximally distant or really tangible, that we should inscribe on our banners today.

2. More consistent with humanism and democracy is a type of internal party structure in which the process of formulation and adoption of resolutions will proceed from the bottom up (and not the reverse, as is currently the case), guaranteeing extensive democracy and conscious discipline based on a single understanding of common tasks.

This can be achieved by taking as a basic party structure the principle of voluntarily delegating powers from the primary party organizations to the leading authorities, while preserving general democratic principles, such as electiveness, accountability and glasnost.

While comprehensively supporting and encouraging a healthy spirit of discussion, comradely arguments and initiative, we must clearly regulate relations between minority and majority in matters of subordination and in the establishment of organizational structures. This must be done in such a way as to provide the minority with equal and guaranteed rights to express its opinion while avoiding a diktat exercised by the minority or its total organizational separation. The latter would only weaken the party, which is inadmissible under the real circumstances of the political struggle.

3. In speaking of the role and place of the party in society, we cannot avoid the question of the status of the party organization in the enterprise. Today suggestions are frequently made of taking the party out of the enterprise or, in other words, abandoning the structuring of the CPSU based on production characteristic. I firmly object to this. I object, above all, because the party consists of many competent and broadly thinking people. It would be unforgivable and wasteful not to use their collective potential at the enterprise, in that cell of society on which the living standard of that same society depends. No, it is not a question of taking over from the administration or imposing upon it and the entire collective one's opinion, but of suggesting sensible approaches to the solution of the various economic, production and social problems.

At the same time, we must not prevent party members, who may prefer to work at home or in different circumstances and would rally in a variety of horizontal structures.

It is important for the party to be able to detect and express the moods of the people in the best possible manner. If it enjoy their confidence it could lay a claim to being a ruling force, having earned the support of the electorate in elections for power agencies. This, in my view, would be the most democratic control on the part of society.

Valeriy Gennadiyevich Ivanov, plane operator, Izhorskiy Zavod Production Association, Leningrad:

1. In my view, all party members have long asked themselves the same questions asked in KOMMUNIST's pre-congress survey. Those who fail to find the answers drop out of CPSU ranks. They are numerous, and some of them have belonged to our party organization a well. Others, the majority, believe in the party's ability to heal and renovate itself and try to do everything they can to this effect. I classify myself among the latter and I shall try to formulate my own personal view on ways to resolve the crisis.

In my view, the most important thing is to have a clear vision of the future, to see the end objective and to know what precisely it is that the party would like to offer to the people. Without this its activities lose their meaning. The end objective of the Communist Party is to build a communist society. I believe that we must not abandon it. The main characteristic feature of such a society, it seems to me, is the highest possible conscientiousness of its members. Therefore, the main function of the CPSU should be educational. However, ideological work will not be efficient unless the trust of the nonparty people in the communists is restored. In this case we cannot do without a purge in the ranks.

I believe that primary party organizations should be established exclusively in residential areas. One must work at the enterprise without being distracted by anything else. Correspondingly, the party structure could be as follows: primary party organization of the microrayon—rayon coordination party committee (RKK), which would include one representative of each primary organization, and so on. The apparatus of the RKK would be small: a secretary with a few assistants.

In my view, party unity is a mandatory prerequisite for the party's ability to implement its plans. There should be no factions or platforms, for otherwise, in the common aspiration to ensure the well-being of our society, some people would be pulling in the direction of Stockholm, others of Washington and others again of Beijing. As a result, as the familiar story tells us, the wagon will not budge.

The renovated CPSU must have relations, based on equality, with all political and social organizations. It is precisely they that will be able to exercise, in the best possible manner, democratic control over the ruling party.

Let me also mention membership dues. After cases of lack of modesty on the part of a number of former party leaders became known, many party members have suggested that dues be lowered. One could understand the people: it is painful to realize that a party official had been living in luxury with your money. This was another of the reasons for people to be dropping out of CPSU ranks. We should probably also take into consideration that under the conditions of a growing inflation, party dues are becoming increasingly more burdensome to low-income party members. I believe that it would be proper for the 28th Congress to discuss this problem as well (although, naturally, it is not the most important one).

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Dudnik, major general, docent, Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin:

1. In considering ways of pulling the party out of the crisis, we must inevitably begin with looking for answers to questions with which some people are becoming fed up: "Where are we? What is happening with us? Why are we what we are?" Again and again, such questions will be

facing us at all times, until we have come out of the gravitational area of Stalinism and stagnation.

Today problems of democratization and the possibility of the existence of factions and platforms and of relations between the CPSU and other sociopolitical organizations are in the center of discussions concerning the party's new image. I believe that these are facets of a single, a basic problem: the essence, the means of manifestation and acceptability, under the conditions of a renovating party, of the principle of democratic centralism, as allegedly being Leninist and, consequently, an organizational principle for structuring the vanguard party, not to be subjected to revision.

In my view, the effort to preserve this principle in both theory and practice, having modernized it somewhat, is becoming one of the reasons for the growing crisis within the CPSU. Historical experience, and not only that of the Soviet Union alone, as has been indicated, proves that democratic centralism can only develop the habit of obeying the orders issued by the center. This always means centralization, i.e., the concentration of power. This contains within itself the permanent possibility of antipeople's degeneracy and readiness to use command methods of activities, commit moral and political violence and persecute dissidence.

Not a single theoretician and practitioner of Marxism today holds Lenin's views concerning democratic centralism. In the ordinary mind, it is associated with dictatorship and coerced obedience—"democratic centralism"—according to Stalin. For this reason alone it would be expedient to abandon it in favor of other much more democratic models of party structure, in the interest of its consolidation. Although today we, communists, do not consider the parliamentary type of party all that acceptable, it has nonetheless proved its consistency with democracy as practiced in the Western countries. Why is it that the party of the socialist choice—the most humane and democratic of all currently existing parties—must mandatorily be structured on different principles which have repeatedly confirmed the possibility of nondemocratic development?

In the past I had the occasion to participate in the discussion of problems of restoring the Leninist essence of democratic centralism. However, the time since the 19th Party Conference proved that, essentially, no single resolution on reforming the party was carried out, and that the CPSU itself has been insufficiently adaptable to the new circumstances. I see here three essential reasons for this: cadre—efforts to do something new by relying on an apparatus which was developed essentially during the preceding period; ideological—dogmatism and concealed Stalinism; organizational—the obstructing role of the principle of democratic centralism.

The conversion of democratic into bureaucratic centralism, the lack of control over and coercion applied by the apparat and its merger with governmental and state agencies and, in some cases, corruption are helped by the

imperfect nature of the statutory norms as well. The CPSU statutes do not contemplate any grounds for, or ways or means of responsibility or else penalties applicable to elected party authorities. This guarantees their independence from the party masses and, on the other hand, the absolute lack of protection of the rank-and-file party members from diktat from above. This triggers an atmosphere of apathy in the party organizations. Despite all efforts, so far we have been unable to find a cure for this disease.

Should the party stubbornly hold onto such treacherous consequences of the system of internal interrelationships? Hardly, the more so since the impression of many party members is that preserving it would be to the exclusive advantage of conservative forces.

2. There is only one universal medicine for our "diseases:" we must patiently learn everything which, for the time being, is a foggy concept of "political standard." As we know, the bolsheviks came to power in a country which lacked even a single generation with experience in independent political thought and action. Subsequently, history developed in such a way that, as it were, such generations did not develop. Today as well, however, we have not been permitted any amount of time during which to acquire political standards in the course of the natural change of generations, in the course of which obsolete or groundless views and activities disappear. We can only compress this time and squeeze within it several "generations" simultaneously (although their age is virtually the same), representing various branches of political standards. We could consider as such the various factions and platforms within the framework of a single party. In this case I am referring to the CPSU and the various trends within it. Although sharing the same socialist orientation, they are different in terms of their tactical approaches, i.e., not in terms of the direction but the way of advancement. The struggle among principles, positions and views concerning the uniform socialist idea offers a variety of potentials which provides the energy needed for the steady development of the party itself. However, the concept of "faction" has become historically compromised. Therefore, it would be expedient to abandon it and to return to the Russian terms of group, trend or society.

It would be useful to apply anything which could, without loss of nuances and originality or, perhaps, even with some autonomy, within the framework of a single party, politically rally around the socialist idea like-minded people, enriching the idea itself. Do we reject avant-garde art merely because it looks beautiful to the avant-gardists and somewhat different to the majority of us? Could this be the case with socialism? Actually, this is not an ideological model but the human dream of a happy, just and free life. It is entirely likely that more than one road may lead to it. Appeals on the part of the supporters of orthodox (read, dogmatized) Leninism to preserve the "loyalty to the ideals" are similar to the army's "mine! No stirring!" Actually, they are not all that keen on having a real perestroika but are ready to

line up along any flank, their eyes turned to the point from which a command was given. In their view, the light of ideas comes only from above, whereas from below there can be only quarrels and arguments, while Lenin's words about the creativity of the people's masses assume inside them the aspect of an acathistus. I fear that many defenders of the "ideals" have not seriously read Lenin with an open mind, either before or after April 1985. All they had was a reflected and, therefore, distorted light of his ideas.

I am becoming increasingly convinced that the ideological and theoretical rearmament of party cadres is a mandatory prerequisite for the CPSU to come out of the crisis. To this effect, however, we must restore to Leninism its living soul and abandon dogmatism, and phrase-and quotation-mongering. It is time to realize that Lenin did not do our thinking for us. His works are not a cookbook with recipes for daily use. It is entirely possible that should we apply today the Leninist method in the analysis of the social ranks, which he studied at the turn of the century, the result would be quite different from Lenin's. Today this frightens us. Unquestionably, Lenin would only be pleased, for there are two consequences to this conclusion: either the method is poor if even after 70 years under the new conditions it is describing an old formula, or else, in 70 years, we have advanced so little that the gauge indicates the same initial results. Which of these conclusions is more dialectical?

Therefore, I would stipulate yet another condition for the successful reform within the party, as follows: let us have as much dialectics as possible, i.e., life and, therefore, progress.

Now as to unity. How to achieve consolidation, and along what lines should the separation discussed in the CPSU Central Committee open letter take place? How, without abandoning free debate, could we carefully consider each constructive idea and not hastily classify it as "separation" as part of the loud sentences and thoughtless promises which lead to a division within the party? I believe that no unity can be absolute. It could be understood only as a constant and uninterrupted process of achieving unity, for otherwise this is not dialectics. It is the deadening of political life. In practice, this inevitably leads to rejecting a developing pluralism, and to one more campaign "for the purity of the ranks," with all its consequences. Is it not time for us to stop frightening ourselves and one another?

We know that Diderot believed freedom of speech to be as much an inalienable right of the citizen as the right to life. This applies to an even greater extent to contemporary public figures. It implies mandatory participation in

the exchange of views and opinions, particularly today, in a period of tempestuous reassessment of many seemingly inviolable theories. However, daily practical experience quickly puts an end to such aspirations with peremptory evaluations such as "ambition," "immodesty," "imposition of opinion," etc. Frequently the authors of nonstandard writings are excoriated for the very fact of publishing their views. It would be pertinent at this point to quote the words of our predecessors. "No party on any side," Engels wrote, "could make me keep silent should I decide to speak out." To this effect, Engels emphasized, it is "necessary to have within the party a press which is independent directly of the board and even of the party congress...." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 38, pp 77, 441-442).

3. A party structured on democratic and humane principles and which proclaims man as the highest value and man's well-being as its objective, should not refuse membership to any citizen, providing, naturally, that he is not a criminal and is not guided by the aspiration to destroy said party from within. In other cases, through its intellectual and organizational activities, the party should make anyone who enters its ranks part of its system of coordinates. I see in such openness the possibility of a steady influence by the party on society and of society on the party. The external lining of the organization will, in all likelihood, not be as rigid as it is now. However, it is precisely this that will ensure the influx of new forces and, naturally, the painless self-cleansing of the party and the right of society to control its activities. Incidentally, this principle governs the structure and functioning of all complex and stable systems in the contemporary world. Conversely, systems requiring a rigid structure collapse, sooner or later.

In this connection, we must firmly change the style of the general party leadership and convert from methods based on directives to those based on coordination and, create the type of conditions in which the party organizations themselves will find efficient solutions in their specific circumstances. Furthermore, there must be not a "selection and placement of cadres," as is presently done, but a competition for leaders, based on competence, professionalism and ability to engage in independent action. To its most authoritative representatives, who have become popular with the people and have been given a mandate within the soviets on all levels and the government, the party would be able to ensure a leading role in society. However, such leadership can be kept only under the conditions of maintaining a flexible partnership with all sociopolitical forces and social movements. In order to succeed a leader must constantly broaden the circle of his allies.

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As We Read the Draft CPSU Central Committee Platform

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[Article by E. Batalov, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text]

I

Let me immediately say that, in my view, although, as a whole it is suitably different from the programmatic documents submitted in previous years and is of a perestroika nature, the document submitted by the Central Committee is not a platform in the strict meaning of the term. Rather, the monopoly status of the CPSU in the country's political and ideological life has atrophied the ability which was once inherent in the party of the Russian social democrats of "fighting for the masses" against political competitors and, therefore, mastering a variety of genres of party writing. The lack of a genre definition is manifested most clearly in the document's language, style and structure. We find in the text formulas inherited from the documents of the past, which cause nothing other than irritation with their didactic and declarative nature and rhetoric, as well as "Byzantine moves," as aptly described by Academician S. Shatalin. What makes this even more annoying is that a platform is, according to the law, the most specific type of document.

Another essential shortcoming has to do with the different scale and levels of the problems, tasks and concepts included in that document. Major problems are listed side-by-side with detailed and isolated prescriptions which would be more characteristic of a departmental directive; long-term tasks are listed next to circumstantial although sometimes important concepts. The question which arises is the following: Is it proper to include in a party platform the type of policy which the Soviet state should pursue in the "Asian-Pacific Region," or else the course it should follow in "chemical weapons and their production," or else to demand "scope for the variety of forms of organization of science and dissemination of knowledge?" All of these, naturally, are important matters. However, they do not belong in a party platform which, by its very concept, is called upon to depict "what the party stands on" and "what it supports" and, in this case, convince the many people who have lost faith in it, which is a fact, however regretful, that it realizes its errors and weaknesses, that it understands their nature and is ready to overcome them and, which is possibly the main thing, that it knows how to accomplish this. What have "chemical weapons" and the "Asian-Pacific Region" to do with it?

The document proves most clearly that the Central Committee, on whose behalf it was published, largely thinks and acts as it did in the past, as the governmental, the economic-executive authority which solves problems

of the "perestroika in the structure of imports," "demonopolization... of insurance," introduction of "flexible economic instruments and standards," and so on and so forth. If we indeed wish for the CPSU to proclaim itself precisely as being a political party and for the members of its Central Committee to start thinking above all as politicians, the text should be rid of the "economic-directive stratum." In my view, what makes this all the more necessary is that, after its adoption by the congress, this document will define not only the trend of activities of the party members but, also whether such an objective exists or does not, and the style and, I would even go so far as to say, the standard of our political thinking.

In my view, no one will dispute the fact that circumstantial statements do not belong in a programmatic document. Yet they are clearly expressed. Let us consider perhaps a large excerpt which notes that "increasingly the question arises in society of creating the position of head of government, a president," after which it explains the reason for which this is necessary. Unquestionably, this is an exceptionally important question both for the party and the state. However, it is only strictly circumstantial considerations and the inertia of the old style of thinking that could explain the fact that these lines have been inserted in a document which must be approved by the party congress after the question of a president has been resolved by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

In my view, it would have been much more important to include, albeit in most general terms, the question of the evolutionary trends of the Soviet state and the nature of relations between the state and the civil society, of which a renovated Communist Party should become an organic part in the future. It would be equally important, I believe, to have an idea of the way a party which aspires to the role of social vanguard considers the social structure of contemporary Soviet society and its future development. Incidentally, this is one of the most vulnerable points in our social science. This problem is bypassed also in the draft platform, the authors of which customarily use concepts such as "masses," "working people," "working class," "all working people," without providing a precise interpretation of those terms.

The document is vulnerable also on the strictly statement-making level, for to speak of the present situation in the party and the country, while avoiding to identify it as a "crisis," means either failure to see that which is on the very surface of life and which imbues it most profoundly, or else to shut one's eyes to the obvious. Such a strange turn of affairs is easy to explain: our authoritarian-bureaucratic political standards, inherent to which is a myth-making spirit, does not have the means for making an adequate analysis of socialism as well as, actually, of capitalism, not as an ideal or an essentially mythical model but as a real society with its declines and crises.

However, this is not simply a question of words. Unless the party acknowledges today that it, and the state and society it guides are, as a whole, in a state of crisis, and unless it fails to understand the essence of the crisis, it

would be unable to find adequate ways of pulling out of the crisis or even less so to contribute to the formulation of a system of anticrisis mechanisms to be used in the future. This is by no means a question of ideology. Incidentally, even where the concept of "crisis" is used, in my view, it is in the nature of a metaphor and in some cases as a means of dramatizing the situation. Yet this is quite a strict concept applied in contemporary sociology, economics and political science. Restoring to this concept as well as, actually, to several other concepts their categorical status is not merely a topic of scientific dissertations but also of programmatic documents, such as the platform of a party, being drafted in a situation of a general crisis of socialism.

Finally, a few words on the structure of the documents. Today it has been almost unanimously acknowledged that the primary task of perestroika at this stage is a reform within the party which, in fact, as in the past remains the center of political power in Soviet society. It is logical, therefore, to include the part "Toward the Renovation of the Party" in Section I which, avoiding an unnecessarily flowery style, should be simply and clearly entitled "The Party and Perestroika."

II

The draft platform which leads us toward building a "humane and democratic socialism" could not, naturally, fail to touch upon the question of socialism as a social system and of its future in our country. It is true that unlike some programmatic documents of the past, which contained all kinds of "codes" and other inventory lists of features inherent, as was believed then, in socialism and its builders, this document does not provide a detailed description of the characteristics of socialism and of the future socialist society. This is not a shortcoming of the draft, as some communists believe, but its tremendous quality. What does "building socialism" mean? Does it mean imposing upon society an artificially prescribed system of ideal community life, down to the most petty details? That is precisely what was being done in our country in the past. However, although not immediately, history avenges any violence committed against it. To "build" socialism means to aspire to use the potential inherent in society itself, leading to the liberation and development of man. No prescription is given as to the type of society this should become as a result. Otherwise, once again we would take the path of fabricating utopias which, in the course of time, we would either have publicly to disavow or shamefully to conceal.

Without getting into the details of defining what is socialism, and what is "socialist" and what is not, the draft platform follows a different path: it formulates tasks which, in accordance with our present concepts, could and should be implemented by Soviet society within the foreseeable future. It speaks of social justice, political freedom, development of education and culture, social balance between town and country, a high

living standard for the people, etc. These are indeed those same features which express the "essence of the initial socialist idea...."

Nonetheless, some concepts of socialism, refuted by the historical experience of a number of countries including, naturally, our own, and unsupported by science, have been included in the draft platform. How else to rate the solemn proclamation by the party of its rejection of "any ways and means of management and economic administration which triggered the alienation of man and do not enable him to realize his possibilities and natural talents?" Is this not anything other than a beautiful promise, which is being moved from one programmatic document to another, the path leading to the implementation of which remains unclear to both contemporary science and practice. This particularly applies in the conditions of a country where manual labor is extensively used, where bureaucratism dominates and where the organization of education is unsatisfactory.

Also purely declarative is the assertion that future society will be "an entirely different society" in which "man will be the purpose of history." It is inherent in an individual to think (and sometimes to promise to others) that tomorrow "an entirely different" a "new" life will begin and that in 10, 20 or 50 years everything will be "different." As the course of history has confirmed, such utopian expectations could, naturally, instill hope. However, they can also serve as a powerful impetus for dangerous attempts at radically breaking with the past and restructuring the world down to its foundations, something which has repeatedly led to unfortunate results.

Dogmatic concepts of socialism are manifested also in another idea expressed in the draft platform, worthy of a more detailed consideration: "We," the document reads, "break above all with the authoritarian-bureaucratic system, which is incompatible with the socialist principles." On the surface, this is an unquestionable thesis. Let us consider it. We are breaking with a system which is incompatible with socialism. However, if such a system had existed in our country, this meant that there was no socialism. Actually, the viewpoint or, more accurately put, the concept according to which socialism can exist only in a more or less perfect form, for otherwise this is not socialism, is quite widespread today among our theoreticians and, naturally, has the right to exist. It would be logical in that case to assume that it is being shared also by the authors of the draft. Yet, as we know, the document is named not simply "toward socialism," but "toward a humane, a democratic socialism." Furthermore, Section I directly states that "our ideal is a humane and democratic socialism." Therefore, there could exist and, as we know, there indeed existed and does exist, a socialism which was both humane and undemocratic, on the basis of which the authoritarian-bureaucratic system was established.

The experience of the 20th century gives credence to claim that socialism can not only exist in a variety of

forms (models) but also that it experiences, in its historical evolution, a variety of stages (phases). As to what they are, what defines them, how are they called, and so on, all of these are individual theoretical problems which demand special studies, and any attempt at answering them in the platform is impossible and, furthermore, out of place. However, going beyond a misleading simplistic alternative of "there is socialism—there is no socialism," would be, in my view, both necessary and pertinent. Consequently, obviously, we should bluntly point out that socialism as a social system is not an ideal social condition. It is not a static embodiment of socialist ideas but a sociohistorical process which becomes crystallized in a variety of forms—authoritarian, democratic, despotic, humane, and so on, which replace each other.

The understanding that the socialist idea is implemented not immediately and not entirely or impeccably and that the means of implementing this idea do not always turn out to be consistent with it as a target; that socialism could be, in the words of Marx and Engels, also conservative and reactionary, would make clearer and easier to explain our own past and the ways of transition to a new society. Today we still need to abandon utopias and myths which accompany the idea of socialism itself, which is frequently interpreted in a semimystical spirit, as well as to adopt a sober view on socialist society, not as being "heaven on earth," a gift of destiny or a reward for tribulations, but a natural product of the evolution of society, and which does not have to be in the least, always and in everything, superior to capitalism.

I submit, therefore, that Section I could should begin as follows: "Historical experience, including the experience of our country, indicates that the establishment of socialism as a system based on the idea of the liberation of man and the assertion of just social relations, is of a conflicting nature. In the course of its historical evolution it goes through different phases. The authoritarian-bureaucratic and military-state socialism which existed in our country has totally outlived its usefulness. In the new historical situation possibilities were created for building a humane and democratic socialism, the establishment of which is precisely the aim of our perestroika."

The evolution of Soviet socialism occurs within the context of an interrelated and interdependent world. What does this world represent in its dynamics, what are the trends functioning within it and where is it going? The draft does not provide clear and specific answers to such questions. It is true that it predicts a brilliant future for socialist ideology on a global scale. "Within the channel of the overall progress of civilization—of which we are convinced—the ideas of socialism will be revived and gain increasing influence," the document stipulates.

The authors of the draft platform could have supported their beliefs with concise but clear concepts concerning the profound formative-civilizing evolution of the contemporary world, which opens ways for the spreading of socialist values in countries with different economic and political systems. Many decades ago, Lenin pointed out

that "the dialectical process of development indeed instills, within the limits of capitalism, the elements of the new society and its material and spiritual elements" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 11, p 370). Since the time that this statement was made, the process of integration of the elements of socialism within the "fabric" of capitalist society and, perhaps, also the laying of the material foundations for the spreading of the ideas and values of socialism, possibly in a different form, have advanced quite far. However, the draft platform does not provide an analysis of the evolution of contemporary capitalism and the thesis of the global prospects of the socialist idea sounds as no more than a symbol of faith.

The draft platform raises the long-pressing problem of surmounting the division within the international socialist movement, underscoring the possibility of its restoration as a global movement.

On what basis could we cooperate with those same social democrats? "On a contemporary basis," the authors of the draft answer in a puzzling and diplomatic way. Nonetheless, a real foundation for interaction and cooperation does exist. On the ideological level, this applies to an orientation toward the socialist ideal, although it could be interpreted differently as has, in fact, always been the case within the socialist movement. On the political level, this would involve the struggle against neofascism, militarism and aggression and for the assertion of democracy and social justice.

As a whole, the final part of Section VI could be formulated, for example, as follows: "The CPSU asserts the traditional course of interaction with communist and worker parties. It is also ready to cooperate with liberal and national-democratic parties and with all organizations and movements which support peace, democracy and social progress."

The CPSU tries, in turn, to surmount the division within the international socialist movement and the restoration of its unity on the basis of the ideals of socialism and democracy. The study and development of the theoretical legacy and practical experience of social democracy is one of the important tasks in the shaping of contemporary socialist theory."

III

It is the moral duty of a party which offers society a program for perestroika to provide an honest and unbiased study of the situation which has developed within that organization itself, to expose its reasons and to formulate ways of solving the problems which face the CPSU. The party, the document stipulates, "was able to surmount the inertia of Stalinism and stagnation. It headed the revolutionary change and thus once again proved its ability to play a vanguard role." It may have been more accurate for a document with this kind of such purpose and scale, if the CPSU were openly to acknowledge that as a "leading force" it above all bears

responsibility for the critical condition in which the Soviet society has found itself.

Furthermore, could it be claimed that the party as such "was able to surmount the inertia of Stalinism and stagnation?" I believe that there are no substantive support of this claim. Today it is no longer possible to speak of our Communist Party as a united and integral organization acting in the same direction, be it in the area of ideology, economics or politics. One segment of the CPSU has been able, in my view, substantially to surmount the "inertia of Stalinism and stagnation" and has indeed headed perestroika. It is precisely this segment that could become the nucleus for the renovation of the CPSU, and would be able to perform the tasks of tomorrow. However, there also is another segment of the party which, in accordance with the familiar metaphor, "follows the line." There are no grounds whatsoever to say about this segment that it has surmounted the "inertia of Stalinism and stagnation." Finally, there is a segment which, as confirmed by some statements made at Central Committee plenums and at the congresses of people's deputies, hinders perestroika, pulling the CPSU and society backward and, in that sense, counteracting the vanguard.

Within the framework of a multi-million strong organization, today there are several trends, the representatives of which act on the basis of different positions. Not to acknowledge this and to structure a platform on a basis of compromise, aimed at preserving a mechanical unity means, in my view, laying in the foundations of the renovated CPSU a delayed action mine. As a result, it could deprive of their ability to act even that part of the communists who, indeed, could play a vanguard role.

What does being in the vanguard mean? What is the Central Committee's concept of this role? "By getting rid of extraneous obligations," the draft platform stipulates, "the CPSU thus acquires the possibility of focusing its efforts on the formulation of theories and programs of action, on organizational and educational work, on implementing party cadre policy and solving the problems of consolidation of society on the way to its revolutionary renovation. This is the main purpose of its vanguard role."

It is entirely obvious that this refers not to the vanguard role of the party but of the functions which, in all likelihood, could be performed not only by the CPSU but by virtually any other party in our country, which would lay a claim to power and, therefore, to having a political influence within society. What serious party would not engage in problems of theory or organizational work or cadre policy? Furthermore, no serious party could ignore the problem of consolidating our multinational society.

As to the vanguard role, which any party which aspires to play it would have to reassert its right over and over again through its deeds, it is defined not only by what the party wishes, i.e., by no means by virtue of its unique

functions under the conditions of a multiparty system, but by the way it goes about it and the way it deals handles said functions. A party which will be able, sooner and better than other, to understand the trends within society and to define the future trends of social development and to lead society to the cutting edge of progress, to surmount the crisis and to contribute to improving the living standard of the people and the role and prestige of the country in the international arena and, as a result, lead if not the entire society at least a considerable part of it, will be the party which will find itself in the vanguard. The same criteria will also determine the actual subordination among political parties and the nature of relations among them.

Let us point out that the old "pre-perestroika" understanding of the vanguard role of the Communist Party as an administrative-mandate-issuing role, emerges at various points in the draft platform. Let us consider, for instance, the question of the mass information media. The party warns in advance that it will "exert its ideological influence on them." This is a more than bold promise, for under the conditions of a democracy, the question of who will influence whom is resolved not by decree but on the basis of real authority, which must be constantly fought for by a political organization, and which includes influencing the mass information media.

The most important objective and task of the party is its self-democratization. What does the draft platform suggest in this case? Most important, what will happen to the principle of democratic centralism which, judging by the debates published in the press, is already generating severe criticism? Is this principle not the legitimized embodiment within the party of the administrative-command system which we are trying today to remove from both society and the state?

The document stipulates that "we must reinterpret the principle of democratic centralism and eliminate an interpretation which would make it possible to use this principle for instilling a barracks hierarchical discipline. Otherwise, we are further told, the dissatisfaction of the party members with their role in politics and with party activities will not end, and the feeling of personal dignity and inner freedom will not be restored to the party members."

Let us consider the way the reinterpretation is treated. "The CPSU," the draft stipulates, "needs true democracy of internal party discussions and procedures for decision-making, in an atmosphere of real party comradeship. Collective work by all party agencies, pluralism of opinion, freedom of criticism, a variety of approaches and platforms, the holding of referendums in special cases, and the right of the minority to defend its views, while mandatorily implementing the decisions passed on a majority basis, must be guaranteed by the statutes."

As we can see, the renovation of the principle of democratic centralism is reduced to the creation of an atmosphere of comradeship, freedom of criticism, debates

and opinions and approaches, i.e., in short, freedom of speech within the party. However, the suggested reinterpretation does not affect, judging by the text of the document, the essential features which precisely contributed to the transformation of the party into an organization of a semimilitary type and substantially narrowed the opportunity of all its members to use their creative potential; there also is subordinating the minority to the majority in the implementation of all decisions, and the mandatory nature of resolutions adopted by superior organizations by subordinate ones. This would inevitably lead, despite the entire comradely atmosphere, to fettering initiative (despite "unbridled" speech), and to bureaucratism and concentration of the power in the respective centers (rayon, city, and so on, on a vertical line) and to other faults which have long and well become familiar to us and which have already triggered a crisis within the party.

The traditional objection to the elimination of the principle of democratic centralism is, as we know, the assertion of the need for discipline within the party and the prevention of anarchy and factionalism, even more so under the conditions of the current intensification of centrifugal forces and trends and the restructuring of the federation. Yet, it is precisely the imperatives of the restructuring of society and the state and preserving the renovated party as a single entity that require, paradoxical though this might appear, not a simple "reinterpretation" of the principle of democratic centralism but the creation of a new model of internal party relations and the ability to integrate within it elements of democratic centralism, which are important in preserving party unity.

Unity and a monolithic structure (ensured by the "subordination of the minority" and the "mandatory nature" of all decisions to the subordinate authorities) are not one and the same. The variety of social and political conditions which prevail in the different areas and republics, the necessary fast, specific and knowledgeable reaction to the course of events under specific circumstances, guaranteeing the rights of the minority and the application of its intellectual potential demand the creation of a new, a flexible type of unity within the party and a new principle governing its activities.

This principle is the principle of "democratic accord." Inherent in this principle are two elements. First, a sharp reduction in the range of decisions made by the superior party authorities, which would be mandatory for implementation by the subordinate organizations. Let us not forget that what unites the party members is less the decisions made by "authorities" than the statutory and, above all, the programmatic requirements. Outside the statutes, the program and the very limited number of decisions made by their own and the superior organization, the party members could be guided not only by the principle of pluralism of opinion but also the pluralism of action. This would benefit the cause. Another essential element of the principle of "democratic accord" is that of decisions made by the party organizations on a

number of matters not through a vote (which, essentially, is an action which divides and blocks one part of the organization by another) but through the method of consensus, which has long been well-recommended in the activities of various types of political organizations, precisely as a way of unification and consolidation of forces holding different views.

As to factions, I believe that any beforehand resolution of the matter under present circumstances would be artificial. The practical activities of the renovated party in the new situation of a multiparty system and economic democracy, which has not been tried as yet in a not entirely clear situation and in the new international circumstances, and the degree of efficiency of the renovation of the structures would indicate the type of internal party integration which is both feasible and necessary. Let us add, however, that some nontraditional forms of integration of party members (such as groups which develop in the course of the activities of the USSR Congresses of People's Deputies) could, as of now, prove to be useful, whereas their identification as "factions," which could perfectly well occur in the heat of the debates, would only hinder the party's democratization.

The draft platform treats the ideological-theoretical foundations of CPSU activities like a tongue-twister. Should there be any renovation in this area and, if so, what should it consist of? For the time being, this is not entirely clear. In any case, if we consider the programmatic documents of the party during the period of perestroika and compare them with the draft, we would find here and there the virtually identical words concerning a creative approach to the legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin, taking new developments into consideration and similar general "access" passages.

Yet, as has already been noted in a number of discussion articles, particularly the one by Academician L. Abalkin, "what our party is facing today includes loss of initiative, loss of authority and weakened influence among the masses, which can be traced to the major crisis in theoretical thinking... without the surmounting of which it would be impossible seriously to speak of any renovation of the party" (PRAVDA, 30 March 1990).

It is natural that as the party of a socialist choice, the CPSU cannot fail to take into consideration socialist (communist) tradition, the summit of which organically includes Marx, Engels and Lenin, a tradition to which the draft platform appeals. It is necessary, in this case, to consider that a socialist, like any other, theoretical and political tradition is not limited to the "summits" however high they may be. Both before and after Marx, Engels and Lenin there have been outstanding philosophers and leaders of a socialist orientation, whose legacy retains its value for us as well. Furthermore, the fetishizing of individuals and of the legacy of great philosophers and politicians, including socialist ones, can harm both the party, those who wish to march in step with our time and, even more so, to be in the vanguard of society, as well as the targets of the fetishizing themselves, who

are turned into icons. Such fetishizing, despite all the talk about a creative approach, is, unfortunately, one of the oldest diseases in our party. If, by debunking the cult of Stalin's personality, we do not wish tomorrow to start a cult of Gorbachev's personality or that of any other leader who would be at the top of the power pyramid, there should not be a cult of personality or of the philosophy of Marx, Engels and Lenin. This would make their ideas and their human images all the more authoritative and attractive.

However, it is not a matter simply of being "iconoclastic." It has long been known that in the "legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin," as in the legacy of any outstanding or simply a great philosopher, not everything is unquestionable or of equal value. From the very start, there were matters which were dictated by the needs of the "moment," by tactical considerations or even emotions, for these people were alive. Some things have lost their validity as the conditions of place and time have changed. Some things have retained their potential but their implementation is possible only within a new theoretical concept, the more so since both in the 19th and the 20th centuries philosophical, sociological and political thinking successfully developed also outside Marxism, having given mankind a number of brilliant accomplishments. In this sense, Lenin's statement according to which Marxism contains nothing which would resemble "sectarianism" sounds today more than relevant.

Naturally, a socialist tradition, despite the crisis in the societies which have tried to implement it, is alive. It would be difficult even to imagine that in our contradictory, unstable and essentially tragic world there would be no place for it in the future. However, in order to support this great tradition, it becomes possible to attain its humanistic potential and to develop it under the new conditions only by going beyond it. We believe that it is not on tradition that a progressive party should rely and not on authorities, however great they may be, but, above all, on the achievement of contemporary science or, to put better said, on contemporary theoretical and political thinking which it even better, in accordance with the logic of evolution in science and culture and the achievements of the past.

In short, I would suggest that one should either provide an expanded, although concise segment of the ideological and theoretical foundations of CPSU activities or else, should this be impossible to accomplish within the limits of a document such as the platform, to include a pertinent paragraph in Section VII, as follows: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a self-governing sociopolitical organization, a voluntary alliance of like-minded communists. As a party of the socialist choice, the CPSU expresses and supports the interests of the working people, oriented toward democratic and humanistic ideals shared by mankind. The party relies in its theoretical and practical activities on the achievements of

contemporary science, continuing and developing the socialist tradition within the context of 20th century historical experience."

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On the Basis of the Unity of Principles and Pluralism of Methods

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[Text] Issue No 3 of KOMMUNIST carries information about a conference held by the party organizations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. A second such conference was held. Its participants adopted the resolution "On the Need to Consolidate the Democratic Forces Within the Party," which the editors submit to the readers.

On the Need to Consolidate the Democratic Forces in the Party

1. The CPSU is in a state of acute crisis caused by the fact that the theoretical-ideological and organizational principles governing the structure and functioning of the party are inconsistent with real life. In a number of party organizations there is growing unconstructive contraposition among different platforms and a danger of division.

We believe that such a division will not contribute to surmounting the crisis within the party and society. The democratic renovation of society is possible on the basis of mutually agreed upon unity among party organizations.

2. The platforms which were published do not provide an objectively substantiated answer to the main questions of the present: 1. Reasons for the crisis; 2. Essence of the crisis; 3. Ways in which the party and society can come out of the crisis.

The conference calls upon party members and party organizations supporting different draft platforms within the CPSU to firmly demand the immediate holding a series of working roundtable meetings on an equal basis, resulting in the formulation of a common program for action aimed at surmounting the crisis and for the formulation of a new concept for the party program to be discussed at the 28th CPSU Congress. We believe that the suggested draft platforms should not exclude the possibility of consolidation on the basis of the following fundamental principles and objectives.

Basic principles:

Acknowledgment of the supreme social value of man;

Giving priority to the human rights to ecological safety, the survival of human society, the progress of civilization and accessibility of its results to all nations;

Priority of universal human spiritual values and interests of the individual over class values and interests, without abandoning the class analysis of social reality;

Priority of constitutional and democratic methods for the gain and the exercise of power and the inadmissibility of the use of violent methods in the seizure of power and in resolving the political, national and economic problems of society;

Unacceptability of dictatorship by any given class or social group in the political life of contemporary society;

Unacceptability of any type of monopoly in ideology, politics, economics, culture, science and information;

Commonality of interests of the working people;

Implementation of the principle of tolerance of other outlooks and social movements which do not preach violence and which oppose national intolerance and discord;

Readiness to cooperate with all democratic forces of society.

Basic objectives in the sociospiritual sphere:

Exercise of human rights and freedoms, based on the priority of consistent humanism, democracy, social justice and nonviolence;

Priority development of culture, education, health care and science as necessary sources of social progress with a guaranteed future;

Assertion and development of the spiritual and historical values of the fatherland.

In the Political Sphere:

Establishment of a democratic multiple-party society with separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers;

Conversion to a real federation of the ethnic groups and nations which are members of the Union, on the basis of a new Union treaty;

Ensuring the protection of the public and private interests of the citizens, as proclaimed by the USSR Constitution, and restoration of the violated rights of nations and ethnic groups;

Strengthening the authority of local elected authorities.

In the Economic Sphere:

Exercise of economic freedom by the citizens on the basis of equal state, collective and private forms of ownership and establishing constitutional guarantees of their inviolability;

Creation of a system for maintaining social stability and the social and economic protection of citizens through the elimination of social inequality;

Combining planning with the market, regulated through economic methods.

In our opinion, a party reform is possible on the basis of the following:

Rejection of the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and the formulation of a new concept of the Communist Party, based on the expression of the political interests of the working people and the electoral struggle for the right to rule;

Analysis of activities and definition of the responsibility of the party and its leaders for the results and consequences of the totalitarian regime in the country;

Achieving profound democratization in internal party life on the basis of a reform in the organizational structure of the party and acknowledgment of the determining role of the primary organizations;

Broadening the organizational and financial rights of the primary party organizations and developing horizontal structures;

Acknowledging the possibility of the existence of political platforms, guaranteeing minority rights, including the right to access to the mass information media;

Ensuring the free manifestation of the will of the party members through direct secret balloting with alternate choices, in all leading party structures;

Implementing the principle of independence of electoral control authorities and subordinating information and executive authorities and the apparatus of the superior authorities to the party organizations;

Ensuring openness in the activities of all party authorities and structures;

Immediate elimination of privileges and benefits within the party.

3. The participants in the conference do not claim to define the ways of resolving the crisis and call upon all constructive forces within the party and society to undertake the search for such means.

Considering the conditions of the grave crisis in which we find ourselves, in our view relying on emotions would be the least useful method for coming out of it. Therefore, the conference calls upon all party members and party organizations in the country to engage in a constructive dialog and to seek agreement on the basis of the unity of principles and pluralism of methods.

The participants in the conference appealed to the CPSU Central Committee to take the initiative in organizing a series of roundtable meetings.

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Failure of the 'Antiparty Group,' The June 1957 CPSU Central Committee Plenum

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[Text] Most important political changes were initiated in the country in the 1950s, a significant impetus for which was provided by the 20th Party Congress and the exposure of the cult of Stalin's personality. Democratization opened to Soviet society new prospects and contributed to the manifestation of the people's creative forces. Nonetheless, from the very start the course charted at the 20th Congress was not brought to its final conclusion. A scientific approach to the solution of the pressing socioeconomic and political problems increasingly yielded to arbitrariness. Many positive results which were initiated with the restructuring were, in the final account, crushed because of errors. Such was also the course of N.S. Khrushchev's political career. Having assumed the leadership in the trend toward the renovation of society, he was unable to carry it out, and it was largely because of this that he was defeated.

One of the key events which predetermined this precise trend in the development of the country and the party and the political fate of its leader was the June 1957 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The 20th CPSU Congress, N.S. Khrushchev's report "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences," and informing the party organizations and the public at large of its content marked the end of the period of a so to say silent struggle against the cult of personality, in which Stalin himself was shoved aside. However, the country's leadership which, on the one hand, tried to avoid responsibility for the repressive Stalinist regime and, on the other, to preserve the continuity in the theory and practice of socialism as a prepared bridgehead for the further advance toward communism, as proclaimed at the 20th Congress, tried to maneuver and stop at halfway measures.

As early as 5 April 1956, soon after the end of the 20th Congress, in an editorial entitled "The Communist Party Has Won and Is Winning With Its Loyalty to Leninism," PRAVDA noted that "individual corrupt elements are trying, under the guise of condemning the cult of personality, to question the rightness of party policy," despite the fact that throughout all historical periods, "it was and remains a Leninist policy." At the same time, the tendency to prevent criticism of the cult of personality from developing into a political reevaluation of the history of the party and the country, and to preserve the theoretical legacy of Stalin and his political activities, was manifested with increasing clarity. A number of articles were published in the central press, emphasizing

Stalin's merits as an outstanding personality in the international communist movement and the building of socialism, and as a defender of Lenin's ideas.

In an effort to keep the criticism of the cult of Stalin within certain bounds, on 30 June 1956 the CPSU Central Committee passed the resolution "On Surmounting the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences." Because of its unquestionable and major social and propaganda significance, it nonetheless marked a step backward in terms of the documents of the 20th Party Congress. The sacramental assertions that Stalin "actively struggled for the implementation of Lenin's behests," and that the cult of personality "could not and did not change the nature of our social system," and had not led Soviet society "away from the right path of development toward communism," indicated the aspiration not to let the criticism of Stalinism exceed the limits of the concept of "isolated errors." For example, the decree did not mention at all Stalin's personal participation in the organization of repressions, something which had been clearly stated from the rostrum of the 20th Congress.

However, none of this could or did remove the question of political responsibility for the abuse of power and illegal mass repressions, the more so since the voices of thousands upon thousands of people returning from prisons and camps, could be heard increasingly loudly. Stalin's former fellow-workers in the leadership of the party and the country felt the threat of the "day of judgment," when the question of their own responsibility could be raised.

It was against that historical background, following the 20th Congress, that the struggle between G.M. Malenkov, V.M. Molotov and L.M. Kaganovich (let us conventionally describe them as the Malenkov group), on the one hand, and N.S. Khrushchev, on the other, became aggravated. Each of the opposing sides pursued its own objectives. The Malenkov group feared, above all, any further exposure of the Stalinist regime. What mattered to Khrushchev was not only definitively to remove from power the old Stalinist guard but also to distance himself from it politically and thus assert himself as the head of a new, democratic course.

Khrushchev started his offensive even before the 20th Congress, after Malenkov was removed from his position as chairman of the Council of Ministers. After the congress, in 1956, Molotov, minister of foreign affairs, and Kaganovich, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Labor and Wages, lost their positions and were appointed to significantly lower posts. A situation developed which already excluded any further "peaceful coexistence." This was realized by both sides. Fearing any loss of time, the Malenkov group decided to deal a preventive strike, hinted by Malenkov, at one point, in a talk with Saburov: "We must act. If we do not bring them down they will bring us down."

The Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich alliance had been forged under the pressure of circumstances. Relations among them had never been noted for sincerity and trust. Rather, these were relations of suspicion and rivalry, something which could always be noticed in the people around Stalin, and something which he encouraged. A.A. Andreyev, who was well acquainted with the situation within the Stalinist Politburo said that "Kaganovich and Molotov are two opposites. Molotov cannot stand Malenkov and during all those years of joint work in the Central Committee they have hated one another. Kaganovich had always terribly disliked Malenkov, suspecting that the latter intended to remove him." However, their personal antipathies were submerged in the face of the common threat. A unified line in their behavior became noticeable. At Central Committee Presidium sessions they avoided any confrontation, even when they held different views, although in the past, conversely, they missed no opportunity to attack one another.

Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich ascribed a major role in the implementation of their plans to N.A. Bulganin. They tried to pit him as chairman of the Council of Ministers against Khrushchev, as CPSU Central Committee first secretary. Although Bulganin owed his promotion to the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers above all to Khrushchev, a certain friction had already developed between them. Trusting that the plan for replacing Khrushchev would succeed, Bulganin switched his support to the Malenkov group. It is not excluded that this triumvirate encouraged Bulganin's aspirations to power with far-reaching promises. Furthermore, Bulganin entertained pro-Stalinist feelings. He actually became the center of the group and it was in his office that the group met and that tactical problems were discussed.

At the last moment the group was able to win over K. Ye. Voroshilov, who was chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium but who played virtually no political role. Actually, the group did not need him but needed his vote in the Central Committee Presidium. Although Voroshilov had no particular reason to oppose Khrushchev, his personal support of Stalinism was unquestionable, and his responsibility for illegal repressions, above all among the military, was equal to that of the others among Stalin's fellow workers. Therefore, he did not require any lengthy persuasion.

As to M.G. Pervukhin and M.Z. Saburov, they were closely tied to the participants in the group. It was with their help that in the past they had become members of the high party and state leadership. For that reason, Pervukhin and Saburov hoped to retain their positions precisely as a result of an alliance with the old leaders.

Let us note that by then "leadership" trends, ambition and claims to preemptory views had already begun to appear in Khrushchev's activities as well. Khrushchev made errors and hasty and unplanned decisions. This triggered a critical attitude toward him not exclusively

on the part of the Malenkov group, something which intensified the latter's aspiration to oppose him.

Bulganin called a meeting of the Council of Ministers Presidium on the morning of 18 June 1957. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was seeing the editor of a Japanese newspaper. The meeting was merely a pretext for the group of members of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium to gather officially on "neutral territory" and definitively agree on its further actions. Once gathered, they demanded that the Central Committee Presidium convene under the pretext of discussing the question of a trip to attend the anniversary celebrations of the 250th anniversary of the founding of Leningrad. Notified of this fact, Khrushchev answered that there was no need to convene the presidium, for all problems related to the trip had already been resolved.

Nonetheless, on the insistence of the majority of the present members of the Central Committee Presidium, a meeting was held. From the very beginning it was attended by the following: Presidium members N.S. Khrushchev, N.A. Bulganin, K. Ye. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Molotov, and M.G. Pervukhin (absent: A.I. Kirichenko, M.Z. Saburov and M.A. Suslov); Presidium candidate members: L.I. Brezhnev, Ye.A. Furtseva, N.M. Shvernik and D.T. Shepilov; after about 1.5-2 hours G.K. Zhukov arrived (F.R. Kozlov and N.A. Mukhitdinov were absent). Malenkov motioned that Khrushchev be removed from chairing the meeting, for a number of presidium members had raised the question of party policy and the activities of the CPSU Central Committee first secretary. He recommended that the meeting be chaired by Bulganin. Khrushchev and Mikoyan objected. However, with six votes for and two against the motion passed and Bulganin assumed the chair. Malenkov made a statement on the need for a change in the party's leadership and criticized Khrushchev's activities. Sharp accusations addressed at the Central Committee's first secretary were also made by Molotov and Kaganovich.

The Malenkov group, which included the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, had on hand substantial power for the implementation of its plans, and the majority of votes in the Central Committee Presidium. In the final account, its objective was to once again assume key positions in the party and country leadership and within the Central Committee. As simple members of the Central Committee Presidium, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich did not have any real power in the party's leadership. They had no direct access to the party apparatus which, naturally, denied them the possibility of decisively participating in political life. Hence their plan was to replace Khrushchev as CPSU Central Committee first secretary, and become, one way or another, part of the Central Committee Secretariat. Furthermore, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich were too experienced as politicians to raise the question of offering to anyone among them the position of first

secretary, realizing that such aspirations would be futile, particularly after the 20th Congress.

Realizing the instability of its numerical superiority, the group stubbornly tried to resolve the problem of Khrushchev on the very first day so that, subsequently, to come to the Central Committee Plenum with an already drafted and suitable politically substantiated motion (possibly, even prior to the plenum, to address a letter to the party organizations). Under those circumstances, both Khrushchev and Mikoyan stated that unless Central Committee Presidium members and candidate members and Central Committee secretaries were present, they would not attend the meeting. They were supported by Zhukov, Brezhnev, Furtseva and others. Brezhnev was instructed to convene the full Central Committee Presidium.

The 19 June Session was quite stormy, involving reciprocal charges and attacks. Once again Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov spoke. They expressed on a number of issues their disagreement with the policy which was being pursued, both in agriculture and industry and in international relations. They were joined by Shepilov in their criticism of Khrushchev, above all concerning the "cult of personality" line and many other matters. Khrushchev was firmly supported by Kirichenko, Mikoyan, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Mukhitdinov, Kozlov, Furtseva, Aristov, Belyayev and Pospelov.

With the full membership of the Central Committee Presidium (including candidate members) and with Central Committee secretaries being present, the ratio of forces at the meeting changed substantially. Whereas during the first day there were six members of the camp of Khrushchev's opponents among presidium members, opposed only by Khrushchev and Mikoyan (taking into consideration the views of candidate members, the ratio was seven to six), during the second day, although the preponderance among presidium members was in favor of the Malenkov group of seven (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin and Saburov) against four (Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov, Kirichenko), the overall ratio of forces at the meeting turned in favor of Khrushchev (13 versus six). Preponderance among the members of the Central Committee Presidium was now no longer particularly important, for it had become obvious that, despite its great persistence, the Malenkov group would not succeed in resolving the question of Khrushchev's remaining in the position of Central Committee first secretary with a simple vote by the presidium members.

Taking the situation into consideration, at the 20 June meeting the Malenkov group no longer raised the specific question of replacing Khrushchev. Instead, it insisted that in the interest of greater collective rule, "with a view to preventing the appearance of a cult of Khrushchev's personality," in general to abolish the position of Central Committee first secretary, as had been the case between March and August 1953. Quite possibly, the purpose of this suggestion was to strengthen

Bulganin's position as chairman of the Central Committee Presidium and, with his help, to assert within it the group's influence.

A number of members of the Central Committee learned about the uninterrupted session of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. On 21 June, the Central Committee members who were in Moscow, addressed a letter to the presidium: "We, members of the CPSU Central Committee, learned that the Central Committee Presidium has been sitting in session uninterruptedly for the past 4 days. We have also learned that you are discussing the question of the leadership of the Central Committee Presidium and the secretary. Such problems of importance to our entire party and country should not be concealed from the members of the Central Committee Plenum. In this connection, we request that the Central Committee Plenum be urgently summoned, and that this question be submitted for discussion by the Central Committee Plenum. We, Central Committee members, cannot stand aside when it comes to matters of our party's leadership." The letter was signed by 80 Central Committee members. A group of 20 members was instructed to present this letter to the Central Committee Presidium and to state that given the developing situation neither organizational nor political or economic problems could be properly resolved. The consideration of such problems should be a matter of the Central Committee Plenum.

The delegation was not granted access to the presidium. After an hour's worth of argument, Bulganin, Voroshilov and Mikoyan were instructed to receive the Central Committee members. Bulganin began by saying that the plenum will meet in 2 weeks. The Central Committee members categorically rejected this suggestion and demanded that any discussion of the question of the Central Committee first secretary be ended and that no decisions be made, but that an extraordinary Central Committee Plenum be summoned immediately. It was agreed that they would meet again at 6:00 p.m. By then, suitably informed, other Central Committee members began arriving in Moscow. By the time that the presidium had resumed its meeting, it had already become clear that it was impossible to avoid an immediate summoning of the plenum. It was agreed that the plenum should assemble on the following day.

Khrushchev chose the only right tactic: to block the making of any decisions whatsoever by the Central Committee Presidium and to shift all problems to the plenum. The point was also that, personally, he could not accuse Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich of having directly participated in the mass repressions. This was fraught with equally strong countercharges. The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the membership of which had become considerably renovated at the 19th and, particularly, the 20th Party Congress, was a different matter. The majority of its members had not been involved in the repressions and condemned them unconditionally. Based on the 20th Congress, they could daringly raise the question of the personal responsibility of

Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich for committing illegal acts and firmly support the political line charted at the congress.

The CPSU Central Committee Extraordinary Plenum opened on 22 June at 2:00 p.m. It was attended by 121 out of 130 (counting some former) Central Committee members, 94 of the 122 candidate Central Committee members and 51 of the 73 members of the Central Auditing Commission, or a total of 266 people. Khrushchev opened the plenum. Suslov submitted a report on the meeting of the Central Committee Presidium and, subsequently, chaired the plenum. Having emphasized that he was speaking for himself and expressing his personal opinion, Suslov described the behavior of the members of the group as nonparty behavior: their intention was to change the structure of the Central Committee Secretariat, take over the leadership of the Central Committee and pursue their own political line. As Kozlov, first secretary of the Leningrad Party Obkom, noted at the meeting of the party aktiv (2 July 1957), "calmly, with great restraint, Suslov described at the plenum the meetings of the Central Committee Presidium, what the supporters of the antiparty group wanted and the wishes of that part of the presidium which supported the party's general line."

Suslov was followed by Zhukov, who bluntly raised the question of the direct responsibility shared by Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov for the criminal repressions of the 1930s and 1940s, cited supporting data and made public the resolution approved by Kaganovich and Molotov concerning the lists of people sentenced, with a request for the death penalty. Zhukov especially emphasized the illegal repressions of the Red Army command, the "Leningrad Case" and the role which Malenkov had played in it. The speaker discussed the attempt to fabricate a "Moscow Case," and Malenkov's participation, in 1950, in the creation of the so-called "special" (political) prison. The plenum demanded the necessary explanations. Zhukov's speech, immediately following Suslov's report, led the plenum along a specific track, and the question of the responsibility of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov for the repressions gained priority.

Why were these people in such a hurry to seize the party leadership? Brezhnev asked. One of the reasons, he pointed out, was that lately increasingly materials on the rehabilitation of party members and leading personnel, who had been repressed in the past by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, were reaching the presidium. The submitted documents clearly indicated their signatories. This worried them constantly. Aristov said that Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich were afraid because of their guilt to the people, the party and the Central Committee due to their participation in the crimes which had been committed as a result of the cult of personality.

For the first time documentary data were submitted at the plenum on the mass repressive measures and their true scale, and the involvement in them of Molotov,

Kaganovich and Malenkov. The materials in the archives of the Supreme Court Military Collegium and the party's Central Committee files proved that between 27 February 1937 and 12 November 1938 alone the NKVD had received from Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich permission to sentence to death 38,679 people. In a single day, on 12 November 1938, Stalin and Molotov had approved the execution by firing squad of 3,167 people. The same materials revealed that on 21 November 1938 the NKVD had submitted a list for sentencing to the firing squad of 292 people, including 45 former members of the VKP(b) Central Committee and Central Committee candidate members, 28 former members of the Party Control Commission and Soviet Control Commission, 12 former obkom and kraykom secretaries, 26 former people's commissars, deputy people's commissars, chairmen of oblast executive committees, and others. The list was reviewed by Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich, and permission for execution by firing squad was granted for 229 people.

The Central Committee Plenum was informed that in 1937 and 1938 more than 1.5 million people had been detained and 353,074 had been executed by firing squad in 1937 and a total of 681,692 in a 2-year period.

Under the pressure of the facts and the documents, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov were unable to deny their direct involvement in the repressions. Their comments inscribed on the lists of those detained were made public at the plenum: "Hit, hit and hit again;" "the scoundrels deserve it" (Molotov); "I welcome the firing squad sentence" (Kaganovich), and so on. They tried to build their defense on isolated admissions and referred to the "peculiar" political situation of that time and the Stalinist thesis of the aggravation of the class struggle as socialism became more successful.

In his report on the Central Committee Plenum, submitted to the Leningrad Party Aktiv, F.R. Kozlov said: "Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov were the initiators of many illegal actions toward honest people, loyal to the party and the Soviet state. In an effort to deny their responsibility for their criminal actions, the participants in the antiparty group tried to put the entire blame exclusively on Stalin. They hoped, after seizing key positions in the party and the state, to conceal the traces of their past actions and avoid responsibility for the errors, distortions and severe violations of revolutionary legality in the course of their past activities."

At the Central Committee Plenum, each member of the group spoke several times. They said that at the Central Committee Presidium it was not a question of removing Khrushchev but of vacating the position of Central Committee first secretary and introducing the institution of Central Committee secretaries of equal rank, the purpose of which was to strengthen collective leadership and to prevent the excessive concentration of power within a single pair of hands, and to help to eliminate shortcomings in the work of the Central Committee Presidium and Secretariat.

The admissions of Saburov, Pervukhin and, subsequently, Bulganin, made clear that the group began to meet in the spring of 1957, most often in Bulganin's office, all of them being members of the Council of Ministers. In the speeches delivered by Mikoyan, Shvernik and other participants in the conspiracy, the "antiparty group" was given its political description. Its purpose was to change the composition of the Central Committee Presidium behind the back of the Central Committee Plenum and deviate from the course set at the 20th CPSU Congress.

The accusation of having set up an "antiparty group" frightened all of its participants, and their "united front" collapsed. They began to accuse each other. Saburov, Pervukhin and Voroshilov and, eventually, Bulganin as well, did everything possible to distance themselves from Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov, to lay the full responsibility for the conspiracy against Khrushchev on them. In his statement, Pervukhin said: "There indeed was a group, an antiparty group. However, it consisted of three people: Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov. They tried to draw over on their side the remaining members of the presidium, including myself.... I must say that a group consisting of seven people did not gather together even once... Three to four people would gather, speak with individuals and then relate what they told one another. It is thus that the worked.... They put strong pressure on every one of us...." Saburov acknowledged unconditionally the fact of group conspiracy: "Yes, there was a group, whatever you may call it, a group, a conference or a faction. That is not the problem. The problem is that they met as a group and discussed the matter.... Who was included? Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Bulganin and Pervukhin; I was present on two occasions."

In his first speech, Bulganin said that the question of changing the party's leadership and policy was not raised; "It was a question, with a view to preventing the development of a cult of Khrushchev's personality, of abolishing the position of Central Committee first secretary." In his second statement he confirmed the existence of the group and its conspiracy, stating that he had become involved with it but that he had never done this before. He accused mostly Malenkov who was active in indoctrinating everyone in turn. Bulganin described Molotov as the ideological inspirer of the party, "all the time maligning the party line."

In the final account, the threesome was forced to admit to the conspiracy: "Naturally, there were conferences, there was a conspiracy" (Kaganovich); "unquestionably, there was a conspiracy" (Malenkov); Molotov was more cautious: "We met among our group and talked.... This could be described as cliquishness." They denied that the group had an antiparty and factional nature.

In their statements at the plenum, Molotov and Kaganovich tried to pursue their line of separating the criticism of the "cult of personality" from the personality of Stalin. Kaganovich, for example, said: "...It began with

the question of Stalin and the cult of personality.... We said that Stalin is the great continuator of Lenin's cause. Then all of a sudden a question was raised about Stalin.... I reacted to this very painfully. I loved Stalin and there was something to love him for, for he was a great Marxist.... We must not raise this question. That is why I consider such a formulation of the matter politically erroneous.... Such a formulation of the matter is politically harmful.... I cannot agree with it." He acknowledged that over a long period of time he had discussed matters with Molotov about Stalin and was "touched by the fact that Molotov, who had personally suffered and been kicked repeatedly, nonetheless, when it came to Stalin, displayed a good attitude." Molotov himself expressed this "good attitude" at the plenum: "After Lenin, the main credit for the unification of the Soviet people and the main credit for the development of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism during that period belong to J.V. Stalin. Therefore, comrades, if this is accurate, and it is something that one cannot deny, we should draw the proper conclusion. Does our press today... ever mention Stalin's name?"

Naturally, neither at the meeting of the presidium nor at the Central Committee Plenum did the Malenkov group reveal its real motivations. It mounted the attack on Khrushchev above all on the basis of criticizing his policies and personal behavior. Khrushchev was accused of violating the principle of collective leadership, cadre arbitrariness, and the insufficient substantiation and adventuristic nature of many of his economic measures, such as the accelerated development of the virgin lands, the consolidation of kolkhozes, the attack mounted against private auxiliary plots, the declarative appeal to catch up with and outstrip the United States within the shortest possible time in per capita production of milk, butter and meat, etc. The trend was noted of clearly exaggerating the successes which had been achieved in industry and agriculture, which had led to the formulation of unrealistic tasks relative to the further development of the economy. The work of the Central Committee Secretariat was criticized.

It must be pointed out that, regardless of the motivations which guided Malenkov's group, in many aspects this criticism was just. However, at the plenum it was interpreted only as a trap set by the "antiparty group," unworthy of attention. Suslov, for example, said that Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich were incredibly exaggerating and inflating Khrushchev's shortcomings and were trying to deny anything positive in that person. According to Mikoyan "the group had used individual shortcomings in Khrushchev's character to solve its own political problems. A discussion of shortcomings was merely a pretext." Any criticism of Khrushchev was simply interpreted as an attempt against the political line of the 20th CPSU Congress. All of this had its reverse side and led to the fact that instead of analyzing the real problems and properly understanding them, the Central Committee members unequivocally took up the defense of Khrushchev, thus objectively consolidating his ambitions and unreceptiveness of criticism.

Khrushchev as well, who spoke out at the conclusion of the plenum, rejected the critical claims of the group. He accused his opponents of opposing the party line formulated at the 20th Congress and of an attempt to divide the party leadership for self-seeking purposes. Khrushchev particularly emphasized the question of the cult of personality and the participation of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov in the repressions. Ignoring obvious facts, he tried to present his opponents as being the main personalities responsible for the past crimes and, once more, trying to deflect the charges against Stalin. Thus, according to Khrushchev, in 1935, while on a trip to the Urals, Kaganovich sent a telegram to Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov, in which he suggested that a committee of three be set up for the operative ratification on the spot of sentences calling for the death penalty, passed by the oblast and kray courts. Stalin, who was resting in Sochi, pointed out in a response telegraph to Molotov and Zhdanov: "What has happened and why has a three-member committee become necessary? I categorically oppose a review of sentences to the death penalty by such committees of three. Such cases must be reviewed through the ordinary normal channels." Reacting to the political situation and contrary to his own claims voiced at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev insisted that "Kaganovich and Molotov, together with Beriya and Malenkov, tried to implement their base plans through Stalin. Stalin rejected and refused them. In the final account, after Stalin had alienated himself from everything—from the party and the people—a situation developed in which Stalin himself took to the use of repressions. Furthermore, the rascal Beriya was on hand, weaving his web of intrigues and, fraudulently spreading fabrications about conspiracies and attempts on Stalin and the party. To this day, efforts are made to blame Stalin for everything." In conclusion, Khrushchev insisted that the gross violations of socialist legality had been eliminated. While the plenum was being, according to Khrushchev, some 200,000 people had been rehabilitated.

The Central Committee Plenum unanimously condemned the group conspiracy and voted its total confidence in Khrushchev as first secretary of the Central Committee. More than 200 of the 266 participants in the plenum registered to speak. More than 60 spoke; 164 participants submitted written statements in which they presented their views at length.

As a result, at the 28 June Plenum Session, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich admitted their errors. "I condemn my actions," Malenkov said. "We violated all party standards." "I admit," Kaganovich said, "that the path which I took, for the first time in my life, was erroneous in the methods, it was a harmful path in terms of the party interests, it was a nonparty path. Together with the Central Committee Plenum I condemn all of my actions." In his statement, Molotov said: "I have come to the rostrum to condemn my positions before and during the plenum. I must point out that I bear particular responsibility for the erroneous nature of my positions

and for the conclusions which we reached in the course of our meetings before the presidium and at the Central Committee Plenum. I stood on positions which have now been condemned and, in my view, condemned accurately." At the final session of the plenum, on 29 July, the written statements by Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov were made public. The plenum considered them unsatisfactory, particularly Molotov's statement, as the latter continued to defend a number of his views.

The commission in charge of drafting the resolution (55 people) discussed the matter at length and suggested, despite the demands of many plenum participants, not to expel from the party the members of the group. The plenum resolved to condemn the factional activities of the antiparty Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov group, and of "Shepilov who had joined them," to remove Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov from membership in the Central Committee Presidium and the Central Committee, and to remove Shepilov from his position as CPSU Central Committee secretary and from candidate member of the Central Committee Presidium and membership in the Central Committee.

Taking into consideration that Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov, who had displayed "political instability, as manifested in their support, at a certain stage, of the antiparty factional group," and had realized their error in the course of the plenum and condemned them and had helped the plenum to expose the factional activities of the group, the Central Committee Plenum deemed it possible to issue a strict reprimand with a warning to Bulganin; Pervukhin was demoted from member to candidate member of the Presidium while Saburov lost his position as member of the Central Committee Presidium. It was decided to forgive Voroshilov because of his total repentance and to limit his penalty to the discussion. All of these resolutions were not included in the published resolution. Together with all participants Malenkov and Kaganovich voted for the resolution. Molotov was the sole abstainer.

The fact that Khrushchev separated Bulganin and Voroshilov from the "antiparty group," and excluded their names from the published resolution and kept them (naturally, for the time being) in their high governmental position of Council of Ministers chairman and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, proved his aspiration to conceal at all cost the gravity of the conflict situation which existed in the leadership of the party and the country which, had it become public knowledge, could have raised doubts as to the incontestable authority of Khrushchev himself.

The plenum passed a resolution on electing a CPSU Central Committee Presidium consisting of 15 members (formerly 11) and nine candidate members (formerly six). The following were elected Central Committee members: A.B. Aristov, N.I. Belyayev, L.I. Brezhnev, N.A. Bulganin, K.Ye. Voroshilov, G.K. Zhukov, N.G. Ignatov, A.I. Kirichenko, F.R. Kozlov, O.V. Kuusinen, A.I. Mikoyan, M.A. Suslov, Ye.A. Furtseva, N.S.

Khrushchev, and N.M. Shverdnik; the following were elected candidate members of the Central Committee Presidium: Ye.E. Kalnberzin, A.P. Kirilenko, D.S. Korotchenko, A.N. Kosygin, K.T. Mazurov, V.P. Mzhavanadze, N.A. Mukhitdinov, M.G. Pervukhin, and P.N. Pospelov.

The meetings with the party aktivs, at which the participants in the plenum submitted their reports, took place immediately after the Central Committee Plenum. As a rule, their assessment of the "antiparty group," was substantially harsher than the plenum's resolution; particularly harsh were the assessments of the "extreme consequences" which could have occurred had the group's "plans" been implemented. As Kozlov, Leningrad Obkom first secretary, said in his report to the city party aktiv, on 2 July 1957, "luckily for our party, the entire country and the international workers movement, the Central Committee Plenum proved to be worthy of its standing. It reflected the will of the people and the party and saved the country, the party and the people from great upheavals. Had that antiparty group won, possibly some of us would not have been able to speak here today and many would not have been in leading positions. This would have once again shaken up the country and the party." He put the "antiparty group" on the same level as Trotskyites and "left wing" and "right wing" opportunists. The plenum's activities were described in a similar vein at all other party aktiv meetings.

The plenum's resolution itself, although the plenum had completed its proceedings by 29 June, was made public as late as 4 July. The resolution avoided the question of the mass repressions and of direct responsibility for them of Stalin's closest circle which, unlike what had taken place at the 20th CPSU Congress, was fully discussed at the plenum with references to specific facts and figures. The resolution merely stated that "Comrades Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov stubbornly opposed the steps taken by the Central Committee and our entire party to correct the consequences of the cult of personality and the violations of revolutionary legality committed in their time and the creation of conditions which would exclude the possibility of their recurrence in the future."

However, the plenum's materials retained the other text as well: "As has now been proven, Comrades Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov bear personal responsibility for unjustified mass repressions taken against party, soviet, economic, military and Komsomol cadres and for other manifestations of a similar nature, which took place in the past. They had hoped, by seizing key positions within the party and the state, to conceal the traces of their past criminal records and to avoid responsibility for the errors, distortions and severe violations of revolutionary legality in the course of their previous activities."

This text, as well as the facts indicating the direct participation of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov in

illegal repressions, did not leave the plenum's premises. Khrushchev continued to observe the taboo and, having succeeded in politically compromising his opponents, did not dare to make public the question of repressions, which would have inevitably affected also Mikoyan, Voroshilov and Bulganin as well as Khrushchev himself.

The maneuvering around the plenum's resolution largely reflected the overall inconsistency in the leadership of the party and the country and the course it was pursuing. Hence the controversial and disparate nature of the results of the June Plenum itself.

In the party documents and in historical-party and journalistic publications, the assessments of the plenum are quite straightforward. As a whole, they are equal to the resolution passed at the plenum itself: "...Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov took the path of group struggle against the party's leadership. Having conspired among themselves on an antiparty basis, they set for themselves the objective of changing the party's policy and taking the party back to the erroneous methods of leadership which had been condemned at the 20th Party Congress.... The unanimous condemnation by the party Central Committee of the factional activities of the antiparty group of Comrades Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov will serve the further strengthening of the unity within the ranks of our Leninist Party and the strengthening of its leadership and the cause of the struggle for the party's general line."

Today, however, while we note the positive significance of the plenum, we cannot ignore another side of this event. Let us begin with the fact that by no means were all the political charges raised against the Malenkov group convincing and suitably substantiated. In any case, the accusation that in all basic problems of domestic policy the group had opposed the line of the 20th CPSU Congress appears biased. Nor is there a reason comprehensively to claim that the group, as was said in the plenum's resolution, "tried to oppose the Leninist course of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, the lowering of international tension and the establishment of friendly relations between the USSR and all nations in the world." Furthermore, for instance, the critical attitude toward the slogan of "catching up in the next few years with the United States in the per capita production of milk, butter and meat," which was also mentioned in the resolution, was entirely justified. Its unrealistic and demagogic nature was obvious not only to Molotov and Malenkov.

The circumstances in which the internal party struggle was waged in June 1957 also confirmed that the party's leadership was still trapped by the same methods for solving political problems, which had developed during the period of Stalinism although, something which, more than anything else, signified the advent of the new times, it did not lead them to extremes, such as physical reprisals. Unconditionally taking the side of Khrushchev which, under such circumstances was of progressive significance, the Central Committee Plenum actually put

him above criticism, without any concern for creating any kind of counterbalance to the first secretary's autocratic rule.

Having acquired, for the first time in many years, the real possibility of collectively solving the radical problems of the development of the party and the country, by applying the old methods, the Central Committee failed to utilize it. Instead of providing an objective analysis of Khrushchev's activities and formulating a considered course, once again the Central Committee gave the party's leader a mandate for full freedom of action. This alone, regardless of Khrushchev's personal qualities, greatly predetermined the faults of the subsequent political course.

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MEASURE OF ALL THINGS

Morality and Politics

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[Report of a discussion, prepared by V. Dymarskiy and V. Nekhotin]

[Text] The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress made public the guideline for social development: a humane and democratic socialism. Inevitably, a number of practical questions arise on the ways of advancing toward this objective and the means of achieving it. Among others, the social scientists must also answer the question of the interconnection between morality and politics, one of the "eternal topics" which is always present in human history. The present contradictions in our life and, above all, the unprecedented politicizing of mass awareness, are fraught, as practical experience has indicated, with an aggravation of the conflict between "usefulness," as embodied in political decisions, and "goodness," as a moral value (a conflict which is quite clearly expressed in events of the electoral campaign and the state of relations among ethnic groups and in parliamentary activities themselves).

To what extent are goodness and usefulness compatible? Does "political ethics" not deny universal human morality? Conversely: Does morality restrict political efficiency? These topics were in the center of a discussion at a meeting held in the editorial premises of *KOMMUNIST*. The following responded to the journal's invitation: V. Bakshtanovskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences (Tyumen); G. Batygin, doctor of philosophical sciences; A. Denisov, doctor of technical sciences, USSR People's Deputy, and chairman of the Commission on Problems of Deputy Ethics of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet (Leningrad); V. Kramnik, candidate of philosophical sciences (Leningrad); V. Krivosheyev, candidate of economic sciences; A. Nuykin, candidate of art sciences; B. Orlov, doctor of historical

sciences; Yu. Sogomonov, doctor of philosophical sciences (Vladimir); A. Shchelkin, doctor of philosophical sciences (Leningrad); and N. Engver, doctor of economic sciences and USSR People's Deputy (Izhevsk). The meeting was moderated by N. Bikkenin, *KOMMUNIST* editor-in-chief.

Following is an abridged record of the debate.

Criterion of Moral Judgment

G. Batygin. The topic which we are discussing is quite risky. This applies also to us, the participants in this meeting, perhaps for the fact alone that, as experience indicates, people in whose hearts good has sunk roots will most frequently say not even a single word about morality. Morality is a favorite topic of those described by Saltykov-Shchedrin as "scoundrels who follow the right path." Usually, in this case we find that the moral vector has a single direction: from me to you, when the moral evaluation can be reduced to the formula: "You are bad." We always know how others should act but not how we should. Although, let me point out, today we can see a certain change in behavior, when many people are saying "I was bad but now I have restructured myself!" In my view, we can detect in this case the concealed thought of earning some kind of repentance capital.

Throughout history, many crimes have been committed under the cover of morality. A wolf will never admit that he is hungry, for which reason he has to eat the lamb. He would first of all accuse his victim of immorality or of uselessness. It is a well-known fact today how frequently features of counterrevolutionary activities during the first years of the Soviet system were rated not only on the basis of the actions but of the social status of an individual: to be a bourgeois meant to be a criminal. Once again, violence was justified with morality. Paradoxical though this might seem, many philosophers believe that evil comes from those who pursue the idea of goodness.

Morality and politics are mutually repellent. However we may try to mix them they are incompatible, like water and oil. In principle, therefore, I think that this is an insoluble problem. Life, however, whether we like it or not, consists of such types of problems which, nonetheless, the people are forced to discuss and resolve.

A. Nuykin. We find in Solzhenitsyn the following sentence: "We have been given one life, one small and brief life! Yet we criminally waste it under someone's machine-gun bullets or else crawl with it, while it is pure, into the dirty dumps of politics." This, in my view, expresses the widespread opinion concerning the problem under discussion. "Politics is dirty," has been a belief over the centuries. However, this is a poor consolation for people who, increasingly, with each event in their lives, depend precisely on politics. Whether for good or for bad, the time is past when people could preserve their purity by distancing themselves from this "dirty matter."

It is a fact that evil and progress have frequently walked hand-in-hand. Today, however, as an innumerable number of examples borrowed from Realpolitik prove, we can consider promising only a position which combines politics with goodness. There is growing awareness of the productivity of a moral behavior in the realm of politics. We are returning to Kant, who was one of the first to proclaim the idea of universal peace, starting not on the basis of political mechanisms but of moral concepts, seeing in morality a harsh need which does not allow any compromise. That which is moral becomes useful politically as well.

B. Orlov. I agree that without morality politics can no longer be implemented. For many years I have followed social democratic theory and practice and throughout this entire time I have tried to understand the psychological differences between them and communist movements. The main criterion is who has more victims on his conscience. Thus, on the one hand, we have "Noske, the bloody dog," the minister of war of the first Weimar Cabinet, who entered history with that nickname for having ordered the use of force in bringing order. On the other, we have "plunder what was plundered," and "if the enemy does not surrender he is destroyed," and so on.

N. Engver. Let us not forget, however, that in practical terms the social democrats have not had to face violent armed resistance, as had the communists.

Yu. Sogomonov. Incidentally, let us say, the error of 1918 and the terror of 1937 are different things. I read somewhere that in 1918 we had civil war whereas in 1937 we had a civil slaughter. In other words, an open struggle cannot be equated with cynical mass repressions and murders.

A. Nuykin. The concept of the "new thinking" presumes also a return to some old categories, including that of conscience. If the bolsheviks are to be blamed for anything it is, above all, for the fact that perhaps they did not notice the mines which were laid under their orientation toward the resolution of practical problems: the pragmatic advantage became the cornerstone. Was this not the reason for which Stalin who, naturally, should not be identified with the previous revolutionary leaders in Russia, defeated them so easily?

B. Orlov. A moral policy can be implemented only where there is democracy, where any action is controlled by the democratic mechanisms and the people, as well as wherever men of culture become involved in politics. The fact that the playwright Havel, let us say, became president is, in my view, not an accident but a pattern which is beginning to make its way.

V. Bakshtanovskiy. A number of men of culture in our country as well are actively entering politics.

B. Orlov. This is both accurate and useful. However, the men of culture as, in fact, any person, should not rate

people according to national and racial features. This would take us the wrong way.

Going back to the social democrats, we must point out that in addition to this "Noske the bloody dog," their conscience does not include any other tyrant. Yet from the viewpoint of social, cultural and spiritual development, the general view is that in 100 years they have accomplished a great deal for the world community.

V. Bakshtanovskiy. An emphasis on the critical function of morality in terms of its relationship with politics, is clearly dominating our discussion. Indeed, as far as I am concerned, the mere mention of the recent electoral campaign in Tyumen for the election of republic and local soviets triggers a yearning, to say the least. As a whole, in the country's political life as well, in terms of its moral dimension, a similar feeling is triggered. A researcher, however, should avoid personal emotion. Yes, politics is subject to "moral judgment." To begin with, however, such judgment should not turn into moralizing, for this would be harmful not only in terms of political activities but of morality itself. Second, are we not lowering in the course of such judgments the role of morality merely to prohibiting standards and restrictions, to the function of restrictions? I believe that a person who has violated such restrictions has committed a precisely moral action and improved our freedom.

A. Shehelkin. In real life, however, morality nonetheless functions on the basis of the principle of restriction: "What is forbidden is always known but what is permitted is as yet unknown." It is not ethics that sets targets but life. Ethics could interpret and sanction objectives. Man should be able sensibly to limit the subjectivism and arbitrariness of his desires. By following this "disciplinary" way mankind has had good accomplishments.

V. Bakshtanovskiy. Whenever a political leader stops at a political crossroads, horrified by the harsh conflict of ways and means and whenever he understands that this becomes a matter of making a moral choice, he should be presented not simply with a choice of prohibitions but also with the moral precept of "daring and nobility." Adopt as your slogan "do not stand out," and you are no longer a politician. If your slogan is "the aim justifies the means," you are a low politician. You can be a noble politician only if you are able (let us remember Vysotskiy) walk "on a rope tight like a nerve fiber in the body."

Naturally, the mere mention of alternate ethical paradigms of the interrelationship between moral goodness and political efficiency (Machiavellism, Ghandism) proves the substantive nature of their conflict. Nonetheless, we are bound to raise the question: How high was the position of those who preached social political expediency and assumed the monopoly for such interpretations? Possibly, demystifying such people would enable us to interpret differently the conflict we are considering, the more so if we analyze on a parallel basis also the

"plenipotentiary rights" of individuals who passed judgment in the name of morality.

The interrelationship between goodness and usefulness (or the categorical and conditional imperatives) should, in my view, be directed toward the familiar principle of "it is not man for the sake of morality but morality for the sake of man."

Moral Consensus?

A. Denisov. We have absolutized the category of good and evil. Yet, a number of intermediate levels exist and, as a rule, the politician must deal precisely with such intermediate truths and values. If we begin to structure good (structuring and the creation of hierarchies of objectives is a specific feature of politics and of all types of management systems), certain details appear which conflict with each other. How will the politician handle such mutually conflicting aspects of goodness? Only by creating, to a certain extent, evil, for one good denies another. In my view, the politician acts morally when the good in his actions exceeds the bad. In general, he simply cannot avoid to create evil, and he must sacrifice some parts of the good for the sake of other.

N. Engver. On one occasion, I explained the need to send troops to Baku as follows: we are currently seeking democratic ways for dealing with emergency situations. I am being asked what is democratic in the use of troops? Imagine the way a totalitarian regime would have acted: it would have exiled one-half of the population of the Transcaucasus to Kolyma, and established some kind of Armenian-Azerbaijani ASSR, with Magadan as its capital. In other words, such a regime would have reacted much less adequately than ours, although our regime as well was unable to avoid bloodshed. Who has been able to in similar situations?

A democracy must not be helpless. It must make others implement resolutions passed in the course of a real, not a make-believe discussion.

V. Kramnik. When a moral action is not arbitrary or subconscious, and when we do not consider its usefulness or suitability, we are faced with an absolute. I would say an ontological morality. There is indeed no connection between such morality and politics. However, both politics and morality are multi-tiered phenomena which include a great variety of layers which could and should mesh.

A. Nuykin. What is the characteristic feature of our situation? If material funds and resources are concentrated in a single pair of hands, subjective factors, including the moral position of politicians, turn out to be decisive. What is encouraging is that, in general, there is an awareness of usefulness, productivity and expediency of moral behavior in politics and not vice versa, as was the case in the past.

Nonetheless, a remark is necessary here. When individuals, who had openly joined political groups which had

been firmly rejected by the voters, were made members of the Presidential Council, I began painfully to select among pragmatic justifications: we are on the threshold of economic acts without which perestroika itself loses its meaning. Be that as it may, such appointments are viewed by public opinion quite differently. This hardly strengthens confidence in the authorities. Nonetheless, in the final account, a decision made on the basis of morality and not of advantages proves to be more efficient.

V. Kramnik. I would not formulate the question in this manner. Politics, particularly in a stressful and transitional situation, when everything is tense and distorted, has the right to abandon some layers of morality and turn to other. In our country people like to consider themselves democrats, frequently preserving the fundamentalism, the absolutizing of their position, something which is traditionally inherent in our society. The experience of the global social democratic movement indicates that it is always checking something and trying various choices. We should stop absolutizing.

A. Denisov. From this viewpoint the present discussion of the statutes and structure of the party and the guarantees to dissidents are exceptionally relevant. Dissidence should be supported and I, if you will forgive my perhaps unpopular opinion, believe that it is precisely this understanding that influenced the membership of the Presidential Council. Supporters of different, including extreme, opinions are useful because they indicate to the common sense its limits. Such limits must be clearly marked, for otherwise common sense could calmly cross them without noticing.

It is precisely tolerance that is ethical. This includes acknowledging the possibility of what I would call "moral pluralism." It is precisely intolerance that leads to the point where we found ourselves. The Commission on Problems of Deputy Ethics of the Council of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet has received more than 2,500 reciprocal complaints filed by deputies. Most of them are caused by the sole reason that someone spoke against something which the authors of the complaint support.

V. Krivosheyev. If I were to criticize the democrats somewhat, I would find it difficult to carry on and I would become ostracized. Yet the firm belief, the confidence that it is precisely "we" who are the holders of the final truth have always been fatal to us.

V. Kramnik. I fear that some "untouchables" will be replaced by other, protected by the mass.

G. Batygin. I have repeatedly attended meetings of the "Moscow Tribune," while Academician Sakharov was still alive. I saw how difficult it was for him to sit for several hours running under the floodlights. Around him everyone was seething: we hate bureaucrats, we want democracy.... Meanwhile, as an elderly person, immeasurably tired, Andrey Dmitriyevich, would leave the presidium table and it would occur to no one to say:

Look, let me drive you home. Instead of letting him rest, bringing him a sandwich or a glass of water, people around him kept asking him questions and exposing the bureaucratic system. This looked like some kind of vicious circle of moral deafness. In order to be considered moral and take moral actions, one must have been a moral person even before and after the event, at all times.

B. Orlov. One of the most complex problems which face a politician is to choose among values. Once again international experience proves that the social democrats do not consider the values of freedom, social justice and solidarity as isolated from each other. Special party commissions check all the adopted programs and resolutions, including the most basic ones, for moral firmness and moral attainability. In order to be able to correlate and coordinate this triad of values with specific political practices one needs competence, political standards and the ability to compromise with other parties.

The social democrats are winning their positions and pressing the bourgeoisie through contracts and compromise. That is how a social state has been created, a democracy, not only bourgeois but also representative. It is thus that it was proved that it is possible to force the ruling classes to yield gradually and to reach social consensus.

A. Nuykin. When we speak of universal human values we must not forget that many of them, such as liberty, equality and fraternity, developed precisely in the course of revolutionary struggle. However, a revolutionary position acknowledges violence as a means of solving historical conflicts. In frequent cases, in the past, it was truly inevitable. Today as well it may have been inevitable had it not been so dangerous.

Yu. Sogomonov. Class struggle does not mandatorily mean violence.

A. Denisov. Within dialectics there is not only the struggle of opposites but also a process of self-denial. This process as well could yield results. Essentially, the CPSU voluntarily surrendered political monopoly, realizing its futility. For the time being, however, this is only a trend which is still not dominant.

V. Bakhtanovskiy. Few are those among us who do not frown at the word "compromise," or who can adopt a neutral tone of voice by saying "the lesser evil." It is thus that a healthy moral skepticism warns us of the danger. However, reaction to danger may be different: avoidance or risk. Political activities are, precisely, the area of risk, both in terms of the criterion of political expediency and the criterion of the moral worthiness of decisions. A person who becomes involved in a conflict situation is doomed to compromise. The best solution here is to seek the lesser evil. One could and should argue this point. All I want to say now is that surmounting the extremes of moral dogmatism and cultivating in political activities an orientation toward compromise and a moral encouragement of consensus (unlike the popular orientation

toward victory at all cost and the mandatory defeat of the opponent) would add humaneness to our political decisions and reality to our moral ideals. Naturally, to many this will seem dangerous political cynicism and lack of principles. To argue with this means to ask questions, such as how to stimulate political activeness with the help of the potential of morality, how to stimulate the "rope walker?"

Should we not today conclude that the appearance of political pluralism led to the development of a real situation of moral choice in political activities? In that case we also have a tricky follow-up: Could it be that political pluralism also triggered a "moral pluralism?" I believe that some people would become upset by this and would be ready immediately to object in the name of moral absolutism. All I want, however, is to stipulate that today the true politician faces a true moral alternative and could serve the ideal of Freedom and the ideal of Equality. These are moral ideals, and the subject of a political choice cannot say that the bearers of the former ideal are the servants of moral positivism, while the latter are those of moral negativism, of immorality. Perhaps at this point it is no longer a question of choice between good and evil in their absolute confrontation but a comparison among equal moral values. The politician then realizes the importance of earning the moral trust of his opponents who support different ideals.

Therefore, to distinguish between "good" and "usefulness" sets a minimal moral standard. The maximal is to be aware of their "opposite directions," and to establish a degree of interaction. In my view, it is precisely the moral substantiation of consensus, a principle new to our politics, that specifically indicates the possibility and need for "cooperation" between the two criteria. It is a question of moral incentive and of sanctioning political compromise in situations when this is not simply a forced act but a reciprocal manifestation of the good will of opposite sides, an expression of discarding the strategy of struggle for the sake of the strategy of coexistence, ennobled by consensus.

Naturally, for the time being this is merely a standard. The transitional period in which our society finds itself is characterized rather by the enhanced status of morality and politics and the uncivil relations existing between them. Since we have already decided to advance toward a law-governed state, toward a civil society, intensifying research in that direction becomes an urgent task.

A. Shchelkin. It seems to me that the crux of the problem has been described quite clearly and directly, although in a way unusual to us: "Moral pluralism" and moral compromise. Naturally, in our age the collapse of myths and skepticism unwittingly create the strong temptation to rely on absolute values, which we seek in morality. Here is a question: Could morality be the absolute and final authority? A positive answer here is hardly obvious. Morality, like politics (although the former to a lesser extent than the latter) are not only an objective but also a simple instrument. There are values which are higher

than the value of morality, such as the gift of life. That is precisely why absolutizing morality would be out of place. In general, attempts against morality are generated not exclusively by various individuals and politicians but also by anonymous forces which could be described as the technical prerequisites of contemporary civilization. From the viewpoint of the great rigorists of all times and nations, in the eternal argument between morality and life, and morality and practice, morality loses. If we adopted the position of moral rigorism all we actually would achieve would be an economic, technological or ecological crisis and experience all the difficulties triggered by the confrontation between democrats and conservatives, equally unwilling to grant any concessions to one another.

A. Nuykin. The logic of our discussion may create an overall impression that, carried away by the events of the day, by some kind of truly pressing necessities to compromise, we are sinking into moral relativism. This is quite different from moral tolerance. Relativism means the lack of real moral criteria.

The consequence has been that several generations have turned out to be defenders of immorality, for we preached tolerance of evil. It was such a tolerance, this omnivorousness and lack of principles that became a major danger corroding the moral health of society. In this sense, it seems to me that "moral pluralism" is a questionable term. I understand that those who suggest it give it a different meaning which presumes the existence of some kind of indivisible center, an invariant.

However, when Anatoliy Alekseyevich Denisov says that it is impossible not to commit evil in politics and one must always make a choice, compromise and show tolerance, he also immediately adds: one must tolerate the fact that it becomes necessary to do evil. I oppose such tolerance. Yes, it may be necessary to do evil and it may be unavoidable. However, the meaning of a moral position is precisely that one feels at all times that one is causing evil, albeit even for the sake of good.

If a person is aware of this, he would probably choose a more moral solution. If you recall, Dostoyevskiy and his supporters attacked more zealously than anything else the concept of "mathematical morality." When it is asked: Could one kill two innocent people for the sake of saving 1 million, this is a dilemma which cannot be solved from the positions of morality, for the murder of even one single person is also extremely immoral. However, this precisely is where the delicacy of such a matter resides, for it cannot be resolved through logic. When we start to determine what is moral and what is immoral, we mandatorily justify immorality. Logic is inventive, treacherous, and can find justification for any baseness. That is precisely why there is a nonlogical criterion, the criterion of conscience. The moral person should not listen to anyone else, neither to his own logic nor that of his neighbors, nor to an ethics commission; he should listen only to his own conscience, the absolute of which lives within the individual and is not simply present in

the awareness of society. Naturally, it could be wrong but, for the time being, mankind has not invented any better, any more reliable criterion.

In this connection, I would like to touch upon yet another topic. Many forms of actions are standardized and demand no moral creativity whatsoever. If one behaves normally nothing else is demanded of him. Yet I view morality as live, as spiritual creativity. If it is present in man man will make nonstandard decisions.

A. Shchelkin. "Situational ethics" is not a subject for mankind's disappointment. There simply is a wisdom which stands above ethical absolutism: the wisdom of culture which watches over life. We know that in the 18th century, during a plague epidemic, a Moscow archbishop forbid the believers to kiss the icon. Confessional morality demanded one thing whereas civilization and culture demanded the exact opposite. Naturally, this story has a sad ending: the aroused crowd lynched the holy father. Culture is nurtured by the reverence of life and develops with it. Morality is strong with its loyalty to its own principles and, therefore, partially, its dogmatism. In politics "moral pluralism" means a concession to life and to the art of sensible compromise. Nonetheless, the "area of application" of this principle is not unlimited. The area of its habitation and application is found, rather, in the "normal" condition of society. If the social organism demands a radical transformation, it does not need the services of a "compromise ethics." Conversely, it seeks its source of energy in a lack of compromise and loyalty to universal human principles. If economics demands revolutionary change while a political crisis indicates the need for this, any kind of juggling and compromise on the political level as such, which could yield temporary success, could merely create the illusion of a "Potemkin Village," beyond the facade of which ever aggravating economic stagnation remains. Temporary accomplishments on the level of political relations is a great luxury and a high price to pay if the economy is not working. That is why today it is a time not only and exclusively of diplomatic maneuvering in the political area but of a radical economic revolution, however difficult and unpopular its initial steps may be. It becomes necessary to choose the better good: relative calm and accord among political trends or the fastest possible resolution of the economic crisis. One should go after the optimum.

A. Nuykin. Let us hope that it does not assume the form in which prices would rise rapidly and there will be no haste to convert to the market....

Yu. Sogomonov. You want an optimum? That is precisely what requires extremes and, in addition to the ethics of struggle, the ethics of consensus-agreement and the ethics of compromise-partnership.

A. Shchelkin. Who should be the subject, the bearer of such ethics: the politician or someone outside the realm of his activities? Naturally, the ideal case is when the politician controls himself on the basis of morality. It is

vitally necessary for such politicians to be a member of our high power echelons. However, in normal human conditions, political ethics and moral policy take shape outside professional politics, around it, in the civil society.

That is precisely why it is useful to listen not only to politicians but also to the civil society and even to the street, the crowd. One can understand the logic of those who consider the congress of people's deputies an anachronistic and unproductive institution from the viewpoint of decision-making. However, it is a rostrum for the all-Union voicing of opinions, a rostrum which, essentially, is a moral one. I, as a taxpayer, am ready to support this institution in the future as well, in order to have the opportunity to listen to everyone. A great deal can be learned better and more clearly even from amateur informal knowledge.

Yu. Sogomonov. Naturally, it is necessary to take into consideration the moral intuition of the people. However, we cannot get rid of immorality in politics by appealing to the instinct of the masses. We are familiar also with cases of mass "obsession," deification of leaders and paranoid search for enemies. There also is the danger that bureaucratic morality could penetrate political ethics under the guise of revolutionism and readiness to step over anything one wishes. A great deal of courage is necessary to go to the square; however, equal courage is needed not to subordinate in this case the ethic to the lumpen, to the crowd, not to flirt with the crowd and not to turn out to be a prisoner of the crowd.

A Code of Political Ethics

Yu. Sogomonov. Human morality is always applied in one area of activities or another in which the moral principles are not detailed but specifically concretized. We must not fear, by this token, to defile or belittle them. Furthermore, concretizing means the richness of life and its variety. Life becomes more complex and branched out: ever new approaches and hierarchical values are created.

Actually, also frequent is the aspiration to pit such forms of symbiosis of moral values against clear and simple and efficient orders: "Do not lie," and so on.

V. Krivosheyev. However, a physician may lie and this is considered ethical.

A. Shchelkin. I believe that there can be no special ethics for politicians. If such an ethic appears, it is more than anything else a "pocket" ethic, convenient in justifying politicking. What civilized politics needs is a universal ethic of the civilian society. It alone can fulfill the role of a guiding principle. Therefore, it is not a question of any kind of special political ethics (in this case one could justifiably speak of no more than "etiquette"), but precisely of Morality, with a capital M, which may be traced all the way to the civilized foundations of society. Actually, it is ridiculous, if not tragic, when a politician draws his morality from politics. In fact, all "Stalins" do

that. To paraphrase the familiar thought, let me say that politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians. It would be proper to note at this point that it is a feature of a mature political morality when a politician turns to a universal human principle such as nonviolence. The social and psychological opportunities offered by nonviolence have still not been entirely studied by political scientists.

Yu. Sogomonov. Incidentally, nonviolence is not synonymous with a passive attitude in the face of evil. It is a specific form of opposition to evil, which has a tremendous power and does not presume either disarmament or, shall we say, refusal to use armed force.

Now as to political ethics. It would be inconceivable to reduce morality in all areas of life to the 10 commandments. It seems to me that one could and should speak of professional political ethics based on universal human morality and specifically adapted to the realm of politics. This does not mean that morality has changed its nature. It has simply become suitable for politics. However, its values and standards are differently refracted in the different areas of life.

V. Bakshtanovskiy. A sociological study included the following question: Does the deputy have the right to live and work on the basis of the principle that "if anything is useful to the cause, whatever it may be, it is essentially moral?" Three-quarters of the voters who were surveyed believe that good is superior to usefulness. Yet fifteen percent answered that everything depends on the circumstances, i.e., they assumed a position of situational ethics.

N. Engver. Naturally, voters may have a variety of opinions. However, I would think that they proceed on the basis of their own advantages rather than considerations of morality or political expediency. The main motivation is, let us have the money, give it to us. They would like to turn the deputies into procurement workers. If you come with your hands empty, it means that you are a poor deputy. The voters are the product of our system and they frequently choose their deputies according to who is the "better liar." Perhaps, as a politician, I should not mention this here. On the contrary, I should be praising the voter. However, during the electoral campaign I pledged to tell the truth however unpleasant it may be.

V. Krivosheyev. The politician, like the physician, the researcher or the economist, has his own shop, his professional ethics. For example, the corps of deputies has the moral right to remain silent. Such was the case when the broadcasting of the discussions about the Karabakh conflict were stopped. This was an ethical action, for such situations have their own logic. All it takes would be to air a single incautious word and... although, from the point of view of universal human moral position, silence is by no means an advantage.

What is unquestionably immoral for a political personality is his incompetence, lack of knowledge of his own

society, and lack of understanding of the nature of the processes occurring within it.

A. Denisov. It is immoral if the deputy is aware of his incompetence. Most frequently, he is confident that he is doing something good.

V. Krivosheyev. Nonprofessionalism is objectively immoral. It is all the more dangerous today, when life is bringing to the surface incompetent politicians and when, in addition to pop culture, we also have pop politics. What does this lead to? A strict discussion on the subject of ownership is held, and the Supreme Soviet reaches what I consider an incompetent decision: land cannot be considered a commodity. In that case, however, we can never become part of the international division of labor. This would be the same as having no labor market. Or else, there have been discussions about privatizing trade. The pop politician appeals to the antimarket mentality of the masses and states: "Moneybags would appear, who would hasten to privatize the GUM." What normal person would buy a store whose shelves are empty? If he were to buy it, it would be for the purpose of filling its shelves with goods. Or else, I came across the following: 200 people were arrested "who profited from the manufacturing of expensive knitwear." What does expensive knitwear mean? In Russian, it means that they produced a high-quality item. In our country, in this connection people are being frightened with the "shady economy," although a shady economy involves the business of drugs, weapons, and so on, and not the production of items and services which the people need, the more so since we do not have a single normally working state restaurant. Those which do normal work have long been operating within the framework of a mixed private-state economy. No gasoline pump would be functioning if it were to become "purely governmental." It simply would not be supplied with any gasoline.

Almost 25 percent of anything sold on the market for commodities and services is the product of that same private-governmental sphere. Yet we are being told that it does not exist and we are being threatened with the possibility of its appearance. This means simply ignorance of real economics. In order to claim, defend and achieve the truth civic consciousness is not enough. Competence is needed as well.

A. Nuykin. In the course of the discussion of the draft law on taxation, for the sake of instant moral thrust toward justice, once again understood as equalization of all and everything, a decision was rejected which, in the final account, would have been most consistent with social justice and economic efficiency.

N. Engver. The deputies have still not realized that in order to be competent in matters they discuss they must, their conscience should demand, that they determine the facts and honestly tell the voters: That is not what you voted for.

A. Shchelkin. There have been efforts to do that.

N. Engver. Herzen wrote that when the Decembrists were "removed" from Russian society, that society declined morally. The same would occur with the Supreme Soviet, should the same type of people drop out. It is precisely such people that we need, for the sake of conscience, even if they are incompetent, they would not allow to be ordered about...

Yu. Sogomonov. In the medieval mind morality and politics were one and the same. Machiavelli is to be credited for being able to separate politics from morality and prove that politics has its own rules and laws and that it should develop a given type of relations with morality. During the Stalinist period society returned to the previous medieval simplification and, as a result, it developed moralizing politics and politicized morality. When the politics of the Stalinist variety is described as "immoral," it would make sense to ask: What type of morality, precisely, is it a question of?

The words "socialist morality," which we use so lightly, is based on an entire conglomerate, a Babylonian mixture of values and standards, including a few rudiments of revolutionary ethics and untrampled vestiges of popular morality, and the elements of the morality of a civil society which had started to develop in Russia.

The main component of this "cocktail" (I can think of no word more fitting) of values is the official, the state morality with its missionary, pioneering and elitist spirit and with priority of the class principle over the universal human, the tribal principle. It comes with its particular combination of labor with morality which is considered a direct production factor, a combination of noneconomic coercion with moral incentives; the subordination of morality to political duty, reducing the former to the level of ordinary family relations, to the "morally stable" entry in one's character reference, and to reducing the concept of "conscience," replacing it with a terrible thing, such as "clean conscience."

B. Orlov. Under our specific circumstances, this was reduced to three main concepts. The first was to act in the name of the class, the bearer of historical truth, which would justify any action: Nagulnov was not being zealous for his own sake but for the "world revolution." He wished the best for all countries. The second was eliminating, along with religion, the concepts of sin, conscience and responsibility in facing absolute values; the third was dialectics, which was taught not according to Hegel but also not according to Marx or Lenin, whose moral-conflict situation was presented in its maximally simplified version.

Yu. Sogomonov. What took place was the absorption of society by the state, as a result of which neither political nor civic ethics remained. No political ethics is possible without the ethics of a civil society with its system of rules and requirements. Hegel believed that the main among them was to be an individual and to respect other individuals as such.

N. Engver. American military, working in Votkinsk were asked what would occur if their colonel would order his soldiers to open fire at the Capitol? The Americans answered: the soldiers would arrest the colonel because to them the constitution stands above military regulations. To our soldiers statutes are superior to anything else, including the constitution.

Yu. Sogomonov. Morality and politics become one when morality leads us to understand democracy: it is not the power of the majority or the minority but the power of everyone, the power of all. The role of political ethics consist precisely of intensifying this understanding of the processes.

On what values other than universal human morality could professional political ethics rely when they take shape? On the ethics of the game (because political activities have something in common with games as such), on respect for the rules of the game and on sporting and noble ethics. It is said that to accuse a politician of the aspiration to gain power is the equivalent of blaming an athlete for his desire to set a record. However, there are careers and careers, there is a struggle among gentlemen and there is political throat-cutting.

Another most important "building material" is the ethics of organization, the ethics of managing. Without this there can be no ethics of a civil society. However, the specific components of the present "cocktail of values" that are developed depends on the basic variant, on the type of combination of the forms of ownership which our society will choose. Each variant offers its own system of values and, therefore, its own political ethics.

For that reason, the most important in terms of political ethics is the problem of objectives and not only of the means. "How" we wish is important but "what" we wish is equally important.

G. Batygin. At this point I would like to go back to the problems of the correlation between politics and morality and try to single out some of the ways to resolve them. Let me conventionally describe the first as the "Russian," in the sense in which G. Shpet defined the Russian thinking and Russian idea: "The good" must lead the "bright." If a person is good he knows what others need, what they should be and what must be done to this effect. Bolshevism, to a certain extent, could be an example of this. Having rejected God, it offered the people the living judge in the flesh, possessing all the virtues. Is this not the origin for our present lamentations: "Give us a leader..."

The second variant is the "Pharisaic," the strict observance of the rules. Do not think about what is moral and why it is moral, and what is not. In this case no questions are asked. One must simply memorize all answers. This is the tradition of erudition. If it has been said, do it, you will thus be saved and become a righteous person.

The third is the new protestant morality of the civil society, coming from Weber. Divine charisma is

replaced by worldly self-restraint, and morality with business; be successful, that is your service. Create true wealth not for the sake of squandering it but for the sake of creating even more wealth. Everyone knows the importance our schools attach to preventing one's comrade from cribbing. In American schools students are not seated according to their grades but to their size, and if one allows one's friend to crib, all others will start cribbing and that person may find himself behind the others. The greatest sin in this kind of morality is deception. You may deceive others once, twice or three times.... On the fourth time no one will be deceived for no one will want to have anything to do with you.

The fourth variant is Kantian tradition. In this case morality has nothing in common with politics and, in general, with human actions and the moment we try to assess them morally, we enter the area of senselessness. There are professional requirements which must be met. They are neither bad nor good. They are outside morality. For example, an editor is given a poorly written article. Its author is not only a good person but also a high-ranking superior. The editor begins to squirm instead of stating that in his professional assessment the article is unpublishable. The same applies to the merchant on the market. Ask him the following: How could he ask so much for a given item? He would answer: this is none of your business. You do not have to buy it. That is his profession and, in this case, there neither is nor could there be any morality. Morality should be sought within the man himself.

V. Krivosheyev. We are not dealing with some kind of desert, where one can build something without destroying something else. That same ethic in production relations is a field which is being plowed and replowed. How to shift it to truly market relations if immediately a moral and a political problem arises: a person with reduced ability to work is expelled from the brigade. From the moral viewpoint, which is that work is a matter of honor, valor and heroism, we shift to a noneconomic behavior in the economic area. This is unfair. Ivan Ivanovich has lost his wife and he must be given material aid. However, this can be achieved only by borrowing from the common bonus fund. We do that. We try to resolve ethical problems in the course of the production process which, in principle, must not take place. For example, did we distribute on the basis of labor or conscience?

A. Nuykin. In my view, it was neither.

V. Krivosheyev. In terms of human relations, the production process requires technology more than ethics. We mentioned the human factor. We did not specify which factor. It is the production factor, which must be technological. Public morality is manifested in the distribution area. At that point everything falls into place.

N. Engver. In the case of our country, virtually all contemporary technologies are socially counterindicated. They demand a different ethics than the ethics of

swinging a shovel. Let us not even mention Chernobyl, let us merely look at chemicalization, in which fertilizer which has been calculated for use down to the gram has been dumped in the shed, the cows drink the water here and then our children get sick....

V. Krivosheyev. Refined technologies presume individual responsibility. That is precisely why we classified them as unsocial. In the past a person who could not work as well as the others could calmly remain at work in a collective. Now he turns out to be yet another dependent who must be fed by the brigade. This too is unfair. Therefore, we have a huge field of work in eliminating the type of ethical concepts which we keep pulling out of the past.

A. Shchelkin. I would like to raise yet another question, that of the way for introducing morality within politics. This is a complex problem which will have to be resolved by the chairman of the commission in charge of deputy ethics. A person can be educated only up to a certain age, until he himself can become father or mother, i.e., an educator. One cannot educate with a stick. With a stick one can only train. Morality enters consciousness through entirely different ways, not external but internal, and cannot be trained. The problem lies in the ability to be convincing, to prove that "deviations" by deputies simply undermine the possibility of any kind of parliamentary behavior. They are destructive in terms of parliamentary standards and the entire structure of parliamentary democracy. Such excesses are under the "jurisdiction" of the Commission for Deputy Ethics and Penalties. For example, in itself criticizing the president is not dangerous. The self-destruction of parliamentarianism begins when a precedent of unsupported charges leveled at the head of the supreme authority has been created.

V. Bakshtanovskiy. Let me say a few words on this subject. Above all, such a commission, in my view, should not turn into a disciplinary institution and the code of deputy honor should not be converted into a set of prohibitions and penalties although, naturally, it is clear from the work of the deputies that today dominant among the reasons for the creation of such a commission was found in precisely such approaches. The control-repressive motivation in the creation of a code for deputy honor should, in my view, be countered with the motivation of the moral self-determination of the deputy and the education in various intonations should be replaced by the incentive for self-education. If it is a question of the function of moral control, it must be paralleled with the function of moral defense.

In my view, the code of deputy honor is not an instruction or regulation formulated and issued from above and subject to strict observance. Moral codes, including the code of professional morality, in general fit with difficulty and most frequently remove themselves from situations in which they must be applied by force. Any possibility they may have of becoming efficient at all

appears only if they are the result of the moral formulation of standards by those who are to observe them, and if they are the product of self-assumed obligations.

A. Shchelkin. Naturally, the law-making process should not be replaced by "morality" and "notations." However, nor should it be free from "following the dictates of conscience." Our congresses of people's deputies trigger justified remarks when it comes to the operative and efficient nature of passing legitimate resolutions. The congress, however, it turns out, performs another important parallel function: it develops a particular psychological environment and a characteristic ethos of a public gathering. At its best sessions, the congress has repeatedly elevated itself to meet high ethical standards. It was precisely the congress that, acting as a council, has been particularly responsive to a moral evaluation of political decisions and, to a large extent, has been their author. Without such a democratic forum, the chamber of the Supreme Soviet could acquire all the "virtues" of a parliamentary machinery. It is of interest to note that the possible mechanism of law and order was disturbing to N. Gogol as early as the 19th century. In his "Selected Excerpts from Correspondence With Friends," he sensitively detected the humanitarian weaknesses of republican parliamentarianism in the United States. In moral sanctions necessity is felt particularly sharply during transitional and critical periods in the life of a country. It is precisely at such times that councils or estates general assemble. Is the function which our congresses of people's deputies perform at this stage not similar?

Particularly noteworthy at the meeting was the statement by N. Engver, USSR People's Deputy. As a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs, dealing with "Afghan" veterans, he raised the comprehensive topic, which included a moral evaluation of the Afghan War in which, in practical terms and extreme circumstances, there was the problem of politics and morality, and in the course of which many moral, political and cultural values were tested for their strength and veracity. Unquestionably, this is an extremely complex topic which requires a separate discussion, for it is very important in terms of the moral cleansing of society. Is the ethical awareness of society prepared to judge this war on the basis of moral and legal criteria which have already been formulated by human history? Is it ready, nonetheless, to understand the specific nature of the Afghan War, the specific nature of the responsibility borne for it by those who made decisions and those who undertook to execute someone else's will? What is the coloring and nature in such extreme situations of traditional moral conflicts (between the duty of the citizen and the duty of the soldier, between the observance of discipline and the observance of the dictates of one's conscience)? These are merely a few questions which, in our view, stem from the statement, an excerpt of which is given below.

N. Engver. The Afghan War is one of those human trials which do not let us sleep peacefully, particularly if one has seen a great deal with one's own eyes. I become furious when I listen to people who do not know this

war, describing it as "dirty" or immoral, making no distinction between the politicians who sent the troops to Afghanistan and the soldiers who obeyed an order. The decision itself or the mechanism for making it cannot be justified. However, we should not also pass hasty judgment on our troops, who were literally sent away not on their own free will into a most difficult situation of making a moral choice.

All of us, the boys who were captured and the deputies, learned what is moral and what is immoral. And then, as many will recall, now the Supreme Soviet is discussing amnesty. Initially, the majority, approximately three-quarters, opposed the formula of "blanket amnesty;" if you shot at your own people there should be no forgiveness. In the final account, they were persuaded that amnesty is not an act of justice but an act of mercy. The "Afghan" deputies described at that session the moral trials which faced our troops. Viktor Yakushkin said: "Everyone has his limit." However, he did not undertake (he was not allowed) to describe in detail the practical meaning of this limit. Let us consider "lamp-shade." What was this? Three or four prisoners-of-war would be gathered together and forced to fire at their own people. The boys would refuse: they are normal people, they have undergone political training, and all of them are Komsomol members. At that point, one of them would be hung on a tree and disemboweled. This was known as "lamp-shade." The first one refused and was made a "lamp-shade;" the second also refused but then the third agreed....

There was also the following optional situation. When the armed opposition captured our boys, it left alive only those who accepted Islam. Many of them refused and were killed. Who bears moral responsibility for their death? How should we rate these boys, as victims of morality or fanatical atheists?

These are difficult questions, the answer to which should be sought not only at parliamentary sessions but by analyzing our entire preceding history. There is a Russian concept, such as spiritual sensitivity, which is similar to the concept of conscience. The main immorality of stagnation was the fact that sensitive people were virtually exterminated. Yet it is precisely this spiritual sensitivity that should have prompted them to say: not knowing what the Afghan War was, let me not judge our soldiers. I may be expressing myself coarsely, but it was about a dozen senile old men who decided to send into another country several hundred thousand young people. Young lives were lost; many were wounded and became disabled. What moral traumas have remained in the souls of those who came back from that war! Who has "estimated" this and is it possible, in general, to keep such "accounts?" However, we must know and understand, in order not to repeat such errors, for it was not only the soldiers who died but also civilians.... It is only now that we are beginning to evaluate military actions from the viewpoint of morality. But what about then? Then all this was conceived as being normal: defense of the Southern borders of the Homeland and we are not

like the Americans who would like to have a view at the Baykonur cosmodrome. Read the leaflets which were issued to our soldiers in sending the troops into Afghanistan: one is simply stricken by the political "literacy" and refinement of the formulations. So, who is to be blamed for what happened?

At a press conference in Kabul, I turned to the foreign journalists with a request to help inform all field commanders of the opposition that from the viewpoint of international law prisoners-of-war are not criminals, for which reason they should not be treated with cruelty and inhumanely. To this the bandits answered: You want us to observe international law but you yourselves, when did you sign the third protocol of the 1949 Geneva Accords? Did you ratify it and did you apply? The moment we tried to use the moral principle of international law to free our boys it became possible to hurl that accusation at us!

We thank Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. He supported us and our formula of "amnesty for all" in two briefings. Then, all of a sudden, it became known that as early as 1984, the year of the greatest stagnation, Hekmatiyar, the head of the most anti-Soviet branch of the fundamentalist opposition, had suggested a release of our prisoners in exchange for allowing Sakharov to be freed and move to the West. Such was the "high morality" that prevailed among our leaders of that time.

War always justifies killing, but war itself is immoral. It must be rejected as a means of resolving international conflicts. I would very much like to see our conflicts among ethnic groups as well to be settled without shedding blood. All people's fronts, whether Baltic, Transcaucasian or Ukrainian, should issue once and for all the order: have as many debates as you wish, formulate any question you wish but without bloodshed. Practical experience indicates that sooner or later politicians reach agreements. The dead, however, cannot be resurrected! We cannot resurrect the Americans who died in Vietnam along with the Vietnamese; we cannot resurrect the Soviet prisoners-of-war and the Afghans who died. Human life is the highest value.

A few concluding words on the discussion which was held. In organizing it, naturally, the editors did not expect that the topics would be covered in their entirety. However, as the people attending the meeting themselves noted, they demarcated (perhaps in a first approximation) the range of problems which are related to the interconnection between morality and politics, about which masses of people think and argue, people who have become actively involved of late in political processes and who have introduced in them their own practical and moral concepts. It is as though at the meeting with the editors a request was formulated for a more profound, a professional analysis of these problems by our philosophers and ethicists. This applies, in particular, to questions such as morality and knowledge, morality and law, the law of justice and the law of economics, collectivism and individualism, and morality and religion. We believe that, to a certain extent,

the discussion in the editorial premises reflected the current state of moral awareness and existing differences in approaches to moral problems and, at the same time, the common understanding of the vital need for its theoretical interpretation.

Therefore, we shall not draw a bottom line. The editors intend to extend the discussion. The journal is ready to open its pages to ethical studies of the live and real processes, above all in the spiritual area, which are developing sometimes quite conflictingly under our very eyes.

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Is a Philosophy of History Needed?

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[Review by V. Golobokov of the book "Nauchno-Filosofskoye Mirovozzreniye Marksizma" [The Scientific-Philosophical Outlook of Marxism] by T.I. Oizerman. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, 640 pp]

[Text] Our present, which is changing at a headlong pace, seems not to leave any time for general thoughts and philosophical considerations, for many are the urgent matters to be dealt with. It may even seem that to raise at this point philosophical problems is to walk arm-in-arm with the working people. I remember Gorkiy's ironical statement that "...to me the world was only beginning, 'being established,' while philosophy was hitting it on the head and, quite out of place, asking: 'Where are you going? Why are you going? Why do you think you are going?' Some philosophers issued the simple and strict order: 'Halt!'"

Is it not true that this picture is quite similar to the present one?

But here is what is typical. Despite a seeming inappropriateness, of late the flow of publications raising those same "eternal problems of life" has increased sharply. Writers and journalists, scientists and artists, workers and state leaders have begun to think about them or, in a word, the representatives of all the various strata in our society. It is not all that necessary to ponder about the reasons for such activeness. The radical changes in social life have reached a level beyond which its simplest possible foundations lose their simplicity and clearly stop being self-evident, assuming a variety of foci and dimensions. The individual aspects of the entity either do not come clear or can merely be guessed. Who are we? What are we? Where are we going? These questions, which have suddenly assumed a global meaning and a philosophical depth, have once again turned out in the center of public attention. It is in the search of an answer

to them that the new thinking is taking shape, man is changing and so are universal human values.

How are professional philosophers responding to this demand of social life?

In order to gain an idea of this we shall resort to the method of selective study, so to say: from of the entire volume of specialized publications we shall take a work on the basis of which we can judge the overall state of affairs. In our view, we could confidently classify as such the new book by Academician T.I. Oizerman. This is not only because the author is a noted scientist which, in itself, is a sufficient guarantee of high professional standards, but mainly because he tries to "put in the foreground **problems**, i.e., questions which must be studied and which have still not become topics of serious discussions among Marxist philosophers" (p 7). It is thus that the author takes the reader to the cutting edge of philosophical knowledge and invites him to think along, which is an opportunity we shall use.

Whatever the problem of the development of nature and society that may be subjected to philosophical interpretation may be, one way or another it affects man and the understanding of his essence, for philosophical knowledge is always, in the final account, knowledge of man. Whereas the natural sciences are directed at the study of the world surrounding man and of man as part of this world, and whereas art deals primarily with the world of man himself, philosophy deals with the understanding of man in the world and of the world in man. The philosophical doctrine of man is also a relatively autonomous part of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in general as well as knowledge which imbues and welds within a single entity all remaining parts and sections and their conceptual and methodological foundations.

The same could be said about T.I. Oizerman's book. Whatever part of the book we may consider, whether the first, which deals with the fundamental problems of dialectical materialism, or the historical-philosophical one, which is in the realm of the invariable and lengthy interest of the scientists, or else the third part, in which it is a question of the interrelationship between Marxist philosophy and the other contemporary philosophical trends, everywhere, one way or another, we find the related topic of man. However, in addition to these parts there also are separate parts which directly deal with this topic. In order to avoid the simple enumeration of such topics and the problems considered in the book (the familiar wisdom is that if you want to say something essential do not speak of everything), we shall focus our main attention on a single yet most important aspect of the problem: the humanistic nature of Marxist philosophy.

As a science, Marxism began precisely with the problem of man, as confirmed by Marx's "1844 *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts*." Ever since this work was published, at first partially in the Russian language, in 1927, and then, in 1932 in its entirety, in the original

language, these manuscripts have been invariably in the focal point of philosophical polemics. In his book, T.I. Oyzerman covers the main aspects of a more than 50-year-old debate. The scientist approaches the essence of the matter also as a historian of philosophy, by asking why is it that it is precisely these manuscripts that became the stumbling stone, as well as a theoretician, by analyzing various aspects of the problem itself of man and his essence.

A brief formulation of the essence of the debate, it consists of the various interpretations of Marxism as a humanistic doctrine. The author describes the development of the discussion itself, particularly on the part of Western researchers. Whereas in the 1930s the prevalent conviction was that the older Marx had abandoned the humanism of his earlier works, having replaced it with a class approach, a different viewpoint prevailed in the 1960s-1980s. Its supporters began to seek in the classical works of Marxism merely the confirmation of the ideas which had been expressed by the founders of this trend in the "1844 Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts." In both cases, as T.I. Oyzerman proves, a single foundation is retained: Marx's early works are presented as the humanistic essence of Marxism as a whole. In that case, the ideas proclaimed by Marx in his Paris Manuscripts, either color in the same hue Marxism as a whole or else deprive entirely his mature works of their coloring.

What is the real place of said manuscripts in the evolution of Marx's views, and why is it that it is precisely this work that draws such close attention, Oyzerman asks? On the level of a historical-philosophical study he provides a quite convincing answer. The "1844 Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts" are a central aspect in the shaping of the Marxist theory, a turning point of this process. They are "essentially distinguished from Marx's doctoral dissertation, for, essentially, they already present a Marxist viewpoint the author writes. However, such manuscripts are quite different also from "The Holy Family," for the viewpoint of Marxism is expressed in them as yet unsystematically and inconsistently and, in terms of terminology, totally inadequately (p 218). Prevalent in the manuscripts are the views of the outstanding representatives of classical philosophy, but at this point still within the framework of their own terminology.

Such a contradictoriness found in Marx's works triggers an inner mental stress and creates the aspiration to develop, to interpret, to complete his fundamental ideas. This is one of the reasons for the fact that it is precisely said work that has become a rich source for a variety of interpretations and found itself in the crucible of the discussions.

The main concept in Marx's manuscripts, as we know, is that of the alienation of labor, this active essence of man, separated from him and opposed to him as an alien force which suppresses and depresses him. The real humanism

which Marx also described as practical humanism precisely means the elimination of such alienation. Naturally, this approach presumed, as its extension, the study of the various stages of history, above all the period which was Marx's contemporary, from the viewpoint of the shaping, aggravation and conditions for surmounting the alienation of labor. That is precisely why the concept of alienation played a major methodological role in the establishment of mature Marxism. According to T.I. Oyzerman, it enabled Marx to determine the scientific approach to the fundamental characteristics of bourgeois society, such as private ownership, the rule of capital over labor, exploitation, and so on. After Marx and Engels developed the theory of socioeconomic systems, antagonistic production relations and social revolutions and formulated the political economy of capitalism, the concept of alienation could no longer play its former role in the system of their views. Nonetheless, did it retain a role? If it did, then what was it?

However, in his book the author does not provide a direct and satisfactory answer to this question. It is true that the debate continued after its publication. Issue No 9 of VOPROSY FILOSOFII for 1989 carried the article by the noted Yugoslav Philosopher M. Markovic "Marx on Alienation," an answer to which was provided in the next issue, No 10, by T.I. Oyzerman. This article makes it possible to determine the views held by the author of the book and to discover some additional features, added to the characterization of the discussion itself.

At this point, it is unnecessary to delve into the way Marx viewed the problem of alienation in his manuscripts. Such a study would be of historical-philosophical significance and, it seems to us, it has been provided in T.I. Oyzerman's works, including the book under consideration, quite completely and profoundly. What is of greater interest is a different formulation of the problem: the concepts of alienation, in its Marxist theoretical interpretation, play an important or perhaps, even a key role in the historical process or else, having fulfilled its structural role, so to say, after Marxism had reached its mature aspects, it could be removed painlessly. If it has not been removed, in any case, it has been used in other, more limited and specific meanings.

"A speculative enhancement of the concept of alienation, converting it into a universal principle for explanations and a key category of the philosophy of history," T.I. Oyzerman believes, "has long been triggering the reasonable objections of researchers who are quite distant from Marxism and who deal with the specific study of social phenomena" (VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 10, 1989, p 69). To discuss society in general and progress in general is the lot of positivism, while Marx opposed this approach. He repeatedly emphasized, T.I. Oyzerman sums it up, that "unlike his predecessors he always considered society as historically defined" (ibid., p 71).

It would be inappropriate to interpret such thoughts as T.I. Oyzerman's total rejection of the significance of philosophical abstractions, most general categories, etc.

In this book, as in other works by this major philosopher, we find a great deal of proof of the high value he ascribed to philosophical summations and concepts. Furthermore, he himself comprehensively used abstract-logical considerations. Here it is a question of positivistically interpreted abstractions and definitions obtained by singling out similarities while, at the same time, abstracting ourselves from specific features within which such similarities exist. Such type of abstractions reach a degree of summation so high that, in the final account, they lose any connection with reality and become essentially meaningless concepts. The aspiration to limit oneself to such "concepts" (such as what is "progress in general") had been biting mocked by Lenin himself, who believed that we find here the wish to "encompass all periods and encompass them in such a way as not to speak about any one of them in particular. Understandably, in order to achieve this, i.e., in order to encompass all periods without essentially touching on any specific one, there is only one way: the way of general places and statements which are 'both brilliant' and meaningless" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 1, p 148).

If the concept of alienation assumes such a general nature, leading to meaninglessness, any talk of its major scientific value is also worthless. However, this is the question which M. Markovic raises as well. "One cannot fail to acknowledge that concepts which encompass so much as to prevent us from determining what they exclude lose their informative value. Information implicitly contains a rejection: *omnis determinatio negatio est*. In order to have a meaning, a concept must introduce important distinctions" (VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 9, 1989, p 43). In other words, in order for a universal concept to have any kind of meaning, it must carry within itself its own rejection. It is obvious that this effort to surmount the meaninglessness of a universal concept is undertaken in a purely Hegelian fashion, as a determination of its inner limitation and as a negation included within it.

The usefulness of general concepts is unquestionable, for they concentrate within themselves a number of meanings. M. Markovic believes. "Brevity requires a metaphor in literature and high abstraction in philosophy. Style, however, is by no means the only consideration in favor of abstractions. A much more important argument is the preservation of the Gestalt, the structure of the entity" (ibid., p 44).

Therefore, the lines have been drawn. On the one side we have T.I. Oyzerman's stand. According to it, one cannot speak of alienation in general as a universal characteristic of the historical development of man. It is necessary to pay attention to the study of specific-historical systems within which various types of relations of alienation may exist. On the other, we have the position held by Markovic, according to which the concept of alienation makes it possible to provide a philosophical interpretation of the historical process and of social life as a whole, for it is a universal category. The main advantage

of this concept, according to the Yugoslav philosopher, is that "it enables us to encompass all the negative aspects of the human condition (ibid., p 42), which is of major practical significance, for it leads the liberation movement to radical changes in all areas of social life.

Is it possible to surmount with the help of so-called universality the looseness of the concept of alienation? It seems to us that in this respect the criticism provided by T.I. Oyzerman is entirely accurate, for if alienation is interpreted as the clash among the possibilities of the human individual and their restricted and inadequate implementation (M. Markovic) this means converting this category into an amorphous concept which could encompass any condition of man both past and future. There has never been and is hardly likely to occur a total coincidence between the possibilities of man and the results of their implementation. From a category of critical radicalism it turns into a category of radical helplessness, for at that point alienation becomes unavoidable in principle.

Is it possible, in general, to abandon this concept as a key category in the philosophy of history and simply to undertake the study of a given socioeconomic system? Along with this, one could also abandon the philosophy of history as a whole, limiting ourselves to the presentation of history as the simple sum of different alternating social systems. There is a view according to which, in general, there is no Marxist philosophical-historical concept but there is a dialectical method applied to the study of a given society. To begin with, however, why not apply this method to the historical process as a whole for the sake of developing a scientific theory of it? Second, how to explain, in the opposite case, the overall pattern of history, the acknowledgment of which is the foundation of Marxism, something which can hardly be denied. Naturally, a general historical concept does not free us from the separate study of each social system and, consequently, it cannot be used as a universal skeleton key, something against which Marx cautioned us (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 19, p 121). Without a general concept, however, it is simply impossible to penetrate into the essence of each system, not to mention the possibility to understand it in its development.

If we reject the philosophy of history, the concept of alienation loses its universal nature. It is localized and indicates only the various forms of manifestation of the more essential processes of specific historical reality.

It seems to us that the concept of alienation indicates not one of the manifestations of some historical forms of division of labor, ownership and class differentiation within society (see T.I. Oyzerman, op. cit., p 236) but expresses, summed up, the historical condition of labor itself as the active essence of man. It is a question of a universal category but not one which could encompass all negative phenomena and processes of human life, both past and future, but one which expresses an entirely defined nature of the historical process in its broad (i.e.,

applicable to more than one system) yet not unlimited boundaries. The specific study of the laws of the capitalist system, contained within classical Marxism, cannot replace the philosophical interpretation of the historical development of man and mankind as a whole. Yet, it is precisely in the process of such an interpretation that the concept of the alienation of labor plays a key role.

What prevented T.I. Oyzerman from acknowledging the tremendous role of this concept within the concept of mature Marxism? The book provides a clear answer and the arguments brought forth are serious. Above all, when it becomes a question of alienation, the hidden implication is that at one point it was some part of us that was alienated. "Such a way of presentation," the author explains, "could be described as essentialist: it presumes the existence of a certain initial essence of man which becomes deformed as a result of specific historical circumstances and which is subsequently restored thanks to their radical transformation. Once again man regains his essence which had been alienated; the surmounting of alienation means the restoration of human authenticity. Subsequently, naturally, Marx abandoned such speculative phraseology, which was incompatible with the study of the way man transforms nature, thus changing both himself and his own nature" (pp 219-220).

Naturally, in transforming the world around him, man transforms himself, including his own essence which, in the initial and final stages of a specific historical period, are by no means one and the same. Furthermore, if it is a question of the process of determining what is human in man, it is as yet by no means completed. Man is only creating himself as such and is only formulating his essence. As yet labor has not become the first basic need for all people. It was not in vain that during the period of his mature creativity Marx noted that so far man is at the stage of his prehistory. If such is the case, one cannot alienate that which is not as yet part of oneself, or something that, in general, does not as yet exist.

In that case, could one speak of alienation? One could and even one must, for this concept expresses the contradictoriness of the contemporary state of history, although relegated to the past. With its help we also express the fact that the nature of man already exists and that even the need for it is realized and the fact that this essence of man does not as yet belong to him and, furthermore, acts outside of him as an imposed, as a dominating force, suppressing him. In the concept of mature Marxism it is a question of restoring to man not something which, at one point, was lost and that which he historically created but the separation from which is realized only now, for it has really not been surmounted as yet. It is precisely on the basis of such a view alone that there can be a philosophical reinterpretation of the entire historical process. What takes place is not only the **humanizing of man** through that which becomes his essence and which precisely makes man what he is, i.e., labor, but also the **humanizing of labor** by surmounting

its alienated nature. As in any dialectical process, these two aspects are interrelated.

Marxism proceeds from the fact that the essence of man is social. It is the sum total of social relations, the nucleus of which is an active-transforming attitude toward nature, practical experience and labor. It was precisely labor that made man what he is. Thanks to practical and labor activity, man separates himself from nature, assuming a certain autonomy toward it and increasingly putting nature at the service of his own development. Labor has provided man with the ability to "transform all other beings, as well as the subjects of external nature, into means of taming his own nature. Such is the nature of **public** production, which is impossible as an activity of a separately considered, an isolated individual; such is labor, a specific human activity defined by its objective. Its immediate target is the production of an item and its end, and usually unrealized by individuals objective, purpose and vocation is the creation of man himself as a member of society" (p 68). The process of man's domination of nature and its transformation for his own purposes is also a process of the self-reorganization of man, it is his own history.

Depending on the participation of natural forces, labor, as a purposeful activity of man, assumes a number of historical shapes. Based on the studies made by Soviet philosophers, let us try briefly to describe these forms. The most general among them usually include today the animal or instinctive form of activities, production work and, finally, the mature development of its form, i.e., labor as creativity, as a need.

At the stage of animal-level activities, when the process of the separation of man from nature is, essentially, in its embryonic condition, use is made primarily of the finished objects of nature and the natural (i.e., not man-made) labor tools and means of activity. The stone and the stick as weapons for hunting and fishing are little different from the stones and sticks lying on the ground. The activities themselves are aimed less at the **transformation** of natural objects than their **acquisition**. The search and extraction, for the sake of physical existence and the sake of consumption dominate over the actively constructive nature of human activities. However, the very fact of the appearance of instruments of activity already provides the opportunity for converting from the **extraction** of means of survival to their **production**. The animal-like activity historically coincides with the age of gathering stuff, hunting and fishing. The appearance of the production form of activity marked the beginning of a period in the development of mankind which, after undergoing a number of stages, is essentially continuing to this day.

Production means, above all, the creation of objects which are either not encountered in nature in a ready state or else are encountered in insufficient amounts. Whereas the quantitative lack of means of survival was

the main factor at the start of the conversion to production activities, along with the appearance and development of such activities the importance of the quality factor increased: man began to use objects radically different from those created by nature. This means that human needs are no longer purely natural. They become dependent on production results and are formed as a result of the production process.

A characteristic feature of production activities is the ever broadening use of the transformed forces of nature into production means. Equipment and technology appear, in the course of the improvement of which the role of man in the straight production process changes radically. From integral subjects of activities, most people become appendages to technology, "partial" workers and "cogs" of the technology. By virtue of this fact, to the overwhelming mass of people labor remains a means of survival. Furthermore, to them labor has become a hated drudge, a monotonous trudging, which does not require any ability on the part of the worker to think, to solve problems and display creativity. This, particularly, is the essence of alienation. In the course of his production activities, man acts contradictorily: on the one hand, as a motive force, as the subject of such activities and as its final objective; on the other, as one of its means, as a factor subordinate to the laws of its functioning, an appendix to the technologically materialized forces of nature. The development of production forces themselves takes place under the pressure of the need to replace, to one extent or another, this live agent, to take him out of the framework of the direct production process, for by virtue of his biological nature, he frequently obstructs further production progress. It is only of late, as a result of the current scientific and technical revolution that, finally, mankind has developed the possibility of automating nature as a whole, placed at the service of man, and surmounting the need for the existence of the "partial" worker. This creates prerequisites for a conversion to a new, mature and higher form of labor, labor as a prime vital need, not exclusively thanks to a proper habit but as a means of the shaping, development and manifestation of the creative capabilities of the human personality. This means nothing other than eliminating the alienation of man from his active essence.

In connection with the discussions which have taken place in the past, it would make sense to point out, albeit briefly, that at all stages in history labor has acted in a state of dialectical (i.e., without differences) unity and interconnection with the natural (biological) and social (production) principles, the knowledge of which is necessary in order to understand the social nature of man itself. It is from this viewpoint that both these principles, as T.I. Ozyerman claims in his book, are indeed essential (see p 66).

The question of surmounting labor alienation makes it necessary also to consider a somewhat different classification of history into periods. This makes history no

longer a succession of alternating different socio-economic systems but also of changing historical types of social relations. Whereas the bourgeois socioeconomic system was of the same type as the systems which preceded it, based on the exploitation of man by man, and if for the same reason it sufficed for bourgeois society merely to adapt many of the previously existing forms of social relations to the conditions of its functioning, the new social system faces infinitely more complex problems. It must radically reorganize the social forms of life which have appeared not only under capitalism but also before it. It can transform them only by mastering them, for one can master only that which has already been created. The new historical type of social relations is the legitimate heir to anything accomplished by numerous preceding human generations. With its appearance, socialism emphasized the dividing line in human history comparable only to the one which separated primitive society from civilization. Indeed, the bourgeois social system marks the end of the prehistory of mankind.

If such is the case, the transition to the new society is a more complex and more lengthy process than we may think.

The currently published social science studies essentially concentrate on the various aspects of the formative division of history. Far less attention is being paid to the study of the historical types of social development. Actually, this problem is merely mentioned in some works (such as V.A. Vazyulin's "*Logika Istarii*" [The Logic of History], Moscow, Moscow University Press, 1988). However, the need for a positive solution of many problems of renovating socialism requires with increasing urgency a deeper understanding of the periodization of the historical process. Unquestionably, this would constitute a serious scientific counterweight to the various types of subjectivistic and superficial concepts of socialist development, including the fact that under the conditions of existing socialism all forms of alienation have already been definitively eliminated. "I do not think," T.I. Ozyerman points out, "that we have already entirely eliminated this error, although ever since the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum Soviet social scientists have started to study alienation under the conditions of our socialist society" (VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 10, 1989, p 67).

The interpretation of the historical process in its entirety is nothing other than the revival of the philosophy of history. Naturally, this makes no sense when the actual social development is made to fit predetermined abstract-logical structures. It is a question of the opposite: of understanding the historical vector of the development of mankind, based on science and the scrupulous study and summation of the trends of this development.

History is not a fatal process. It lives through the actions of man and mankind, giving each new generation the spiritual and material strength and putting in its hands and hearts that which its predecessors have created. Man

who lives only for the present is a twig carried by the tempestuous stream of daily life. He cannot look at life from the viewpoint of a historical perspective and understand the trend of the development of society and his place and active role in this development. Should we therefore be amazed that at such turning points of social life as ours the interest in the "eternal problems of life" drastically increases?!

A process of the formation of man is under way. Actually, all history is nothing other than the formation of man by himself and the creation of mankind within itself, which is a complex process, by no means straight, but difficult and, at times, painful. However, it is also irreversible, noted by heights of accomplishments, and increasingly illumined by a maturing human mind. The philosophical interpretation of this process is the most important factor in the building of what is human in man.

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Short Book Review

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[Text] "*Puls Reform: Yuristy i Politologi Razmyshlyayut*" [The Pulse of Reform: Jurists and Political Scientists Consider]. Progress, Moscow, 1989, 378 pp. Reviewed by G. Kamenskaya, candidate of historical sciences.

The collection of articles "*Nothing Else is Allowed*" was published only a short time ago (summer of 1988). This was the first book in the series "Perestroyka: Glasnost, Democracy, Socialism." By now the readers already have the possibility to read new books in the same series: "*Achievement: Sociology. Social Policy. Economic Reform*," "*In a Human Dimension*," "*The Pulse of the Reform: Jurists and Political Experts Consider*," "*Socialism: Between the Past and the Future*," and "*Interpreting the Cult of Stalin*."

Most of this book's authors are members of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law. Comparing this collection with "*Nothing Else is Allowed*," it is noteworthy that it includes more academic and more strictly selected topics and that the range of discussed problems is narrower. However, the sign of the times and the absolute merits of this new work are found elsewhere: in the overall aspiration on the part of the authors of this collection to engage in a constructive discussion of the principles of the political reform and their readiness to engage in joint research and a proper comparison among different viewpoints. Naturally, this is not to say that sharp discussions, the polarization of opinions and the clash of views are a thing of the past. On the contrary, social thinking is only now beginning to master the area on the basis of which it becomes possible to discuss, freely and honestly, the basic problems of the social sciences. At the same time,

the level of glasnost, as it steadily rises (regretfully, less through the efforts of research scientists than journalists) has already reached a height which enables the specialists in the field of political theory and law to engage in a professional dialogue, free from blinkers, on a topic of prime scientific and sociopolitical interest: the principles governing the law-governed socialist state and the need for and possibility of laying such principles at the foundation of the reform of our political system and to sum up the acquired positive and negative experience of perestroyka.

As in any other discussion on the paths of the political reform, the authors of this collection inevitably undertake the study of the structures, views and traditions which we have inherited from previous times. One way or another, such topics are discussed by all authors in this collection. Probably the most controversial reaction is triggered by the article by B.P. Kurashvili. The evolution of our social system he suggests will draw the attention of historians and political experts to the difference between the Stalinist variant of the administrative-command system and the variant which was established in the past few years. The essence of this difference, sometimes underestimated, is found in the changes in the allocation of the real power prerogatives within the political system. The administrative apparatus, the party one above all, as well as the state or, more accurately, the departmental apparatus which, under Stalin, was totally subordinated to the political leadership, which was based on the repressive organs, and became an independent and leading power in the decision-making process. Is it justified, in terms of the post-Stalinist regime, to use, as the author does, the concept of "authoritarian-bureaucratic socialism?" Most likely yes, if we proceed from the fact that this definition reflects the type of characteristics of the political mechanism, such as the type of symbiosis which developed within the party-departmental structures and the significant increase in their autonomy, as well as the weakening of ideological control, which constituted a withdrawal from the practices of the period of totalitarianism. Nonetheless, by no means uncontroversial is the authors' overall conclusion to the effect that "as an ideology, a policy and system of management during an exceptional period of development...Stalinism was legitimate, necessary and inevitable," for it was dictated by the necessity to surmount the mixed economic system of the country and to be prepared to repel the external threat (p 58). G.Kh. Shakhnazarov counters this concept with an assessment of the cult of personality as the usurping of power, as a socio-political phenomenon which caused the country incalculable harm, conservative in spirit and accompanied by stagnation and, occasionally, regression (see p 82).

In my view, it is hardly possible to argue that it is preferable to have a democratic path of development of the country without violations of legality and abuses of power. Nonetheless, we cannot fail to ask ourselves the question of whether it was possible to cover the period of industrialization, which was exceptionally compressed

in terms of historical dimensions, and which led to the clash between the two political cultures which existed in Russia: the "patriarchal" and the "urban," without the establishment of a right-wing or left-wing authoritarian system (naturally, while avoiding the extremes of totalitarianism). Are we not dealing in this case with a pattern common to all countries which belong, conventionally speaking, to the second level of capitalist development, and which entered the path of modernization by the turn of the 20th century? So far, no sufficiently convincing answers to such questions is found, for philosophers, historians and political experts have by no means completed their analysis of the correlation between the general (general historical, doctrinal) reasons and factors of a specific historical nature which led to the appearance of the type of socialism familiar to our country's history.

The theory of the law-governed state is part, above all, of the universal human values developed by the theory and practical experience of political democracy, currently actively mastered and developed by our social sciences. This topic is addressed by V.N. Kudryavtsev, Ye.A. Lukashcheva, V.S. Nersesyants, and A.M. Yakovlev. "The Rule of Law" is a definition which is repeatedly mentioned in this collection. Differences in formulations do not prevent us from seeing the unity among the authors in the main factor: in understanding the nature of the law-governed state, which presumes the supremacy of the law and expresses the legal principles of society (see p 18), the establishment of the "legal form and legal nature of interrelationships (reciprocal rights and obligations) between the public powers and their subordinate subjects of the law" (p 38); and the creation of conditions which ensure the implementation of the rights and freedoms of the citizens. The most important guarantee of democracy in political life is the creation of mechanisms of competitiveness, which put in the hands of society effective means of control over the activities of the power authorities and prevent the monopolizing of power by any given individual, authority or social stratum (see p 39). A return to general democratic forms, tried through the state-political practices of many countries, is viewed by the authors as the assertion of the principle of the separation of powers and the need to ensure the true independence of the judiciary and the restoration of the rights of representative institutions and the shaping of a civilian society which alone could guarantee the stability of democracy. The authors justifiably emphasize yet another aspect of the strength and consistency of democratic changes: laying the economic foundations of a socialist law-governed state, which should consist of "economically independent and organizationally and legally equal commodity producers," whose activities are regulated by economic and not administrative-command methods (p 216).

We must point out that not all the authors in this collection see as the main trend of the political reform the establishment of a law-governed state. According to M.A. Krasov, it is necessary to develop and implement the concept of "semi-state," following the trend of combining legislative with executive powers and ensuring the constant and

decisive participation of the "majority of people... in the administration of governmental and social affairs..." (p 211). Unwittingly, in this connection the following question arises: Is it realistic to develop the self-management of society without having built a law-governed state? Of all the ideas which have been tried in our history, the idea of a law-governed state should be ranked among the first.

In analyzing progress on the path of reform, N.F. Sharafetdinov and V.L. Entin point out how difficult it is to surmount the opposition to the new and how difficult is the process of demarcating among the functions of party, soviet and economic authorities, and the problems encountered by the legislative authorities in the course of the conversion to their real and not merely proclaimed supremacy. Perestroika in the political area is developing by passing laws which are increasingly consistent with the concept of a law-governed state but are passed, sometimes, on the basis of not always justified compromises, in the course of a constant struggle with existing structures and management standards.

The theoretical as well as practical primacy of international law is a real step toward the acceptance of universal human standards developed through the practices of inter-governmental relations. V.S. Vereshchetin and R.A. Myullerson convincingly prove the profound internal connection existing between the rule of law within a country and the acceptance and observance of the standards of international law. The strengthening of democracy and the free development of a civil society, and the creation of conditions for the timely identification, through the political area, of economic, social and other contradictions are mandatory prerequisites for ensuring, on a long-term basis, national security and the country's stability, as V.A. Rubanov, A.Ye. Savinkin and M.A. Smagin justifiably conclude.

The further development of the theory of the law-governed state makes absolutely necessary the decisive updating of political science as a discipline which studies, on the different levels of theoretical analysis, the political system as a whole as well as the political institutions, standards, values and culture, the entire range of topics related to the study of politics. Unfortunately, we must point out that in our country political science is as yet only being developed as a separate scientific discipline, determining its aspect under the complex circumstances of the crisis experienced by the social sciences.

A great deal remains to be done on the way to establishing a law-governed state in our country. Regretfully, this book virtually ignores the discussion of the type of sequence of steps that is necessary in attaining this objective. Let us hope that this will be answered quite soon in subsequent works by Soviet political experts and jurists.

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Chronicle

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May 90 (signed to press 15 May 90) p 128

[Text] A meeting between journal associates and authors, on the one hand, and readers, on the other, was held on 6 May in one of the pavilions of the VDNKh. The meeting lasted 3 and a half hours. Dozens of questions and rejoinders, suggestions and wishes were heard; debates were improvised on the forthcoming party congress and on the situation within the country and the CPSU. The editors are very grateful to the authors of this journal who participated in the debates: Vladimir Georgiyevich Kostakov, director of the USSR Gosplan Scientific Research Economics Institute; Yuriy Ivanovich Koryakin, doctor of historical sciences; Vladlen Terentyevich Loginov, doctor of historical sciences; and Vladimir Arsenyevich Rubanov, senior MVD official.

Editors and members of the V.I. Lenin Central Museum participated in the rayon's Day of the Propagandist, which was held in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast, timed for Lenin's anniversary. A wide range of problems were discussed related to the pre-congress debate taking place within the party. Particular attention was paid to the modern reinterpretation of the Leninist legacy and the ideas contained in V.I. Lenin's final works and letters and their refraction in the practices of perestroika, as well as ways of communist consolidation on the basis of the CPSU Central Committee Platform.

KOMMUNIST associates visited the labor collective of the Altair Scientific-Production Association. Views were exchanged on problems of the democratization of society and the party, the implementation of the economic reform and the enhancement of the efficiency of the materials published in the journal.

The editors were visited by Milija Komatina, editor-in-chief and responsible editor of *SOCIALISM*, the journal of the Yugoslav League of Communists. In the course of the discussion, the need was emphasized to enhance the level of scientific knowledge of contemporary reality, active participation of party publications in the development of the theoretical and political aspects of the socialist future, and the creative study and summation of the experience of social thinking of all left-wing forces in our two countries and in the rest of the world. Also discussed were problems of the development, intensification and utilization of new forms of

cooperation among fraternal journals and broadening their relations with the printed organs of other parties.

The editors were visited by personnel of the Bulgarian weekly published by the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, which is the opposition trade union organization. The guests were interested in the attitude of *KOMMUNIST* toward political and socioeconomic processes occurring in the USSR and the new phenomena in the life of Soviet society. Also discussed were problems related to the latest events in the Eastern European countries and the future of world socialism.

The problems of interethnic relations within the Soviet Union, the history of their development and the reasons for their current worsening in several parts of the country and the possibilities of settling the conflicts which broke out were topics discussed in the premises of the Soviet Peace Committee, with personnel of the journal and delegations of the Christian Peace Service (FRG), the World Peace Council and the National Peace Committee and the Green Party of Switzerland.

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